Doe v. Villa Marie Education Center

• Court: Connecticut Superior Court
• Writing for the Court: Richard E. Arnold Judge.
• Decision Date: 20 July 2017
• Docket Number: FBTCV165032101S
• Citation: Doe v. Villa Marie Education Center, FBTCV165032101S (Conn. Super. Jul 20, 2017)
• Parties: John Doe v. Villa Marie Education Center et al

John Doe v. Villa Marie Education Center et al

No. FBTCV165032101S

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Fairfield, Bridgeport

July 20, 2017

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION MOTION TO STRIKE

Richard E. Arnold Judge.

Pursuant to Practice Book § 10-39, the defendants, Villa Marie Education Center, Inc., The Bernadine Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis of Stamford, Conn., Inc, The Bernadine Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis and Carol Ann Nawracaj, have moved to strike Count One and Count Three of the plaintiff's complaint dated October 4 2016.^[1] The defendants maintain that these two counts are insufficient as a matter of law because: (1) the defendants cannot be held vicariously liable for an employee's alleged sexual assault of the plaintiff and (2) the plaintiff has failed to allege any facts to establish the requisite fraud, self-dealing or conflict of interest on the part of the defendants to support a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.

In support of their claims, the defendants have submitted a memorandum of law and a reply memorandum of law. The plaintiff has filed his objection and supporting memorandum of law. The court heard oral argument on the motion to strike on March 27, 2017.

This action arises from the alleged sexual abuse of the plaintiff while he was a minor student at the Villa Marie Education Center, Inc. (" Villa Marie") from 1977 to 1983. Villa Marie is a full-time day school for children with learning disabilities. The school is owned and operated by a Catholic " religious community of women" known as the Bernadine Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis (the " Sisters"). The defendant, Sister Carol Ann Nawracaj, was the executive director of the school at some of the relevant times alleged in the complaint. The plaintiff alleges that one of his teachers, Sister Domitian, who is deceased, " sexually abused, sexually assaulted sexually battered and sexually exploited" him while he was a minor attending the school. He also alleges that Sister Domitian " was acting as a nun" at all relevant times.^[2]

I Standard of Law: Motion to Strike

" A motion to strike attacks the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a pleading." Keane v. Fischetti, 300 Conn. 395, 402, 13 A.3d 1089 (2011). " [I]t is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted . . . The role of the trial court in ruling on a motion to strike is to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the [plaintiff], to determine whether the [pleading party has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Coe v. Board of Education, 301 Conn. 112, 116-17, 19 A.3d 640 (2011).

" In reviewing the sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint, courts are to assume the truth of the facts pleaded therein and to determine whether those facts establish a valid cause of action . . . If the pleading fails to establish a valid cause of action, a court shall grant a motion to strike the offending claims." (Citation omitted.) Keane v. Fischetti, supra, 300 Conn. 402. On the other hand, " [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 349, 63 A.3d 940 (2013).

II Count One: Vicarious Liability

The defendants argue that, as a matter of law, they are not vicariously liable for the alleged sexual assault on the plaintiff by Sister Domitian, as any sexual assault was an intentional tort and was not within the scope of Sister Domitian's employment or in the furtherance of her defendant employers' business. " We have long adhered to the principle that in order to hold an employer liable for the intentional torts of his employee, the employee must be acting within the scope of his employment and in furtherance of the employer's business." A-G Foods, Inc. v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 216 Conn 200, 208, 579 A.2d 69 (1990); Cardona v. Valentin, 160 Conn. 18, 22, 273 A.2d 697 (1970). " [I]t must be the affairs of the principal, and not solely the affairs of the agent, which are being furthered in order for the doctrine to apply." (Citations omitted.) Id. " A servant acts within the scope of employment while engaged in the service of the master, and it is not synonymous with the phrase 'during the period covered by his employment.'" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 209-10. " While a servant may be acting within the scope of his employment when his conduct is 'negligent, disobedient and unfaithful' that does not end the inquiry. Rather, 'the vital inquiry in this type of case is whether the servant on the occasion in question was engaged in a disobedient or unfaithful conducting of the master's business, or was engaged in an abandonment of the master's business . . ." (Internal citations omitted.) Id. Therefore, if an employee's actions are not authorized by his employer, and the employee is acting for his own interests and not in furtherance of his employer's business, the employer cannot be held vicariously liable for the employee's actions.

The defendants assert that the actions of Sister Domitian in allegedly sexually assaulting a minor child, such as the plaintiff, is never within the scope of her employment. " [S]exual assaults on the plaintiff were repugnant to his employer's business and in utter contravention of the employer's aims and rules. Unlike a situation in which a servant performs the master's work poorly or misunderstands what the master wants done, the molestation of children is a total abdication of the master's work so that the pedophile priest can satisfy personal lust." Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 49 Conn.Supp. 667, 671, 909 A.2d 983 (2006).

The defendants claim the same is true for a teacher's alleged sexual assault of a minor student. See, Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of New London, No. KNLCV146021601S (Oct. 14, 2015, Cole-Chu, J.), 61 Conn.L.Rptr. 95,; Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury. No. X10UWYCV105015963 (May 9, 2014, Dooley, J.), 58 Conn.L.Rptr. 177, . In Sparano v. Daughters of Wisdom, Inc . Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, No. X08CV030199399 (July 1, 2004, Adams, J.), 37 Conn.L.Rptr. 422, the plaintiff alleged that while she was a minor child attending Waterbury Catholic High School in Waterbury, Connecticut, a defendant Sister, who was acting as a nun and teacher at the high school, sexually abused, assaulted and exploited the plaintiff causing her injury and damage. Id. The plaintiff further alleged that the defendant Congregation of Notre Dame of Ridgefield, Inc. was a religious community of women that controlled, supervised and was responsible for all teachers at Waterbury Catholic High School. The plaintiff also alleged that the defendant Daughters of Wisdom, Inc. was a religious community of women that controlled, supervised and was responsible for all teachers at the high school. It was alleged that the defendant Sister was an " agent and/or employee of the defendant Congregation and/or the defendant Daughters" during the time the plaintiff attended the high school. Id. Among the counts alleged by the plaintiff were counts seeking to hold the Congregation of Notre Dame of Ridgefield, Inc. and the Daughters of Wisdom, Inc., vicariously liable on a theory of respondeat superior for the defendant Sister's alleged torts. Id. The trial court struck these claims on the grounds that the defendant Sister's alleged conduct was " nothing less than a clear digression from duty and an abandonment of the [employer's] interests." Id.

In summary, the defendants argue that Sister Domitian's alleged sexual assault of the plaintiff was a clear digression from her duties and an abandonment of the interests of the school and the Bernadine Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis. Therefore, because Sister Domitian's conduct was not within the scope of her employment, as a matter of law, the court should strike Count One, the vicarious liability claim.

The plaintiff has filed his objection arguing that there are only " occasional cases" where the employee's digression from duty is so " clear-cut" that the matter can be disposed of as a matter of law. A-G Foods Inc. v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., supra, 216 Conn. 207, and this is not one of them. The plaintiff claims that a question of fact exists as to whether Sister Domitian was a " disobedient servant" whose conduct was sufficiently within the scope of her employment, so as to impose vicarious liability. Even a " negligent, disobedient and unfaithful" servant may be acting within the scope of his employment. Id. at 210. " The doctrine of respondeat superior focuses on the employee's conduct rather than on the employer's knowledge or approval of the acts. If the employee acted with apparent authority in furtherance of employer business, the employer's consent or ratification of the misconduct is irrelevant . . . even an innocent employer must compensate an injured party." Belanger v. Village Pub, 26 Conn.App. 509, 603 A.2d 1173 (1992); Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Winters, 22 Conn.App. 640, 646, 579 A.2d 545, cert. denied, 216 Conn. 820, 581 A.2d 1055 (1990). " The doctrine of respondeat superior, which makes the employer liable for actions by an employee, is based on public policy considerations that the employer shall be held responsible for the acts of those whom he employs, done in and about his business, even though such...