Doe v. State

• Decision Date: 22 May 2020
• Docket Number: No. 19-1402,19-1402
• Citation: 943 N.W.2d 608
• Parties: Jane DOE, Plaintiff, v. STATE of Iowa, Defendant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

943 N.W.2d 608

Jane DOE, Plaintiff,

v.STATE of Iowa, Defendant.

No. 19-1402

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Filed May 22, 2020

Andrew Duffelmeyer (until withdrawal) and Robert J. Poggenklass (until withdrawal), and Alexander Vincent Kornya of Iowa Legal Aid, Des Moines, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney General, and John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, for appellee.

McDONALD, Justice.

In 2011, Jane Doe was charged with one count of unauthorized use of a credit card. The charge was dismissed. In 2019, having satisfied all of her financial obligations in the dismissed case, Doe filed an application to expunge the criminal record pursuant to Iowa Code section 901C.2 (2019). The district court denied Doe’s application on the ground Doe had had court-ordered financial obligations remaining in other cases and thus had not met the requisite condition set forth in section 901C.2(1)(a )(2). The question presented in this appeal is whether the district court erred in denying Doe’s application for expungement on the ground Doe had court-ordered financial obligations in other cases. This is a question of statutory interpretation, and our review is for the correction of errors at law. See State v. Doe , 903 N.W.2d 347, 350 (Iowa 2017).

Before addressing the merits, we first address a jurisdictional issue. The State contends this court lacks jurisdiction over the case because an order denying an application for expungement is not appealable as a matter of right. See Iowa Code § 814.6(1). Doe responds that the district court acted illegally in denying her application and that this court may choose to treat her notice of appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.107(1)(a ) ("Any party claiming ... an associate district court judge ... acted illegally may commence an original certiorari action in the supreme court by filing a petition for writ of certiorari as provided in these rules."); State v. Propps , 897 N.W.2d 91, 97 (Iowa 2017) ("Additionally, if a case is initiated by a notice of appeal, but another form of review is proper, we may choose to proceed as though the proper form of review was requested by the defendant rather than dismiss the action."). We agree with Doe’s response, and we choose to treat Doe’s notice of appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari.

Turning to the merits of the case, in questions of statutory interpretation, "[w]e do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means." Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation , 12 Harv. L. Rev. 417, 419 (1899). This is necessarily a textual inquiry as only the text of a piece of legislation is enacted into law. Any interpretive inquiry thus begins with the language of the statute at issue. See Doe , 903 N.W.2d at 350. Using traditional interpretive tools, we seek to determine the ordinary and fair meaning of the statutory language at issue. See State v. Davis , 922 N.W.2d 326, 330 (Iowa 2019) ("We give words their ordinary meaning absent legislative definition."); In re Marshall , 805 N.W.2d 145, 158 (Iowa 2011) ("We should give the language of the statute its fair meaning, but should not extend its reach beyond its express terms."); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 33 (2012) [hereinafter Scalia & Garner, Reading Law ] (defining "fair reading method" as "determining the application of a governing text to given facts on the basis of how a reasonable reader, fully competent in the language, would have understood the text at the time it was issued"). In determining the ordinary and fair meaning of the statutory language at issue, we take into consideration the language’s relationship to other provisions of the same statute and other provisions of related statutes. See Iowa Code § 4.1(38) ("Words and phrases shall be construed according to the context and the approved usage of the language ...."); Doe , 903 N.W.2d at 351 (stating we consider the "relevant language, read in the context of the entire statute"). If the "text of a statute is plain and its meaning clear, we will not search for a meaning beyond the express terms of the statute or resort to rules of construction." In re Estate of Voss , 553 N.W.2d 878, 880 (Iowa 1996) ; see State v. Richardson , 890 N.W.2d 609, 616 (Iowa 2017) ("If the language is unambiguous, our inquiry stops there."). If the language of the statute is ambiguous or vague, we "may resort to other tools of statutory interpretation." Doe , 903 N.W.2d at 351.

We begin our inquiry in this case with the language of the statute as a whole. See State v. Pettijohn , 899 N.W.2d 1, 16 (Iowa 2017) ("Interpreting a statute requires us to assess it in its entirety to ensure our interpretation is harmonious with the statute as a whole rather than assessing isolated words or phrases."); In re Estate of Melby , 841 N.W.2d 867, 879 (Iowa 2014) ("When construing statutes, we assess not just isolated words and phrases, but statutes in their entirety ...."); Scalia & Garner, Reading Law at 167 ("Perhaps no interpretive fault is more common than the failure to follow the whole-text canon, which calls on the judicial interpreter to consider the entire text, in view of its structure and of the physical and logical relation of its many parts.").

The statute requires the district court to expunge the record of a criminal case upon the defendant establishing five conditions have been satisfied. The statute provides,

1. a. Except as provided in paragraph "b ", upon application of a defendant ... in a criminal case ... the court shall enter an order expunging the record of such criminal case if the court finds that the defendant has established that all of the following have occurred, as applicable:

(1) The criminal case contains one or more criminal charges in which an acquittal was entered for all criminal charges, or in which all criminal charges were otherwise dismissed.

(2) All court costs, fees, and other financial obligations ordered by the court or assessed by the clerk of the district court have been paid.

(3) A minimum of one hundred eighty days have passed since entry of the judgment of acquittal or of the order dismissing the case relating to all criminal charges, unless the court finds good cause to waive this requirement for reasons including but not limited to the fact that the defendant was the victim of identity theft or mistaken identity.

(4) The case was not dismissed due to the defendant being found not guilty by reason of insanity.

(5) The defendant was not found incompetent to stand trial in the case.

b. The court shall not enter an order expunging the record of a criminal case under paragraph "a " unless all the parties in the case have had time to object on the grounds that one or more of the relevant conditions in paragraph "a " have not been established.

Iowa Code § 901C.2.

When the statute is considered as a whole, it is apparent the statute is concerned with only the singular case for which expungement is sought. The application for expungement must be filed in "a criminal case"—singular. Id. § 901C.2(1)(a ). The conditions prerequisite to expungement repeatedly refer to "the criminal case" or "the case." Id. § 901C.2(1)(a )(1), (3), (4), (5), .2(1)(b ). The statute’s use of the definite article "the" particularizes "the criminal case" and "the case." See Nielsen v. Preap , 586 U.S. ––––, ––––, 139 S. Ct. 954, 965, 203 L.Ed.2d 333 (2019) (stating "grammar and usage establish that ‘the’ is ‘a function word ... indicat[ing] that a following noun or noun equivalent is definite or has been previously specified by context.’ " (alteration in original) (quoting Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1294 (11th ed. 2005))); Am. Bus. Ass'n v. Slater , 231 F.3d 1, 4–5 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ("[I]t is a rule of law well established that the definite article ‘the’ particularizes the subject which it precedes. It is a word of limitation as opposed to the indefinite or generalizing force of ‘a’ or ‘an.’ " (quoting Brooks v. Zabka , 168 Colo. 265, 450 P.2d 653, 655 (1969) (en banc))); State v. Hohenwald , 815 N.W.2d 823, 830 (Minn. 2012) ("The definite article ‘the’ is a word of limitation that indicates a reference to a specific object."). "The criminal case" and "the case" thus must refer to a particular antecedent. Here, the antecedent is the singular "criminal case" in which the application for expungement was filed and for which expungement was sought. See Iowa Code § 901C.2(1)(a ).

The text of the subsection at issue also relates only to the record of the singular criminal case in which the application for expungement was filed and for which expungement was sought. The text provides the defendant must establish as a prerequisite to expungement that "[a]ll court costs, fees, and other financial obligations ordered by the court or assessed by the clerk of the district court have been paid." Id. § 901C.2(1)(a )(2). The State argues this provision is not limited to the singular case sought to be expunged because the provision does not specifically reference "the case" or the "criminal case." However, the State ignores other limiting language in the provision. Section 901C.2(1)(a )(2) uses the definite article "the" in limiting the financial obligations at issue to those "ordered by the court or assessed by the clerk of the district court." Id. Use of the definite article "the" means "the court" and "the clerk" have antecedents and must refer to a specific court or a specific clerk. See Am. Bus. Ass'n , 231 F.3d at 4–5 ; Hohenwald , 815 N.W.2d at 830. Here, those antecedents are the court that ordered the financial obligations or the clerk that assessed the obligations at a particular point in time in the past in "such criminal case." Iowa Code § 901C.2(1)(a )(2). "[S]uch criminal case" refers to the singular criminal case in which the application for expungement was filed.

An additional textual consideration...