Doe v. Statewide Grievance Committee

• Decision Date: 11 June 1996
• Docket Number: No. 14174,14174
• Citation: Doe v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 677 A.2d 960, 41 Conn.App. 671 (Conn. App. 1996)
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: John DOE v. STATEWIDE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE.

Page 960

677 A.2d 960

41 Conn.App. 671

John DOE v. STATEWIDE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE.

No. 14174.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Jan. 17, 1996.

Decided June 11, 1996.

James A. Wade, with whom, on the brief, was Craig Raabe, Hartford, for appellant (plaintiff).

Darlene Frances Reynolds, Assistant Bar Counsel, for appellee (defendant).

Before LAVERY, LANDAU and SCHALLER, JJ.

LAVERY, Judge.

The plaintiff appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying the plaintiff's request for a permanent injunction. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly refused to enjoin the statewide grievance committee (committee) from proceeding in a matter in which the committee failed to comply with the temporal requirements set forth in General Statutes (Rev. to 1993) § 51-90g and Practice Book § 27J. We conclude that the trial court improperly denied the plaintiff's request to enjoin the committee from taking further action, and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.

There is no dispute about the essential facts. The plaintiff, referred to anonymously in his verified complaint as John Doe, ¹ is an attorney licensed to practice law in the state of Connecticut. On June 18, 1993, the grievance panel of the judicial district of New Haven, geographical area number six, (local grievance panel) commenced grievance proceedings against the plaintiff by filing a complaint ² with the committee. ³ On August 31, 1993, the local grievance panel determined that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause that the plaintiff was guilty of misconduct. The local grievance panel filed its determination of no probable cause with the committee on September 2, 1993.

On December 16, 1993, the committee informed the plaintiff that, contrary to the determination of the local grievance panel, there was sufficient probable cause to hold a hearing to determine whether the plaintiff was guilty of misconduct. The committee took no further action until February 8, 1994, when it assigned the matter to a subcommittee and scheduled a March 9, 1994 hearing. As of February 8, 1994, more than 120 days had elapsed since the local grievance panel filed its determination of no probable cause. On March 9, 1994, the plaintiff appeared before the subcommittee and filed a motion to dismiss the grievance proceedings on jurisdictional grounds. The subcommittee denied the plaintiff's motion. Thereafter, on March 10, 1994, the plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the grievance proceedings with the committee based on the same jurisdictional grounds. The committee denied the plaintiff's motion.

The plaintiff commenced this action seeking to enjoin the committee from taking any further action on the underlying grievance complaint. The plaintiff's complaint alleges that the committee is without jurisdiction to take further action in this matter and its failure to render a decision within the statutory time period deprived the plaintiff of his due process rights. On October 25, 1994, the trial court rendered judgment denying the plaintiff's request for a permanent injunction. The plaintiff filed this appeal.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the committee's failure to comply with the timing requirements of General Statutes (Rev. to 1993) § 51-90g(g), now § 51-90g(h), ⁴ and Practice Book § 27J(i) ⁵ requires dismissal of the underlying complaint alleging attorney misconduct. The plaintiff argues that the committee's failure to comply with the statutory timing requirements necessitates a dismissal of the complaint against the plaintiff. We agree.

We begin our analysis of the plaintiff's claim by recognizing that "the rules regulating attorney grievance procedures exist within the broader framework of the relationship between attorneys and the judiciary. ' "The practice of law is ... a profession the main purpose of which is to aid in the doing of justice...." ' In re Application of Griffiths, 162 Conn. 249, 254-55, 294 A.2d 281 (1972), rev'd and remanded, 413 U.S. 717, 93 S.Ct. 2851, 37 L.Ed.2d 910 (1973), quoting Rosenthal v. State Bar Examining Committee, 116 Conn. 409, 414, 165 A. 211 (1933). An attorney 'as an officer of the court in the administration of justice, is continually accountable to it for the manner in which he exercises the privilege which has been accorded him.' In re Peck, 88 Conn. 447, 450, 91 A. 274 (1914). This 'unique position as officers and commissioners of the court ... casts attorneys in a special relationship with the judiciary and subjects them to its discipline.' (Citations omitted.) Heslin v. Connecticut Law Clinic of Trantolo & Trantolo, 190 Conn. 510, 524, 461 A.2d 938 (1983)." Statewide Grievance Committee v. Rozbicki, 211 Conn. 232, 237-38, 558 A.2d 986 (1989). "The regulation of attorney conduct is, therefore, within the court's inherent authority. Section 51-90g and the parallel Practice Book rules authorized the grievance committee to act as an arm of the court in fulfilling this responsibility." Id., at 239, 558 A.2d 986.

The judiciary has exercised its inherent authority over attorneys by acquiescing to the statutory framework enacted by the legislature and promulgating concurrent rules. See Practice Book § 27F et seq.; General Statutes § 51-90 et seq. By acquiescing to these statutory procedures, the judiciary has limited the committee's jurisdiction to only those matters acted on within the time limitations outlined in § 51-90g. State v. James, 211 Conn. 555, 561, 560 A.2d 426 (1989); Adams v. Rubinow, 157 Conn 150, 156, 251 A.2d 49 (1968). ⁶ This court, therefore, will not require the committee to dismiss a complaint for failure to act in a timely manner unless such action is mandated by § 51-90g. Statewide Grievance Committee v. Rozbicki, supra, 211 Conn. at 239, 558 A.2d 986.

Section 51-90g(g) is the applicable statute outlining the time constraints for committee review of local panel determinations of probable cause and committee hearings on grievance complaints. That statute provides that the committee "shall render its decision not later than four months from the date the panel's determination of probable cause or no probable cause was filed with the State-Wide Grievance Committee." (Emphasis added.) We conclude that this language clearly and unambiguously mandates that the committee complete its action within four months.

"[W]e approach the task relying on familiar principles of statutory construction in order to determine the intent of the legislature. Police Dept. v. State Board of Labor Relations, [225 Conn. 297, 303 n. 7, 622 A.2d 1005 (1993) ]. 'It is fundamental that statutory construction requires us to ascertain the intent of the legislature and to construe the statute in a manner that effectuates that intent.... In seeking to discern that intent, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation.... Petco Insulation Co. v. Crystal, 231 Conn. 315, 321, 649 A.2d 790 (1994). In order to determine the meaning of a statute, we must consider the statute as a whole when reconciling its separate parts in order to render a reasonable overall interpretation. Broadley v. Board of Education, 229 Conn. 1, 6, 639 A.2d 502 (1994); Ganim v. Roberts, 204 Conn. 760, 763, 529 A.2d 194 (1987).' (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Murchison v. Civil Service Commission, 234 Conn. 35, 45, 660 A.2d 850 (1995). The task of determining whether a particular provision is mandatory or directory involves the same criteria, namely, the statute's language, the legislative history and the statutory context. Engle v. Personnel Appeal Board, 175 Conn. 127, 129-31, 394 A.2d 731 (1978)." Angelsea Productions, Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 236 Conn. 681, 688-89, 674 A.2d 1300 (1996). "Where, as here, neither the context nor the legislative history indicates a contrary intent, '[t]he use of the word "shall" by the legislature connotes that the performance of the statutory requirements is mandatory rather than permissive.' Caulkins v. Petrillo, 200 Conn. 713, 717, 513 A.2d 43 (1986); see Sullivan v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 174 Conn. 229, 233, 384 A.2d 384 (1978); 1A J. Sutherland, [Statutory Construction (4th Ed. Sands 1972) ] § 25.04." Statewide Grievance Committee v. Rozbicki, supra, 211 Conn. at 240, 558 A.2d 986; see also Angelsea Productions, Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, supra, at 689-90, 674 A.2d 1300.

In Statewide Grievance Committee v. Rozbicki, supra, 211 Conn. 232, 558 A.2d 986, our Supreme Court similarly held that the time constraints contained in General Statutes § 51-90g(c) ⁷ were mandatory. The court held, however, that a subcommittee's failure to comply with the timing requirements of § 51-90g(c) was not a jurisdictional defect absent a showing of prejudice. The court based its decision on the language of § 51-90g(c) which, upon the failure of a subcommittee to complete its action on a complaint within the time constraints, allows the committee to "inquire into the delay and determine the appropriate course of action." The Supreme Court stated that "[s]uch a construction [requiring dismissal of the grievance complaint] would impermissibly render the final phrase of § 51-90g(c) a nullity. In implementing § 51-90g(c), the grievance committee has discretion to decide what remedy a particular delay warrants." Id., at 243, 558 A.2d 986. The Rozbicki court concluded that, despite the existence of a violation of § 51-90g(c), that section did not require the complaint to be dismissed. Id.

We hold that § 51-90g(g) requires dismissal of the complaint against the plaintiff. Unlike the time limitations on subcommittee action contained in subsection (c), § 51-90g(g) contains no language authorizing the committee to ...