Doe v. The Univ. of N.C. Sys.

Docket NumberCIVIL 1:23-cv-00041-MR
Decision Date28 November 2023
PartiesJACOB DOE, Plaintiff, v. THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA SYSTEM; THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL; THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL BOARD OF TRUSTEES; BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA; KEVIN GUSKIEWICZ, in his official capacity; ELIZABETH HALL, individually and in her official capacity; JEREMY ENLOW, individually and in his official capacity; BETH FROEHLING, individually and in her official capacity; REBECCA GIBSON, individually and in her official capacity; JACLYN FEENEY, individually and in her official capacity; DAVID ELROD, individually and in his official capacity; and DESIREE RIECKENBERG, individually and in her official capacity, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER

Martin Reidinger Chief United States District Judge THIS MATTER is before this Court on the Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction [Doc. 49].

I. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In the spring of 2021, Jacob Doe (Plaintiff) was suspended from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC-CH), on an interim basis, after UNC-CH received complaints accusing him of sexual misconduct. [Doc. 1 at 1-4]. After an investigation into the complaints determined that he was “responsible” for multiple acts of sexual misconduct, the Plaintiff was permanently expelled from the affiliate universities of the University of North Carolina System. [Id.]. The Plaintiff contends, however, that he did not commit the misconduct alleged, and that the process that found him responsible was “unfair[,] “prejudicial[,] and “replete with gender bias.” [See id. at 3]. After exhausting his administrative appeals, on February 15, 2023, the Plaintiff commenced this action against the University of North Carolina System, UNC-CH, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Board of Trustees, the Board of Governors of the University of North Carolina, Kevin Guskiewicz, Elizabeth Hall, Jeremy Enlow, Beth Froehling Rebecca Gibson, Jaclyn Feeney, David Elrod, and Desiree Rieckenberg (collectively Defendants). [See Id. at 1-2]. The Plaintiff alleges denial of procedural due process, violations of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX), and a number of state law claims. [Id. at 4].

On February 15, 2023, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”), seeking to prevent the Defendants “from releasing or disclosing any information concerning the disciplinary proceedings that are the subject of this lawsuit[.] [Doc. 5]. This Court granted the Plaintiff's motion and entered a TRO on February 22, 2023. [Doc. 14]. However, that same day, the Plaintiff withdrew his Motion for a TRO and notified this Court that the Defendants had not yet received any requests to release the Plaintiff's information. [Doc. 15]. Accordingly, this Court dissolved the TRO on March 1, 2023. [Doc. 19]. On July 13, 2023, this Court entered an Order allowing the Plaintiff to proceed pseudonymously, given the sensitive subject matter of this action. [See Doc. 41].

On October 3, 2023, UNC-CH notified the Plaintiff that it had received a public records request seeking disclosure of his name and disciplinary record. [See Doc. 52 at 2]. As such, on October 6, 2023, the Plaintiff filed a new Motion for a TRO and Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. [Doc. 49]. In his Motion, Plaintiff seeks an order:

(i) Prohibiting Defendants from releasing or disclosing any information concerning the disciplinary proceedings that are the subject of this lawsuit;
(ii) Requiring Defendants to direct all individuals, including but not limited to employees and students, over whom they exercise control to refrain from publishing or disclosing any information concerning Plaintiff, the disciplinary proceedings, or the outcomes of such proceedings; and
(iii) Requiring UNC to inform any media outlet, or any other third party, that receives information concerning Plaintiff's disciplinary outcome about the filing of this motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, and notifying such media outlets or other third party, that they are prohibited from publishing any information concerning Plaintiff, the disciplinary proceedings, or the outcomes of such proceedings.

[Id. at 1-2]. On October 9, 2023, the Defendants filed a Response in Opposition to the Plaintiff's Motion. [Doc. 53]. On October 10, 2023, the Honorable Judge Max O. Cogburn, Jr., United States District Judge,[1] held a hearing on the Plaintiff's Motion. [Doc. 49]. The next day, on October 11, 2023, Judge Cogburn entered a TRO through October 25, 2023. [Doc. 57]. On October 25, 2023, Judge Cogburn extended the TRO an additional fourteen (14) days, through November 8, 2023. [Doc. 58]. On October 30, 2023, the undersigned scheduled a hearing on the Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction to be held on November 8, 2023. Thereafter, the Plaintiff filed an unopposed motion to continue the preliminary injunction hearing due to a scheduling conflict. [Doc. 59]. The Court granted the Plaintiff's unopposed motion to continue the hearing and extended the TRO until the date of the rescheduled hearing, November 21, 2023. [Doc. 60].

Prior to that hearing, Amici Curiae ACLU of North Carolina Legal Foundation and Freedom of the Press Foundation sought leave to file an amended amici brief, which the Court granted. [See Doc. 61 and Text-Only Order entered Nov. 17, 2023].

The Court held the preliminary injunction hearing on November 21, 2023. At the conclusion of the hearing, and with the consent of the parties, the Court extended the TRO to November 29, 2023, so that this written order could be entered.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A plaintiff's entitlement to injunctive relief is a matter of discretion with the Court. See Metro. Regul. Info. Sys., Inc. v. Am. Home Realty Network, Inc., 722 F.3d 591, 595 (4th Cir. 2013). “When considering a motion for preliminary injunction, a district court may assess the relative strength and persuasiveness of the evidence presented by the parties, and is not required to resolve factual disputes in favor of the non-moving party.” Microban Int'l, Ltd. v. Kennedy, No. 3:22-CV-00620-KDB-DSC, 2023 WL 2533085, at *3 (W.D. N.C. Mar. 15, 2023) (quoting Queen Virgin Remy, Co. v. Thomason, No. 1:15-cv-1638-SCJ, 2015 WL 11422300, at *2 (N.D.Ga. June 10, 2015)). While the plaintiff is responsible for making a sufficient showing to justify the entry of a preliminary injunction, “the burdens at the preliminary injunction stage track the burdens at trial.” Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 429 (2006); see also In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 333 F.3d 517, 526 (4th Cir. 2003).

Here, the parties have not offered any affidavits or declarations in support of or in opposition to the Motion for Preliminary Injunction. As evidence, the Plaintiff relies only on the allegations as set forth in his Verified Complaint. When presented with a motion for preliminary injunction, courts “may consider a verified complaint as the equivalent of an affidavit[.] Parson v. Alcorn, 157 F.Supp.3d 479, 489 n.13 (E.D. Va. 2016).

III. DISCUSSION

A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate that (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable harm absent injunctive relief, (3) the balance of the equities tips in his favor, and (4) the injunction would be in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Id. at 24. A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction “need not establish a certainty of success, but must make a clear showing that he is likely to succeed at trial.” Di Biase v. SPX Corp., 872 F.3d 224, 230 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, the Defendants do not contest that the Plaintiff has made a sufficient showing with respect to three of the Winter factors, namely, the likelihood of irreparable harm, the balance of equities, and the public interest. [See Doc. 53 at 7 n.2]. As addressed in more detail infra, the Plaintiff has shown the likelihood of irreparable injury if the preliminary injunction is not granted, while the Defendants have not shown any potential harm to them if it is granted. On this factor alone the equities tip heavily in the Plaintiff's favor, and public interest would be served by preserving the status quo as the Plaintiff seeks.

The sole focus of the Defendants' argument is that the Plaintiff is not entitled to the requested relief because he has failed to show that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his Title IX claim. Therefore, the propriety of the Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction rests solely on the determination of the Plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits on his primary federal claim.

The “likelihood of success” factor, however, must be analyzed in the context of the unique circumstances presented by the Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief. The Plaintiff is not seeking a preliminary grant of the relief that would flow from a successful prosecution of his Title IX claim, such as temporary reinstatement to the University during the pendency of this litigation. Rather, he is only seeking to maintain the status quo and to prevent the disclosure of his identity and details regarding the University's allegedly flawed investigation into his conduct until the underlying claims can be fully litigated.

The Fourth Circuit formerly held in Blackwelder Furniture Co of Statesville, Inc. v. Seilig Manufacturing Co., 550 F.2d 189, 195 (4th Cir. ...

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