Doe v. Statewide Grievance Committee

• Decision Date: 06 May 1997
• Docket Number: No. 15533,15533
• Citation: Doe v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 240 Conn. 671, 694 A.2d 1218 (Conn. 1997)
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: John DOE v. STATEWIDE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE.

Page 1218

694 A.2d 1218

240 Conn. 671

John DOE v.STATEWIDE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE.

No. 15533.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Feb. 19, 1997.

Decided May 6, 1997.

Darlene F. Reynolds, Assistant Bar Counsel, with whom was Elizabeth F. Collins, First Assistant Bar Counsel, for appellant(defendant).

James A. Wade, with whom were Craig A. Raabe and, on the brief, Dina S. Fisher, Hartford, for appellee(plaintiff).

Before BORDEN, BERDON, KATZ, PALMER and PETERS, JJ.

KATZ, Judge.

The sole issue in this certified appeal is whether the failure by the defendant, the statewide grievance committee (committee), to comply with the temporal requirements of General Statutes(Rev. to 1993)§ 51-90g (g)¹ and Practice Book§ 27J (i), ² deprives the defendant of subject matter jurisdiction to act on a grievance complaint alleging attorney misconduct and, further, deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction to exercise its inherent authority over attorney conduct.We conclude that it does not.

In June, 1993, misconduct charges against the plaintiff were brought to the attention of the committee.When the committee failed to act within the statutory period, the plaintiff brought this action for injunctive relief in the Superior Court.Determining that the committee's failure to render a decision on a grievance complaint within the prescribed time period was not cause to dismiss the complaint, the trial court rendered judgment denying the plaintiff's request for a permanent injunction against any further action by the committee.The Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, concluding that the committee's failure to comply with the statutory time period required dismissal of the underlying complaint.Doe v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 41 Conn.App. 671, 677 A.2d 960(1996).We granted the defendant's petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issue: "Did the Appellate Court properly conclude the failure of the statewide grievance committee to comply with the timing requirements of General Statutes § 51-90g (g)andPractice Book§ 27J (i) deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction over a complaint for attorney misconduct?"Doe v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 239 Conn. 905, 682 A.2d 999(1996).We reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

As the Appellate Court stated, "[t]here is no dispute about the essential facts.The plaintiff, referred to anonymously in his verified complaint as John Doe, ³ is an attorney licensed to practice law in the state of Connecticut.On June 18, 1993, the grievance panel of the judicial district of New Haven, geographical area number six (local grievance panel), commenced grievance proceedings against the plaintiff by filing a complaint ⁴ with the committee.⁵ On August 31 1993, the local grievance panel determined that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause that the plaintiff was guilty of misconduct.The local grievance panel filed its determination of no probable cause with the committee on September 2, 1993.

"On December 16, 1993, the committee informed the plaintiff that, contrary to the determination of the local grievance panel, there was sufficient probable cause to hold a hearing to determine whether the plaintiff was guilty of misconduct.The committee took no further action until February 8, 1994, when it assigned the matter to a subcommittee and scheduled a March 9, 1994 hearing.As of February 8, 1994, more than 120 days had elapsed since the local grievance panel filed its determination of no probable cause.On March 9, 1994, the plaintiff appeared before the subcommittee and filed a motion to dismiss the grievance proceedings on jurisdictional grounds.The subcommittee denied the plaintiff's motion.Thereafter, on March 10, 1994, the plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the grievance proceedings with the committee based on the same jurisdictional grounds.The committee denied the plaintiff's motion.

"The plaintiff commenced this action seeking to enjoin the committee from taking any further action on the underlying grievance complaint.The plaintiff's complaint alleges that the committee is without jurisdiction to take further action in this matter and its failure to render a decision within the statutory time period deprived the plaintiff of his due process rights.On October 25, 1994, the trial court rendered judgment denying the plaintiff's request for a permanent injunction."Doe v. Statewide Grievance Committee, supra, 41 Conn.App. at 672-73, 677 A.2d 960.

On appeal, the Appellate Court, principally relying upon this court's decision in Statewide Grievance Committee v. Rozbicki, 211 Conn. 232, 558 A.2d 986(1989), concluded that the legislature, with the acquiescence of the judicial branch as demonstrated by Practice Book§ 27J, intended § 51-90g (g) to preclude the trial court from exercising its inherent authority over attorney conduct in cases in which the committee has failed to comply with the time limitations.Doe v. Statewide Grievance Committee, supra, 41 Conn.App. at 678, 677 A.2d 960.⁶The Appellate Court's conclusion was based upon its determinations that § 51-90g (g) is mandatory in nature and contains no language similar to that in General Statutes § 51-90g (c)--the provision at issue in Rozbicki--authorizing the committee to take discretionary action in the event of a delay.Although we agree that this case is necessarily influenced by Rozbicki, we conclude that there is no legislative intent that the failure to comply with the timing requirements of § 51-90g (g) should deprive either the defendant or the court of subject matter jurisdiction.⁷We begin with this court's decision in Statewide Grievance Committee v. Rozbicki, supra, 211 Conn. 232, 558 A.2d 986, wherein we held that the defendant's failure to act within the time constraints of General Statutes(Rev. [240 Conn. 677] to 1987)§ 51-90g (c), ⁸ did not require dismissal of the complaint absent a showing of prejudice.Our decision was premised largely upon the broad supervisory role of the judiciary in governing attorney conduct.We emphasized that "the rules regulating attorney grievance procedures exist within the broader framework of the relationship between attorneys and the judiciary.The practice of law is ... a profession the main purpose of which is to aid in the doing of justice....An attorney as an officer of the court in the administration of justice, is continually accountable to it for the manner in which he exercises the privilege which has been accorded him....This unique position as officers and commissioners of the court ... casts attorneys in a special relationship with the judiciary and subjects them to its discipline."(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)Id., at 237-38, 558 A.2d 986.

We further stated that "[b]ecause of this special relationship, [w]e have a continuing duty to make it entirely clear that the standards of conduct ... of the members of the profession of the law in Connecticut have not changed, and that those standards will be applied under our rules of law, in the exercise of a reasonable discretion ... [and t]his court will neither neglect nor attempt to avoid that responsibility."(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)Id., at 238, 558 A.2d 986.

Consequently, our review of § 51-90g (c) was "informed by the judiciary's responsibility for governing attorney conduct.Disciplinary proceedings are for the purpose of preserving the courts from the official ministration of persons unfit to practise [sic] in them....The proceeding to disbar [or suspend] an attorney is neither a civil action nor a criminal proceeding, but is a proceeding sui generis, the object of which is not the punishment of the offender, but the protection of the court....Once the complaint is made, the court controls the situation and procedure, in its discretion, as the interests of justice may seem to it to require....[T]he power of the courts is left unfettered to act as situations, as they may arise, may seem to require, for efficient discipline of misconduct and the purging of the bar from the taint of unfit membership.Such statutes as ours are not restrictive of the inherent powers which reside in courts to inquire into the conduct of their own officers, and to discipline them for misconduct....In proceedings such as those at issue, therefore, the attorney's relations to the tribunal and the character and purpose of the inquiry are such that unless it clearly appears that his rights have in some substantial way been denied him, the action of the court will not be set aside upon review....Consequently, ministerial delays do not ordinarily warrant judicial abstention from dealing with the important issues raised by allegations of attorney misconduct.

"The regulation of attorney conduct is, therefore, within the court's inherent authority.Section 51-90g and the parallel Practice Book rules authorized the grievance committee to act as an arm of the court in fulfilling this responsibility.Requiring the grievance committee to dismiss a complaint whenever the ... subcommittee has failed to act in a timely manner, with no discretion to pursue another course of action if appropriate, would frustrate the purposes of attorney grievance procedures and run counter to the special supervisory role of the courts in regulating attorney conduct.We will, therefore, require such action only if specifically so directed by § 51-90g (c)."(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)Id., at 238-39, 558 A.2d 986.

In Rozbicki, we thereafter examined § 51-90g (c) in order to decide whether its time requirements were mandatory and, if so, whether the statutory mandates had been violated and what effect such a violation has on the jurisdiction of the Superior Court.We held that the provision's use of the word "shall" was mandatory, but concluded...