Doe v. The Roman Catholic Bishop of Las Vegas & His Successors
| Decision Date | 24 March 2023 |
| Docket Number | 84346-COA |
| Parties | JOHN DOE, AN INDIVIDUAL, Appellant, v. THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF LAS VEGAS AND HIS SUCCESSORS, A CORPORATION SOLE, A NEVADA DOMESTIC NON-PROFIT CORPORATION SOLE, Respondent. |
| Court | Nevada Court of Appeals |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
John Doe appeals from a district court final judgment in a tort action. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; James M. Bixler, Senior Judge; Monica Trujillo Judge.[1]
Doe was an at-will volunteer for the St. Joseph, Husband of Mary Roman Catholic Church (SJHOM), a church under the direction of respondent The Roman Catholic Bishop of Las Vegas and His Successors, (hereinafter referred to as the Diocese).[2] As a volunteer, Doe acted as a lector and provided guidance counseling to the SJHOM youth ministries which consisted of middle school and high school-aged children and teenagers.
In November 2017, Doe volunteered at the SJHOM youth group's Homeless & Hunger Retreat. During the retreat, Doe directed a minor and the minor's friends toward the lunch line. As the minor and his friends walked past Doe, the children began rough-housing. Doe crouched down and spread his arms, but it is unclear whether Doe did so to engage in the rough-housing or to stop the children's conduct. In doing so, Doe made unwanted physical contact with the minor. At the conclusion of the retreat, the minor reported the incident to one of the Diocese's staff members, indicating that Doe had inappropriately touched him in the genital area. The Diocese staff member and the minor filed incident reports with the Diocese.
After receiving the incident reports, the Diocese initiated an investigation into the allegations against Doe. At the outset, the Diocese sent Doe a suspension letter to inform him that he was suspended from providing volunteer services for the Diocese. While the investigation was pending, Doe contacted Diocesan representatives on several occasions to express his frustrations with the investigation.[3] In December 2017, the Diocese sent Doe a termination letter wherein it elected to terminate Doe as a volunteer as the result of its investigation of the underlying allegations and Doe's conduct during the investigation. In the termination letter, the Diocese indicated that the investigation of the complaint, which included review of a surveillance video of the incident, as well as communications with Doe and other Diocesan employees, supported its decision. Accordingly, Doe's at-will volunteer status with the Diocese was terminated.
In April 2018, Doe filed a complaint against the Diocese in the Eighth Judicial District Court. Doe alleged six causes of action: (1) defamation, (2) defamation per se, (3) false light, (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (5) negligent infliction of emotional distress, and (6) punitive damages.[4]
During discovery, Doe provided deposition testimony and made several concessions. Of note, Doe conceded that he made physical contact with the minor, acknowledged that it was possible that he may have touched the minor's groin area, and agreed that it was never appropriate for a volunteer to touch a child in this manner. Doe also conceded that it was appropriate for the Diocese to investigate the allegations. Furthermore, Doe testified that the only written statements he believed were defamatory were certain statements contained in the suspension and termination letters he received. As to the suspension letter, Doe admitted that there was nothing written in the suspension letter that constituted a false statement. Additionally, Doe agreed he did not know with whom or even if the Diocese representatives shared the letters.
Doe also testified in his deposition that during a conversation he had with Anna Millage, an assistant to the Deacon for the Diocese, Millage volunteered information that she received from her son regarding Doe's innocence. However, Doe did not elaborate on the communications made to Millage's son, and no further details about such communications are in the record. Tiffany Madsen, an employee of the Diocese, testified that she spoke with Frank Kocka, an attorney and "core team member" for the Diocese, because Doe had asked her to give Kocka his telephone number. Madsen testified that she informed Kocka that Doe wanted to speak with him because he needed a friend but did not provide further details. Finally, Father Mark Howes with the Diocese testified that he had discussed Doe's case with his mother, but he did not elaborate on the statements discussed.
In February 2021, the Diocese moved for summary judgment on all of Doe's causes of action and sought dismissal of Doe's complaint in its entirety. After holding a hearing, the district court granted the Diocese's motion for summary judgment. In its findings of fact, conclusions of law and order, the district court found that none of the statements made in the suspension and termination letters were false, and that the Diocese did not share the letters with anyone outside of the Diocese. The district court further found that Doe failed to provide any evidence demonstrating that Millage, Madsen, and Father Howes made any false statements concerning Doe. Additionally, the district court found that Doe failed to present any evidence of publication of a false statement to any third parties. Thus, the district court found that the Diocese was entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to Doe's claims for defamation, defamation per se, and false light. As to Doe's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the district court found that Doe failed to present evidence that the Diocese engaged in any extreme or outrageous conduct. Finally, the district court found that Doe failed to establish the elements of negligence to support a claim for emotional distress damages. Accordingly, the district court granted the Diocese's motion for summary judgment as to Doe's complaint in its entirety. This appeal followed.
On appeal, Doe argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on his claims for defamation and defamation per se, false light, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress because genuine disputes of material fact remain. Specifically, Doe argues that (1) the suspension letter, termination letter, and the communications to Millage's son, Kocka, and Father Howes' mother contained false and defamatory statements that supported his claims for defamation and defamation per se; (2) the communications to Millage's son, Kocka, and Father Howes' mother demonstrate that the Diocese placed him in a false light; (3) he suffered severe emotional distress as a result of the Diocese's intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (4) he suffered severe emotional distress as a result of the Diocese's negligent infliction of emotional distress. Conversely, the Diocese disagrees with each of Doe's arguments on appeal. We agree with the Diocese.
Standard of review
We review the district court's decision to grant summary judgment de novo. Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005). Summary judgment requires this court to view all evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings and all other evidence on file demonstrate that no genuine dispute of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Id. "However, the nonmoving party must, by affidavit or otherwise, set forth specific facts demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue for trial or have summary judgment entered against him." Sprague v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 109 Nev. 247, 250, 849 P.2d 320, 322 (1993). "The nonmoving party's documentation must be admissible evidence, and he or she is not entitled to build a case on the gossamer threads of whimsy, speculation and conjecture." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A defendant is entitled to summary judgment "[w]here an essential element of [the plaintiffs] claim for relief is absent." Bulbman, Inc. v. Nev. Bell, 108 Nev. 105, 111, 825 P.2d 588, 592 (1988).
The district court did not err in granting summary judgment as to Doe's claims for defamation and defamation per se
On appeal, Doe argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment as to his claims for defamation and defamation per se because the underlying allegations infer that he is a sexual deviant. Doe points to the suspension and termination letters, and deposition testimony regarding statements made to Millage's son, Kocka, and Father Howes' mother, to support that the Diocese is liable for defamation and defamation per se. The Diocese argues that summary judgment was appropriate because Doe failed to show evidence that the Diocese published a false or defamatory statement to a third party. We agree with the Diocese.
In Nevada, "[a]n action for defamation requires the plaintiff to prove four elements: (1) a false and defamatory statement. . .; (2) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (3) fault amounting to at least negligence; and (4) actual or presumed damages." Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Virtual Educ. Software, Inc., 125 Nev. 374, 385, 213 P.3d 496, 503 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). "However, if the defamatory communication imputes a person's lack of fitness for trade, business, or profession, or tends to injure the plaintiff in his or her business, it is deemed defamation per se and damages are presumed." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Whether a statement is susceptible to a defamation claim is a matter of law for the court to decide. Branda v. Sanford, 97 Nev. 643, 646, 637 P.2d 1223, 1225 ...
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