DOE A v. Special Sch. Dist. of St. Louis County

• Decision Date: 02 July 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85-2801C(1).,85-2801C(1).
• Citation: 637 F. Supp. 1138
• Parties: Jane DOE "A", etc., et al., Plaintiffs, v. The SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT OF ST. LOUIS COUNTY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

637 F. Supp. 1138

Jane DOE "A", etc., et al., Plaintiffs, v. The SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT OF ST. LOUIS COUNTY, et al., Defendants.

No. 85-2801C(1).

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, E.D.

July 2, 1986.

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Ramsey & Taylor, Ross Harry Briggs, St. Louis, Mo., for plaintiffs.

Timothy K. Kellett, St. Louis, Mo., for Sp. Sch. Dist.

Thomas J. Casey, Russell F. Watters, Brown, James & Rabbitt, St. Louis, Mo., for defendant Cerny.

MEMORANDUM

NANGLE, Chief Judge.

This matter is before the Court on separate motions to dismiss filed by the defendants Special School District of St. Louis County (SSD); David Cerny, a former bus driver for SSD; and 12 individual administrators of SSD.

Plaintiffs, nine handicapped children enrolled in the defendant Special School District and their parents, allege that the defendants deprived them of their constitutional rights either by beating and sexually abusing the children or by failing to investigate and to act upon complaints of abuse.

Plaintiffs' first amended complaint contains nine counts. The first count alleges a § 1983 claim against the Board of Education and individual administrators of SSD for failing to provide handicapped students a safe and humane environment, including protection from sexual assaults. In Count II, plaintiffs allege that SSD maintained a de facto policy of failing to investigate complaints of abuse, actively inhibiting investigation of complaints and failing to train and monitor employees. In Count III, the minor plaintiffs allege that the acts of Cerny resulted from a de facto policy of defendant SSD in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and § 1983. Similarly, in Count IV the minor plaintiffs allege that the acts of Cerny resulted from a de facto policy of defendant SSD and violated plaintiffs' rights under the Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments and § 1983. Count V alleges that SSD allowed defendant Cerny to restrain the minor plaintiffs without probable cause in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments and § 1983. Count VI purports to state common law claims for assault, battery, and false imprisonment against defendants Cerny and SSD. In Count VII, the minor plaintiffs sue SSD, its Board, and its administrators for their negligent failure to supervise employees and to investigate complaints of abuse. In Count VIII, the plaintiff parents allege that the District, Board, and administrators deprived them of their rights to custody, care, and companionship in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and § 1983. In Count IX, the parents allege tortious interference with their custody rights.

In passing on a motion to dismiss, a court is required to view the facts alleged in the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). A motion to dismiss will not be granted merely because the complaint does not state every element necessary for recovery with precision. 5 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216 at 120 (1969). A complaint is sufficient if it "contains allegations from which an inference fairly may be drawn that evidence on these material points will be introduced at trial." Id. at 122-23. A complaint should not be dismissed unless it "appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46, 78 S.Ct. at 101-102.

The complaint alleges the following facts: Defendant David Cerny was employed by SSD as a school bus driver. Between September, 1983 and February, 1985, defendant Cerny repeatedly molested the minor plaintiffs while they were passengers on his bus. These incidents occurred while the bus was stopped at a transfer point, a location at which the children would make connections between buses on their way to and from school. These incidents included the fondling, stroking, and pinching of the minor plaintiffs' genitalia and buttocks, the masturbation of defendant Cerny in the presence of the minor plaintiffs, the striking of the minor plaintiffs, and the confinement of the students in the school bus for one or more hours after the conclusion of the school day and completion of the bus route. In addition, Cerny frequently started and stopped the school bus so quickly that the students were thrown about the bus. Cerny also made obscene gestures and used profane language in the presence of the children. Due to their handicaps, the minor plaintiffs were incapable of resisting or protecting themselves from the assaultive and abusive behavior of Cerny. Despite complaints from parents, teachers and other employees of SSD, defendants SSD, its Board, and its administrators failed to investigate the actions of Cerny. Indeed, defendant SSD concealed the actions of Cerny by discouraging any investigation of complaints. In addition, the defendants failed to develop a policy to provide training for the investigation of complaints and to screen employees for their propensity to abuse children. Also, the defendants failed to report Cerny's conduct to law enforcement and child protective agencies despite their statutory obligation to do so. As a result of these acts, the plaintiff children suffered serious physical, psychological, and emotional damage, requiring them to undergo medical and psychological treatment. The plaintiff parents have suffered mental anguish and lost the companionship of their children. The minor plaintiffs seek $24,000,000.00 in actual damages and $24,000,000.00 in punitive damages on each count; the parents seek $20,000,000.00 in actual damages and $40,000,000.00 in punitive damages on each count.

Collectively, the defendants present five arguments in support of their motions to dismiss: 1) the plaintiffs failed to allege conduct arising under color of state law; 2) the student plaintiffs failed to allege actions which rise to the level of constitutional violations; 3) the parent plaintiffs failed to allege actions which rise to the level of constitutional violations; 4) the Board and administrators of SSD are protected by the doctrine of official immunity; and 5) SSD is protected by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. As set out below, defendants' motions to dismiss are granted in part and denied in part.

I. UNDER COLOR OF STATE LAW

As defendant Cerny and the individual SSD defendants assert, Cerny's actions were taken as a private citizen and not under color of any state law authorizing him to operate a school bus. As plaintiffs argue, the defendants' actions occurred under color of Mo.Rev.Stat. § 162.900 (Vernon Supp.1986), which delegates authority to the Board of Education of each Special School District to provide free transportation to its students. This Court finds that defendants' actions were taken under color of state law.

To state a claim under § 1983, an individual must allege facts constituting a deprivation of a constitutional right under color of state law. An official's actions are not removed from under color of state law merely because the official acted beyond the scope of the authority granted by state law. As the Supreme Court held in United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 1043, 85 L.Ed. 1368 (1941), misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken "under color of" state law. Accord Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961); Phaby v. KSD-KSD-TV, Inc., 476 F.Supp. 1051, 1053 (E.D.Mo.1979) (if the sheriff "used the power and prestige vested in him due to his office, even though acting outside the scope of his authority as granted by law, his actions would sufficiently constitute state action.").

Here, the district was obligated by statute to provide free transportation to handicapped students enrolled in this district. That statute also vested the Board of Education of the district with the authority to promulgate rules and regulations necessary to provide transportation. Under this mandate, SSD employed defendant Cerny to drive a school bus. This arrangement provided Cerny with custody of the children and opportunities to engage in the alleged conduct. Thus, defendant Cerny acted under color of state law.

II. STUDENT PLAINTIFFS' FEDERAL CAUSE OF ACTION

Plaintiffs assert § 1983 claims based upon violations of their Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. As defendants argue, the alleged actions sound in tort and do not rise to the ignomy of constitutional violations. In response, plaintiffs assert that the alleged conduct "shocks the conscience" and, therefore, violates the minor plaintiffs' rights to substantive due process. This Court concludes that plaintiffs' allegations state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Initially, the Court notes that in their motion in opposition to defendants' motions to dismiss the plaintiffs defend only their substantive due process claims. Thus, to the extent plaintiffs rely upon the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments, their claims are dismissed. This Court construes plaintiffs' remaining claims as claims arising out of violations of substantive due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.¹

A public official is liable under § 1983 only if the official deprives an individual of a constitutional right. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2693, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979). Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of duties of care arising out of tort law. Remedies for these injuries must be sought in state court under traditional tort law principles. 443 U.S. at 146, 99 S.Ct. at 2695; Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 700, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 1160, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976). Thus, the crucial issue is whether plaintiffs allege...