Doe v. Univ. of Scranton
| Decision Date | 09 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:19-CV-01486,3:19-CV-01486 |
| Parties | JOHN DOE, Plaintiff. v. UNIVERSITY OF SCRANTON, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(Judge Brann)
Presently before the court is the Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint.1 This motion, having been fully briefed, is ripe for disposition. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant in part Defendant's motion.
On August 27, 2019, Plaintiff, John Doe, filed a Complaint against the sole Defendant in this case, the University of Scranton ("Defendant" or "University").2 On December 9, 2019, Plaintiff filed an eleven-count Amended Complaint against Defendant, which stands as the operative pleading in this matter.3
The facts giving rise to this action stem from peer-on-peer harassment that Plaintiff allegedly endured based on his sexual orientation, gender stereotypingand/or sex. Plaintiff alleges that, during the fall semester of 2018, he lived in an off-campus housing unit with four other male University students, including roommate Shawn Mallon ("Mallon").4 Off-campus housing was only available to University students who had successfully completed an application process through the University's Office of Off-Campus and Commuter Student Life ("OCCSL") and received permission to live off-campus.5 Plaintiff alleges that the OCCSL promulgated rules regarding the regulation of parties, activities, and student conduct that occurred off-campus, and had the authority to regulate off-campus housing.6
Plaintiff also asserts that Defendant had disciplinary authority or control over the students that lived, and student conduct issues that arose, off-campus.7 Specifically, Plaintiff refers to Defendant's "Off Campus Conduct Policy" and "Off-Campus Behavior Policy," which delineated certain activities that could result in a student being referred to the Office of Student Conduct for disciplinary action.8 Such activities included "excessive or unreasonable noise," "the illegal use of and/or sale or distribution of alcohol or drugs," "excessively large parties," "disrespect for neighbor and community," and "other disruptive behaviors." (Id.) Plaintiff also points to Defendant's Non-Discrimination and Anti-Harassment Policy, whichcovered "off-campus conduct that has continuing adverse effects on campus, in the context of an education program or activity, or where the conduct has the potential to adversely affect any member of the University of Scranton Community."9
Shortly after Plaintiff moved into the off-campus residence, Mallon began to make homophobic remarks.10 For example, Plaintiff alleges that Mallon frequently commented that other male students either were gay or looked gay, and generally made statements like "that's gay."11 On an unspecified date, in response to one such statement, Plaintiff revealed to Mallon that he was gay.12 Thereafter, Mallon frequently ostracized Plaintiff and spoke down to him, as the only openly gay roommate in the house, in a denigrating matter.13 Mallon also allegedly emphasized Plaintiff's homosexuality, or the fact that he didn't intimately associate with members of the opposite sex, to alienate him and embarrass him in front of other University students.14
On November 1, 2018, Mallon allegedly sent an offensive group text message that referenced a sexual encounter between Plaintiff and his ex-boyfriend.15 Plaintiff subsequently complained to Ms. Karen Marx ("Ms. Marx"), an administrativeassistant at the University's Academic Advising Center, about his living situation.16 According to Plaintiff, his complaint was not taken seriously; Ms. Marx merely indicated that some people might take issue with Plaintiff's homosexuality and then said something to the effect of "you only have to live with [Mallon] one more semester after this."17 Plaintiff also took his complaint to Mr. Kevin Stanford, an academic advisor at the University, who similarly dismissed Plaintiff's concerns and declined to take any disciplinary action against Mallon.18
Plaintiff alleges that he continued to experience harassment, which culminated in Mallon physically attacking him on or about December 15, 2018 (the "Attack").19 During the Attack, Plaintiff asserts that Mallon referred to him as a "faggot" and threatened his life.20 Plaintiff alerted both the campus police and the University's Dean of Students, Lauren Rivera ("Dean Rivera"), about the Attack.21 Plaintiff also lodged a complaint with Dean Rivera regarding the discrimination, harassment, and physical confrontation that he experienced because of his sexual orientation.22 Although Defendant processed Plaintiff's complaint as a possible violation of the University's community standards of behavior, it declined to findthat the aggrieved of conduct violated the University's sexual harassment policy or Title IX policy.23 Plaintiff claims that Defendant's response was unsatisfactory, insofar as it failed to apprise him of the outcome of any investigations and expressly deviated from the procedures outlined in its own Sexual Harassment and Sexual Misconduct policies.24
Plaintiff further claims that he, instead of his alleged harasser, moved out of the off-campus residence and back onto campus.25 Although Defendant implemented a no-contact order between Plaintiff and Mallon in or around February 2019, Plaintiff complained to Dean Rivera that he continued to encounter his former roommate on campus.26 Plaintiff asserts that he regularly avoided the DeNaples Student Center, dining hall and cafeteria, and gym out of fear that he would encounter Mallon.27 Plaintiff further alleges that he experienced ongoing emotional distress based on the harassment that he suffered, which not only impaired his higher education experience but also his psychological well-being.28
On December 23, 2019, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.29 The matter is now ripe for disposition.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court dismisses a complaint, in whole or in part, if the plaintiff has failed to "state a claim upon which relief can be granted." A motion to dismiss "tests the legal sufficiency of a pleading"30 and "streamlines litigation by dispensing with needless discovery and factfinding."31 "Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law."32 This is true of any claim, "without regard to whether it is based on an outlandish legal theory or on a close but ultimately unavailing one."33
Following the Roberts Court's "civil procedure revival,"34 the landmark decisions of Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly35 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal36 tightened the standard that district courts must apply to 12(b)(6) motions.37 These cases"retired" the lenient "no-set-of-facts test" set forth in Conley v. Gibson and replaced it with a more exacting "plausibility" standard.38
Accordingly, after Twombly and Iqbal, "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'"39 "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."40 "Although the plausibility standard does not impose a probability requirement, it does require a pleading to show more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully."41 Moreover, "[a]sking for plausible grounds . . . calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [wrongdoing]."42
The plausibility determination is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense."43 No matter the context, however, "[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility andplausibility of entitlement to relief.'"44
When disposing of a motion to dismiss, the Court "accept[s] as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw[s] all inferences from the facts alleged in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff]."45 However, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions."46 "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice."47
As a matter of procedure, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has instructed that:
Under the pleading regime established by Twombly and Iqbal, a court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps. First, it must tak[e] note of the elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state a claim. Second, it should identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Finally, [w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, [the] court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.48
Defendant raises the following issues in its motion to dismiss: (1) whether Counts I and II of the Amended Complaint, brought against Defendants under TitleIX of the Education Amendments of 1972,49 should be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim; (2) whether Counts III and IV, which raise purported violations of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA")50, and Counts V and VII, which raise purported violations of the Pennsylvania Fair Educational Opportunities Act ("PFEOA")51, should be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim; (3) whether Counts VII and VIII, brought under the City of Scranton Human Relations and Discrimination Ordinance,52 should be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim; (4) whether Counts IX...
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