Doe v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. At Hous.

• Decision Date: 13 December 2021
• Docket Number: Civil Action H-21-1439
• Parties: John Doe, Plaintiff, v. University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

John Doe, Plaintiff,
v.
University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. H-21-1439

United States District Court, S.D. Texas

December 13, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

GRAY H. MILLER, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Pending before the court are defendants Margaret McNeese, Deana Moylan, Sheela Lahoti, Dana McDowelle (collectively, the "Individual Defendants"), and the University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston's ("UTHealth") motions to dismiss and to stay discovery. Dkts. 20, 33. Having considered the motions, responses, replies, and the applicable law, the court is of the opinion that the motion to dismiss (Dkt. 20) should be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, and the motion to stay discovery (Dkt. 33) should be DENIED AS MOOT.

I. Background

This case arises from a confrontation between plaintiff John Doe and Jane Roe, and the defendants' subsequent investigation and disciplinary actions. Dkt. 1. Doe alleges the following facts in his complaint, which the court takes as true for the purposes of this motion.

Doe and Roe were both students at UTHealth. Dkt. 1 ¶ 2. After years of a tumultuous relationship and while intoxicated, Doe threatened self-harm in a phone call to Roe on Valentine's Day 2020. Id. ¶¶ 2-3. Responding to the phone call, Roe entered Doe's apartment with a previously given key. Id. ¶ 63. A verbal altercation ensued where Doe waved an unloaded firearm and told Roe to leave. Id. ¶¶ 64. Roe left the apartment, made a criminal complaint, and reported

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the incident to UTHealth. Id. ¶ 4. The criminal complaint was eventually dismissed, and Doe's record was expunged on October 27, 2020. Id. ¶ 142.

UTHealth's Handbook of Operating Procedures ("HOOP") sets forth various policies on student conduct, discipline, and investigative processes. Id. ¶ 154. Among the policies in the HOOP are the sexual misconduct policy, HOOP Policy Number 59 ("HOOP 59"), and the general student conduct and discipline policy, HOOP Policy Number 186 ("HOOP 186"). Id. When HOOP 59 applies, HOOP 186 states that unless the complainant and accused agree to waive hearing procedures, the accused is afforded a hearing to dispute investigative findings. Id. ¶ 163. The Department of Education's Office for Civil Frights provided guidance that influenced the creation and implementation of the HOOP policies in manner that is allegedly biased against male students. Id. ¶ 50.

Doe alleges that, but for an anti-male bias, UTHealth would not have considered the incident one of dating violence, selectively enforced its policies in favor of Roe, nor imposed the sanctions he ultimately received. See Id. ¶¶ 185-215. Doe also contends UTHealth misclassified Roe's claims as instances of dating violence in violation of HOOP 59 because of her "shifting, baseless stories." Id. ¶¶ 2, 5. Doe alleges the investigating committee interviewed him in manner that "was more similar to an interrogation," and that his account of the incident was not seriously considered. Id. ¶¶ 70, 73. Defendants McNeese and Moylan, the UTHealth's Title IX Coordinator and Deputy Title IX Coordinator respectively, served on the committee throughout the investigation. Id. ¶¶ 23-24, 70-74. Doe alleges that the committee always "took everything Roe said at face value and presumed [Doe] guilty from the start, as a male accused." Id. ¶ 84.

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On March 9, 2020, McNeese informed Doe that he was interim suspended pending UTHealth's investigation and requested he waive his right to a formal hearing to contest the suspension. Id. ¶ 76. After Doe refused to waive his right to a hearing, McNeese informed him that a disciplinary hearing would be arranged when the COVID-19 pandemic allowed it. Id. ¶ 78. That hearing never took place. Id.

After six months of investigation, UTHealth found Doe in violation of HOOP 59. Id. ¶ 86. Moylan issued the Title IX determination letter to Doe. Id. The determination letter relied heavily on Roe's description of events. Id. Doe alleges that UTHealth never provided a hearing to contest the finding. Id. ¶ 87. He further asserts that he did not waive his rights to such a hearing. Id. ¶ 164. UTHealth permitted Doe a "conditional return" and ultimately allowed him to graduate. Id. ¶¶ 110, 132. However, during his suspension, Doe alleges that Roe engaged in spreading rumors about the investigation, and UTHealth "took no action against Roe for her failure to maintain confidentiality." Id. ¶ 123. McDowelle, the Assistant Dean of Admissions and Student Affairs at UT Health McGovern Medical School, even admitted that "UT is a small school and people talk" despite prior assurances of confidentiality. Id. ¶¶ 25, 123.

McNeese and McDowelle met with Doe on August 14, 2020. Id. ¶ 113. They informed him they would document the results of the investigation, including a notation of Doe's suspension, on his Medical Student Performance Evaluation ("MPSE") which will later be shared with Doe's potential residency programs. Id. Doe was provided with the language UTHealth intended to include. Id. Any interested residency programs will be allowed to contact McNeese off-record to inquire further about the events in the notation. Id. ¶ 148. At this same meeting, McNeese allegedly told Doe that he "should reach out to the chairman of orthopedics at UT Health

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because he would empathize with [Doe] as they 'both have problems with women." Id. ¶ 114 (emphasis in original). Further, McNeese and McDowelle allegedly gossiped throughout the meeting about Doe's "dilemma with women" while he was still present. Id.

On October 9, 2020, Doe met with Lahoti, the Assistant Dean of Admissions and Student Affairs at UTHealth, and McDowelle regarding residency. Id. ¶¶ 24, 128. In that meeting, Lahoti was allegedly "extremely disrespectful and unprofessional." Id. ¶ 128. Lahoti had previously replied to an email Doe had sent to McNeese and McDowelle asking administrative questions; otherwise, the October 9th meeting was the only interaction between Doe and Lahoti. See Id. ¶ 125-35. In that meeting, she allegedly made dismissive comments about Doe's academic record. Id. ¶ 130. Lahoti also expressed doubt that Doe would get his criminal record expunged and advised him to "make sure you have the expunction in hand if you do not mention your arrest to the Texas Medical Board." Id. ¶ 131. Lahoti refused Doe's request to defer a year and was allegedly determined to have Doe graduate "as soon as possible, even if it was not in his best interest." Id. ¶ 132. Lahoti also discouraged Doe from pursuing orthopedics, advising him to apply to general surgery programs. Id. ¶ 135.

On April 23, 2021, Doe filed the instant lawsuit seeking damages and injunctive relief for Title IX claims of erroneous outcome and selective enforcement against UTHealth and a claim for denial of procedural due process against UTHealth and the Individual Defendants.^[1] Id. ¶¶ 185- 238. On July 6, 2021, the defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss. Dkt. 20. The defendants argue that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

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12(b)(1) regarding Doe's procedural due process claim because they are not "persons" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, they are protected by sovereign immunity, and his claim is not justiciable. Id. at 6. Additionally, the defendants argue that Doe has failed to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for both his Title IX and procedural due process claims and that the Individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Id. On November 22, 2021, the defendants filed a motion to stay discovery pending a ruling on their prior motion to dismiss. Dkt. 33. Both motions are now before the court.

II. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) authorizes dismissal of an action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). Federal courts are ones of limited jurisdiction. Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673 (1994)). A federal court's decision to hear a case that is beyond its subject-matter jurisdiction is not a "mere technical violation," but rather "an unconstitutional usurpation" of power. 5C Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3522 (3d ed. 2004). Because it "spring[s] from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the United States and is inflexible and without exception," subject-matter jurisdiction is a "threshold" matter. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95, 118 S.Ct. 1003 (1998) (internal quotations omitted).

"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief" Bell Ail. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a complaint, courts generally must accept the factual allegations contained in the complaint as true.

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Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982). The court does not look beyond the face of the pleadings in determining whether the plaintiff has stated a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999). "[A] complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, [but] a plaintiffs obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). The "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. The supporting facts must be plausible-enough to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal further...