Doherty v. King
| Decision Date | 20 November 1944 |
| Docket Number | No. 5663.,5663. |
| Citation | 183 S.W.2d 1004 |
| Parties | DOHERTY et al. v. KING et al. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Donley County; A. S. Moss, Judge.
Suit by Winifred P. Doherty and another, as trustees and tax-paying voters of McKnight Common School District No. 23 of Donley County, Texas, and others against R. Y. King, County Judge of Donley County, and others, to contest school elections, wherein the Quail Rural Consolidated Hight School District No. 4 of Collingsworth County, Texas, intervened. From an adverse judgment, contestants appeal.
Affirmed.
J. R. Porter, of Clarendon, for appellants.
L. E. Gribble and W. M. Tucker, both of Wellington, for appellees.
This is a contested school election case in which Winifred P. Doherty and W. H. Moss, trustees and resident tax-paying voters of McKnight Common School District No. 23 of Donley County, Texas, joined by G. M. Johnson and Chester Hill, resident tax-paying voters of the said district, filed suit against the contestees, R. Y. King, County Judge of Donley County, the Commissioners Court of Donley County and the County Board of School Trustees of Donley County. The contestants alleged that two school elections were held in the McKnight Common School District No. 23 on September 7, 1944, to determine in one election whether or not the said McKnight district should be consolidated with the Quail Rural Consolidated High School District No. 4 of Collingsworth County, Texas, and to determine in the other election whether or not the said McKnight district would assume, in case of consolidation, the outstanding bonded indebtedness of the said Quail Rural High School District No. 4 of Collingsworth County; that both elections were void and held without any legal authority to support the holding of such elections and they prayed that the said elections be declared null and void and of no force and effect.
The contestees failed to answer but the Quail Rural Consolidated High School District No. 4 of Collingsworth County, Texas, intervened and admitted that the elections were held in the McKnight Common School District No. 23 of Donley County as alleged by the contestants and pleaded further that on the same date like elections were held in the said Quail Rural Consolidated High School District No. 4 in Collingsworth County on the same questions of consolidation and the assumption by the Quail District of the McKnight District's bonded indebtedness; that both propositions carried by popular vote in each of the said districts; that the returns of the said elections were properly canvassed and the results declared and that the said elections were held in accordance with the laws of Texas governing such matters. Intervenor prayed that the contests be not sustained and that the contestants be denied all the relief prayed for.
The case was heard without a jury before the trial court on October 10, 1944 and judgment rendered denying the relief prayed for by contestants and declaring the elections valid and binding, from which judgment the contestants perfected an appeal to this court. A joint motion was filed by the parties in this court on November 1, 1944, asking that the case be advanced as provided for in article 3056, R. C. S.; the motion was granted and the case was submitted and oral argument heard on November 13, 1944.
Such election contests are usually brought in the name of the State or some State's attorney but it has been held in the case of Tate et al. v. Farmer, County Attorney, et al., Tex.Civ.App., 112 S.W.2d 782, that a majority of the trustees of a common school district are authorized to institute such a suit. In the instant case the record shows contestants Doherty and Moss were trustees of the McKnight Common School District No. 23 of Donley County and they constitute a majority of the trustees. It has likewise been held in the case of Baker et al. v. Webster et al., Tex.Civ.App., 123 S.W.2d 690, that in such contests the statutory requirements have been met when either the county attorney or the county judge is made a contestee and in the instant case R. Y. King, County Judge of Donley County, was made a contestee.
An agreed stipulation of facts filed in the case reveals that petitions with requisite numbers of qualified voters of the two contiguous school districts, the McKnight Common School District No. 23 of Donley County and the Quail Rural Consolidated High School District No. 4 of Collingsworth County, were presented on August 16, 1944 to the county judges, respectively, of Donley and Collingsworth Counties, praying for elections to be held in the respective districts to determine whether or not the said districts should be consolidated and whether or not, in case of consolidation, each would assume the bonded indebedness of the other; that elections were ordered held in the respective districts on September 7, 1944, and notices of the same duly posted; that both propositions carried in separate elections held in the Quail district by a vote of 46 to none, and in separate elections held in the McKnight district by a vote of 40 to 13; that the returns of the elections were duly made to the commissioners courts of the respective counties and on September 11, 1944, during the forenoon, the said commissioners courts respectively canvassed the returns, declared the results accordingly and ordered the said districts consolidated. It appears that the proceedings were had simultaneously in the two districts but that the proceedings were had, the elections were held, the returns were canvassed, and the results declared in each district and in each county independently of the other. It further appears that proper notices of the election contests were given and that this suit was subsequently filed in the afternoon of September 11, 1944 and after the results of the elections had been declared by the commissioners courts of the respective counties.
The contestants make no complaint about any of the proceedings had in the holding of the elections, canvassing the returns, and declaring the results other than there was no provision in the State law authorizing such elections to be held and no provision in the State law authorizing a consolidation of two such school districts in such a manner as these were sought to be consolidated. The intervenor contends that articles 2922aa and 2806 of Vernon's Civil Statutes authorize such a consolidation and that the provisions of these Acts were complied with in effecting this consolidation and the assumption of the indebtedness.
It clearly appears that articles 2922a and 2922c of Chapter 19a, R. C. S., have to do with procedure in the matter of annexing or grouping of school districts of various types to form rural high school districts, while article 2922aa of Chapter 19a and article 2806, Revised Civil Statutes, 1925, Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. arts. 2806, 2922aa, are related solely to the matter of consolidation of school districts of various types.
In reviewing the history of the Rural High School Act we find that the Thirty-ninth Legislature, c. 59, enacted Chapter 19a in 1925, authorizing the county board of school trustees to create rural high schools by grouping or annexing independent or common school districts with the consent of a majority of the trustees of the districts affected; that the said chapter provided that in some instances such could be done by the said county board only after elections have been held in the districts to determine the question and that the said Act likewise provided for the establishment of county-line rural high school districts by the county board of school trustees upon a written order of a majority of the members of each county board concerned. Chapter 19a was amended by Act of the Fortieth Legislature, First Called Session, in 1927, c. 78, which amendment strengthened the provisions of the original Act, provided for the assumption of outstanding indebtedness and for abolishing such districts after establishment if desired. The regular session of the Forty-fifth Legislature in 1937, c. 416,...
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