Doerun Municipal Court Inc. v. Bey, 073020 FED11, 20-11000
|Opinion Judge:||PER CURIAM|
|Party Name:||DOERUN MUNICIPAL COURT INC, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. TZEDKIYAH EL BEY, Defendant-Appellant.|
|Judge Panel:||Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.|
|Case Date:||July 30, 2020|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit|
DO NOT PUBLISH
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 7:19-cv-00083-HL
Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
Tzedkiyah EL Bey, 1 a defendant proceeding pro se, appeals the sua sponte order remanding his action, arising out of a traffic citation by a Doerun police officer, to Doerun Municipal Court.
In 2017, Tzedkiyah EL Bey was issued traffic citations by the Doerun Police Department. When Bey failed to appear before the court on his trial date, his driver's license was suspended pursuant to O.C.G.A. §17-6-11. Once detained in Albany, Georgia, Bey paid $332.00 to be released.
Concerning these events, Bey filed in federal district court a document he entitled "Notice of Removal," which included, among other items, a complaint that the district court construed as attempting to bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court dismissed the claim as barred and remanded the matter to state court for lack of removal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1).
On appeal, Bey argues that remand was improper and claims that the district court had removal jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332.
We review removal jurisdiction de novo. See Singleton v. Apfel, 231 F.3d 853, 856 (11th Cir. 2000). Ordinarily, we lack jurisdiction to review an order remanding a case to state court for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. 1447(c), (d); Alvarez v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 508 F.3d 639, 641 (11th Cir. 2007). For that reason, we do not consider Bey's claims that the district court erred in not finding subject-matter jurisdiction under §§ 1331 and 1332. But we can review orders remanding cases that were removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1443 to determine if removal was proper. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1443, 1447(c), (d); Alabama v. Conley, 245 F.3d 1292, 1293 n.1 (11th Cir. 2001).
Generally, "[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed." Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). Under 18 U.S.C. § 1443, a criminal defendant may remove an action to federal court if it is brought "[a]gainst any person who is...
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