Dolan v. Continental Airlines/Continental Exp.

• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: BOYLE; MALLETT, C.J., and BRICKLEY, MICHAEL F. CAVANAGH, RILEY, WEAVER and MARILYN J. KELLY, JJ., concurred with BOYLE
• Citation: Dolan v. Continental Airlines/Continental Exp., 563 N.W.2d 23, 454 Mich. 373 (Mich. 1997)
• Decision Date: 20 May 1997
• Docket Number: No. 19,Docket No. 102413,19
• Parties: , 12 IER Cases 1631 Sue Ann DOLAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CONTINENTAL AIRLINES/CONTINENTAL EXPRESS, a Delaware corporation, Defendant-Appellee. Calendar

Page 23

563 N.W.2d 23

454 Mich. 373, 12 IER Cases 1631

Sue Ann DOLAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CONTINENTAL AIRLINES/CONTINENTAL EXPRESS, a Delaware corporation, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 102413.

Calendar No. 19.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Jan. 16, 1997.

Decided May 20, 1997.

Cunningham & Associates by Douglas C. Cunningham, Lansing, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone by Megan P. Norris, Detroit, for Defendant-Appellee.

Opinion

BOYLE, Justice.

I

In this case we are asked to determine whether plaintiff has stated a valid claim of wrongful discharge from employment under Michigan's Whistleblowers' Protection Act (WPA), ¹ breach of contract principles, and public policy. For the reasons that follow, we hold that plaintiff has failed to state a claim of wrongful discharge from employment under public policy and breach of contract principles, but has stated a valid claim under the WPA. Accordingly, we affirm the grant of summary disposition as it relates to the public policy and breach of contract claims, and reverse and remand for further proceedings on the WPA claim.

II

Plaintiff worked as a ticketing agent for defendant airlines ² at the Capitol City Airport in Lansing, Michigan . In early 1991, as a means of tightening airport security during the Persian Gulf War, plaintiff and her colleagues were asked to stay alert to individuals purchasing tickets or otherwise contacting the airline who fit a designated profile description relating to drug trafficking or terrorist activities. Plaintiff did just that and, in January or February, 1991, she and a co-worker informed airport security of individuals who fit the profile description. On the basis of plaintiff's tip, the Federal Drug Enforcement Agency intervened and made an arrest. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff again contacted the authorities to report yet another individual whom she believed fit the designated profile. The DEA assured plaintiff that she would be rewarded.

On February 10, 1991, the general manager of Continental Express posted a written notice directing employees to seek management approval before contacting authorities to report individuals believed to fit the profile description. ³ One month later, plaintiff was approached by the general manager and asked if she had contacted the DEA after February 10, 1991. Plaintiff claimed that she had not, but was sent home pending an investigation.

According to plaintiff, Continental's investigation unearthed two individuals who agreed to provide written statements indicating that plaintiff had reported two passenger names to the DEA after February 10, 1991. When confronted, plaintiff admitted that she contacted the DEA after the February date, but insisted that she did so only because she wanted information on the status of her reward. Plaintiff contends that she did not report passenger names after the February 10 posting.

In March, 1991, the general manager of Continental Express contacted the plaintiff and told her that her relationship with Continental was over. The next day, plaintiff was shown one of two written statements that alleged that she had contacted the DEA without Continental Express' approval after February 10, 1991. ⁴ Plaintiff was told that corporate headquarters would make the final determination on her employment status. Subsequently, plaintiff's employment was terminated. ⁵

Plaintiff's original complaint alleged wrongful discharge from employment under the Michigan Whistleblowers' Protection Act and breach of contract principles. The circuit court granted defendant's motion for summary disposition on the WPA claim. ⁶ Shortly thereafter, plaintiff filed an amended complaint, adding a new charge of wrongful discharge from employment in violation of public policy. Defendant again sought dismissal of plaintiff's claims under MCR 2.116(C)(8). At the same time, plaintiff filed a motion for relief from the October 10, 1991, order granting defendant summary disposition on the WPA claim. After consolidating the matters, the court granted defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's first amended complaint with prejudice and denied plaintiff's motion for relief from the October 10, 1991, order. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We granted leave to appeal. 452 Mich. 866 (1996).

III

Plaintiff alleges that the court dismissed the WPA claim on the basis of a faulty interpretation of the law. According to plaintiff, the December 16, 1991, decision in Dudewicz v. Norris Schmid, Inc., 192 Mich.App. 247, 254, 480 N.W.2d 612, aff'd. in part and rev'd in part 443 Mich. 68, 503 N.W.2d 645 (1993), extended the application of the act and required that the court grant relief from its earlier order dismissing the whistleblowers' claim.

In considering plaintiff's motion for relief from that order, the circuit court reviewed the whistleblowers' claim in light of the Court of Appeals opinion in Dudewicz and determined that the grant of summary disposition had been appropriate. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, having the benefit of this Court's analysis in Dudewicz, reduced the instant issue to whether the WPA was intended to protect "third parties whose violations, if any, have no connection to the business." 208 Mich.App. 316, 318-319, 526 N.W.2d 922 (1995). The Court of Appeals found that the act did not apply, stating that "in order for the WPA to apply, the violation or suspected violation must be committed in the course of doing business." Id. at 320, 526 N.W.2d 922.

IV

Michigan's Whistleblowers' Protection Act was first enacted in 1981, largely in response to the accidental PBB-contamination of livestock feed. ⁷ The act "encourage[s] employees to assist in law enforcement and ... protect[s] those employees who engage in whistleblowing activities." ⁸ It does so with an eye toward promoting public health and safety. The underlying purpose of the act is protection of the public. ⁹ The act meets this objective by protecting the whistleblowing employee ¹⁰ and by removing barriers that may interdict employee efforts to report violations or suspected violations of the law. Without employees who are willing to risk adverse employment consequences as a result of whistleblowing activities, the public would remain unaware of large-scale and potentially dangerous abuses. ¹¹

To establish a prima facie case under the WPA, plaintiff must prove that she "report[ed] or [was] about to report ... a violation or a suspected violation of a law ... to a public body." M.C.L. § 15.362; M.S.A. § 17.428(2). ¹² Plaintiff asserts that she was terminated "because [she] reported and/or was perceived to report a violation or a suspected violation of a law...." ¹³ Because plaintiff appeals from a motion granting summary disposition, all factual allegations supporting her claims must be accepted as true.

V

A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8), tests the legal basis of the claim and is granted if the claim is so manifestly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual progression could possibly support recovery. Simko v. Blake, 448 Mich. 648, 654, 532 N.W.2d 842 (1995). Motions for summary disposition are examined on the pleadings alone, absent consideration of supporting affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence, and all factual allegations contained in the complaint must be accepted as true. Id. at 654, 532 N.W.2d 842.

VI

The pivotal question in this case is whether the plaintiff stated a valid claim of wrongful discharge from employment under the WPA where she alleged that she reported or was perceived to report a violation or suspected violation of the law. We find that she did. ¹⁴

A plain reading of the WPA reveals that employees who report violations or suspected violations of the law to a public body are entitled to protection under the act. As interpreted, the act provides protection to employees who report violations of law by either their employers or fellow employees. Dudewicz, 443 Mich. 68, 503 N.W.2d 645. The act was intended to protect employees who alert the public to "corruption or criminally irresponsible behavior in the conduct of government or large businesses." ¹⁵ Id. at 75, 503 N.W.2d 645. Frequently, a close connection exists between the reported violation and the employment setting, although no such limitation is found in the statute. Id.

In Dudewicz, the plaintiff worked as a parts manager for the defendant automobile dealership. In an effort to gain better service for a customer, the plaintiff, along with the dealership's owner, convinced the service manager to perform work for the customer under warranty. After the owner left the area, the service manager allegedly assaulted the plaintiff. The plaintiff was fired when he refused to drop criminal charges against the service manager. A majority of this Court afforded the plaintiff protection under the WPA. While acknowledging that the connection between the violation and the employment setting was slightly more attenuated than "traditional notions of whistleblowing," ¹⁶ the majority found that the violation was "very much within the employer-employee setting." ¹⁷

In light of the approach taken in Dudewicz, we decline to limit application of the WPA to reported violations of the employer alone. In accordance with the plain language of the act, plaintiff has alleged that she was fired because she reported or was believed to have reported a violation of the law. This allegation is sufficient to state a claim of wrongful discharge from employment under the WPA. In addition, we find that the reported violation in the present case was sufficiently related to the employment setting to be protected under the WPA. This is not to say that only those violations that are connected to the employment setting are contemplated under the WPA, only that the reported violation in the present case was sufficiently connected to the employment setting to be contemplated under the...