Doe v. United States

• Decision Date: 28 March 2022
• Docket Number: Civ. 3:19CV01649(SALM)
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: JANE DOE v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

JANE DOE
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

Civ. No. 3:19CV01649(SALM)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut

March 28, 2022

RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

HON. SARAH A. L. MERRIAM UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Plaintiff Jane Doe brought this action in five counts, naming six defendants: the United States of America; the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”); Kevin McAleenan, in his official capacity as the Acting Secretary of DHS; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”); Matthew T. Albence, in his official capacity as Acting Director of ICE; and Wilfredo Rodriguez, in his individual and official capacities (“Rodriguez”). See generally Doc. #1.^[1] The first five defendants are represented by the Department of Justice, and are collectively referred to herein as the Government Defendants.

Count One brings a claim for Assault and Battery, pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§1346 (b), 2671-80 (“FTCA”), against the United States. See Id. at 13-14. Count Two

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brings a claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress pursuant to the FTCA against the United States. See Id. at 14-15. Count Three brings a claim for violation of plaintiff's rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, against Rodriguez. See Id. at 15. Count Four brings a claim for violation of plaintiff's equal protection rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, against Rodriguez. See Id. at 15-16. Count Five brings a state law claim for negligence against ICE and DHS. See id. at 16-18.^[2]

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), the Government Defendants move for summary judgment on Counts One, Two, and Five of the Complaint. See Doc. #69 (Government Defendants' motion for summary judgment). Defendant Rodriguez moves for summary judgment on Counts Three and Four of the Complaint. See Doc. #74 (defendant Rodriguez's motion for summary judgment). For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motions are GRANTED.

I. Background

The following facts are derived from the parties' submissions pursuant to Local Rule 56(a) and the affidavits,

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declarations, and exhibits attached thereto.

Defendant Rodriguez is a former ICE officer. See Doc. #71 at 2, ¶1; Doc. #82 at 1, ¶1. Plaintiff Jane Doe “claims that [Rodriguez] began sexually assault[ing] and threaten[ing]” her in 2007. Doc. #71 at 2, ¶1; Doc. #82 at 1, ¶1. These assaults continued until 2014, when plaintiff “suffered a work accident” and “believed that Rodriguez was going to retire in the near future.” Doc. #71 at 2, ¶¶4-5; Doc. #82 at 2, ¶¶4-5. Throughout that seven-year period, “Plaintiff threatened Rodriguez with disclosing the assaults, and she considered telling another deportation officer about Rodriguez's actions.” Doc. #71 at 2, ¶3; Doc. #82 at 2, ¶3. Despite these threats, however, plaintiff did not “file an anonymous report about Rodriguez. She did not report the alleged assaults to any medical provider, to her attorney, or to anyone at all. She never asked to be transferred away from Rodriguez, or to a different ICE office.” Doc. #71 at 2-3, ¶8 (citations to the record omitted); Doc. #82 at 2-3, ¶8.

“Plaintiff first disclosed the alleged sexual assaults by Rodriguez to ICE officers in May of 2018.” Doc. #71 at 2, ¶6; Doc. #82 at 2, ¶6. “Plaintiff presented an administrative claim to DHS on July 10, 2018.” Doc. #71 at 3, ¶10; Doc. #82 at 3, ¶10. “Plaintiff did not pursue her rights from 2007 until her presentment of her administrative claim on July 10, 2018.” Doc. #71 at 3, ¶11; Doc. #82 at 3, ¶11. Without citing record

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evidence, plaintiff argues that she did not report the assaults earlier because she “was afraid for her life and that of her family's[.]” Doc. #83 at 6 (sic).

Plaintiff brought this action on October 19, 2019. See Doc. #1. Defendants filed their motions for summary judgment on April 30, 2021, contending that plaintiff's claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. See Doc. #69, Doc. #74. Plaintiff filed responses to defendants' motions on June 14, 2021, contending that the doctrine of equitable tolling applies, and prevents the matter from being time-barred. See Doc. #81, Doc. #83. This matter was transferred to the undersigned on October 21, 2021. See Doc. #85.

II. Legal Standard

The standards governing summary judgment are well-settled Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits ... show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)[.]

Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280, 285-86 (2d Cir. 2002). Summary judgment is proper if, after discovery, the nonmoving party “has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

“The party seeking summary judgment has the burden to

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demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists.” Marvel Characters, Inc., 310 F.3d at 286. “In moving for summary judgment against a party who will bear the ultimate burden of proof at trial, the movant's burden will be satisfied if he can point to an absence of evidence to support an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim.” Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth Defects Found., 51 F.3d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1995).

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court “must construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the movant.” Beyer v. Cnty. of Nassau, 524 F.3d 160, 163 (2d Cir. 2008) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “If there is any evidence in the record that could reasonably support a jury's verdict for the non-moving party, summary judgment must be denied.” Am. Home Assur. Co. v. Hapag Lloyd Container Linie, GmbH, 446 F.3d 313, 315 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

III. Discussion

All defendants move for summary judgment on multiple grounds, including that the claims brought by plaintiff are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. Because the Court finds this issue dispositive, it need not reach the parties' other arguments.

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A. Statute of Limitations -- FTCA

The three claims brought against the Government Defendants sound in tort, and therefore are governed by the FTCA. “As a precondition for suit under the FTCA, an administrative claim must be filed with the responsible federal agency within two years of a plaintiff's alleged injury.” Torres v. United States, 612 Fed.Appx. 37, 39 (2d Cir. 2015) .

The Supreme Court has held that “the FTCA's time bars are nonjurisdictional and subject to equitable tolling.” United States v. Wong, 575 U.S. 402, 420 (2015).

B. Statute of Limitations -- Bivens

Before turning to the analysis of the limitations period applicable to plaintiff's claims against Rodriguez, the Court pauses to clarify the nature of those claims.

Plaintiff brings two “Federal Constitutional Claim[s]” against Rodriguez for violations of the Fourth Amendment and Fifth Amendment. Doc. #1 at 15. Rodriguez was, at the time of the alleged events, a federal employee. See Id. at 3, ¶12. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), sets forth “a judicially-created remedy designed to provide individuals with a cause of action against federal officials who have violated their constitutional rights.” Higzay v. Templeton, 505 F.3d 161, 169 (2d Cir. 2007). Plaintiff does not refer to Bivens in the Complaint. However,

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“[a]lthough not styled as such, ” the Court construes plaintiff's constitutional claims against defendant Rodriguez “as asserting causes of action under” Bivens. Offor v. Mercy Med. Ctr., No. 17CV01872(NRB), 2018 WL 2947971, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2018).

The parties are not prejudiced by the Court's construction of plaintiff's claims against Rodriguez as being brought pursuant to Bivens. The parties do not mention Bivens in their briefing on Rodriguez's motion. See Doc. #75, Doc. #83. Rather, defendant Rodriguez asserts: “Through [plaintiff's allegations], the Plaintiff has made a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983.” Doc. #75 at 2. However, because plaintiff claims that defendant Rodriguez was a federal official, rather than a state official, see Doc. #1 at 3, her claims are properly analyzed under Bivens. See Shue v. United States, 466 Fed.Appx. 51, 51 (2d Cir. 2012) (summary order) (“[Plaintiff]'s constitutional claims against federal officials are properly analyzed as claims pursuant to Bivens ... rather than 42 U.S.C. §1983.”). The parties' timeliness arguments are unaffected by this confusion in the briefing, because “Bivens and §1983 actions [are] governed by identical statute[s] of limitations[.]” Varon v. Sawyer, No. 3:04CV02049(RNC), 2007 WL 2217085, at *2 n.3 (D. Conn. July 30, 2007) (citing Chin v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 21, 23-24 (2d Cir. 1987)). Indeed, as is true of claims brought pursuant to Section 1983, “[f]ederal courts look to state law when determining the statute

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of limitations ... applicable to Bivens claims.” Brown v. Greene, No. 11CV04917(BMC), 2012 WL 911560, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2012); see also Leonhard v. United States, 633 F.2d 599, 616-17 (2d Cir. 1980) (“[F]or both Bivens-type actions and §1983 actions we must borrow the most appropriate state statutes of limitations.”).

“Under Connecticut General Statute §52-577, the applicable statute of limitations for a Bivens action is three years from the point of accrual.” Bakowski v. Kurimai, 387 Fed.Appx. 10, 11 (2d Cir. 2003). “While state law supplies the statute of limitations period, federal law determines when a federal claim accrues.” ...