Doggett v. City of Hyattsville, Case No.: PWG-13-3889

Decision Date14 May 2014
Docket NumberCase No.: PWG-13-3889
PartiesERNEST DOGGETT, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF HYATTSVILLE, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maryland
MEMORANDUM OPINION

While arresting Ernest Doggett for charges that later were dismissed, Hyattsville Police Officers Chantha Vong and Chite allegedly "punched [Doggett] in his face, his back, and his elbow, and bent his finger back," causing him to "suffer[] a broken left index finger, a broken right elbow, and facial contusions." Compl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 2. Initially represented by counsel, who subsequently was permitted to withdraw his appearance, he filed a seven-count complaint alleging assault,1 battery, false arrest, and violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. ¶¶ 12-34. As Defendants, he named Officers Vong and Chite, individually and in their official capacity, as well as the City of Hyattsville, Maryland ("Hyattsville"). Id. at 1. Hyattsville moves to dismiss the § 1983 claims against it (Counts V and VII) for failure to state a claim under Monell v.Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).2 Def.'s Mem. 3. Because Plaintiff has not pleaded sufficiently that a Hyattsville policy or custom caused the alleged violations of § 1983, Plaintiff has failed to state a Monell claim, and I will dismiss Counts V and VII.

Hyattsville contends that Counts V and VII are "the only counts pertaining to it," Def.'s Mem. 2, but Plaintiff claims in Counts II and III (for battery and false arrest) that "Hyattsville is liable for the actions taken by these officers pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior." Compl. ¶¶ 17 & 20. Yet, Hyattsville is immune from liability for Counts II and III because the officers' alleged actions were governmental in nature. Therefore, I will give Plaintiff notice and an opportunity to be heard and, absent a showing that he has stated a claim against Hyattsville in Count II or III, I will dismiss these counts as to Defendant Hyattsville as well.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for "the dismissal of a complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Velencia v. Drezhlo, No. RDB-12-237, 2012 WL 6562764, at *4 (D. Md. Dec. 13, 2012). This rule's purpose "'is to test the sufficiency of a complaint and not to resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.'" Id. (quoting Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006)). To that end, the Court bears in mind the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), when considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Specifically, a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and must state "a plausible claim for relief," as "[t]hreadbare recitals ofthe elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice," Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. See Velencia, 2012 WL 6562764, at *4 (discussing standard from Iqbal and Twombly). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663.

II. DISCUSSION
A. Counts V and VII

Counts V and VII allege "Violation of 4th Amendment Rights, 42 U.S.C. Section 1983," against Hyattsville, through arrest without probable cause in the fifth count and excessive force in the seventh count. Compl. 5-7. In Count V, Plaintiff claims

26. On February 19, 2011, while acting under color of state law, Officers Vong and Chite knowingly deprived plaintiff of his 4th Amendment right to be free from arrest without probable cause by arresting plaintiff without probable cause to believe he had committed a crime.
27. Officer Vong and Chite's actions were the result of the City of Hyattsville's custom, policy, and practice of and deliberate indifference to, and failure to take action to stop, the widespread and on-going practice of arresting individuals without probable cause by the City's police officers.

Compl. ¶¶ 26-27. Similarly, in Count VII, Plaintiff claims

33. On February 19, 2011, while acting under color of state law, Officers Vong and Chite knowingly deprived plaintiff of his 4th Amendment right to be free from the use of excessive force by using excessive force during the course of an arrest.
34. Officer Vong and Chite's actions were the result of the City of Hyattsville's custom, policy, and practice of and deliberate indifference to, and failure to take action to stop, the widespread and on-going use of excessive force by the City's police officers.

Id. ¶¶ 33-34. Plaintiff does not include any other allegations regarding Hyattsville's alleged custom or policy.

In Hyattsville's view, "Counts V and VII are devoid of any allegations from which it could be concluded that the City of Hyattsville is potentially liable under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)." Def.'s Mem. 3. Hyattsville insists that "Counts V and VII consist of nothing by non-specific boilerplate, without any relevant factual allegations whatsoever concerning an unconstitutional policy, custom or practice of the municipality," such that they fail to state a claim. Id. at 8-9.

Plaintiff counters that "there is sufficient circumstantial evidence of a de facto custom, policy and/or practice of the City of Hyattsville permitting its police officers to use excessive force and to make arrests without probable cause that plaintiff's constitutional claims against the City should not be dismissed." Pl.'s Opp'n1-2. Specifically, he alleges that "[a]t this time, at least six other individuals have filed claims against the City of Hyattsville and its police officers alleging that between 2010 and 2012, City of Hyattsville police officers have used excessive force and\or have arrested or incarcerated City residents without probable cause." Id. at 2. In support, he cites three cases in this District and attaches two articles from online publications. Id.; see Pl.'s Opp'n Ex. A, ECF No. 7-1. He insists that these cases and articles are "sufficient evidence . . . to establish the existence of a practice of constitutional violations that is so 'persistent and widespread' as to 'constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.'" Pl.'s Opp'n 3 (no citation provided). He asserts that "plaintiff should, instead, be permitted to conduct discovery in order to obtain additional facts, information and evidence to maintain his 4th Amendment claims against the City." Id. at 2.

Hyattsville, as a unit of local government, is a "'person[]'" subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as stated in Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). DiPino v. Davis, 729 A.2d 354, 368 (Md. 1999). But, "[u]nder Monell, a municipality's liability"arises only where the constitutionally offensive actions of employees are taken in furtherance of some municipal 'policy or custom.'" Walker v. Prince George's Cnty., MD, 575 F.3d 426, 431 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Milligan v. City of Newport News, 743 F.2d 227, 229 (4th Cir. 1984)); see Rockwell v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., No. CIV.A. RDB-13-3049, 2014 WL 949859, at *11 (D. Md. Mar. 11, 2014) (citing Walker). Thus, a Monell claim is a form of § 1983 action under which a municipality, such as Hyattsville, is liable "where a policymaker officially promulgates or sanctions an unconstitutional law, or where the municipality is deliberately indifferent to the development of an unconstitutional custom." Smith v. Ray, 409 Fed. App'x 641, 651 (4th Cir. 2011). The government's policy or custom must have "played a part in the deprivation" underpinning the plaintiff's claim. DiPino v. Davis, 729 A.2d 354, 369 (1999). The policy or custom may be "an express policy, such as a written ordinance or regulation"; a decision by "a person with final policymaking authority;" "an omission, such as a failure to properly train officers, that manifest[s] deliberate indifference to the rights of citizens;" or "a practice that is so persistent and widespread as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law." Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 471 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

To state a Monell claim, a plaintiff must allege that "'(1) the municipality [had] actual or constructive knowledge of the custom and usage by its responsible policymakers, and (2) there [was] a failure by those policymakers, as a matter of specific intent or deliberate indifference, to correct or terminate the improper custom and usage.'" Rockwell, 2014 WL 949859, at *11 (quoting Randall, 302 F.3d at 210 (internal quotation marks omitted)). The plaintiff also must allege that there was "a 'direct causal link' between the policy or custom and the deprivation of rights." Id. (quoting City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 386-86 (1989)). Notably, "'there must be numerous particular instances of unconstitutional conduct in order to establish acustom or practice,'" because "[a] municipality is not liable for mere 'isolated incidents of unconstitutional conduct by subordinate employees.'" Smith v. Ray, 409 Fed. App'x 641, 651 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 473 (4th Cir. 2003)).

Plaintiff's threadbare counts cannot survive more careful scrutiny. While he claims that Hyattsville had either a policy, or a failure to act that amounts to "deliberate indifference," or a "widespread and on-going" practice that is tantamount to a custom, he fails to describe the alleged "formal and informal customs, policies, and practices" beyond the boilerplate, conclusory statements quoted above. See Compl. ¶¶ 27 & 34. Moreover, Plaintiff only alleges one instance of allegedly unconstitutional conduct in his Complaint: the police officers' acts on ...

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