Dolan v. Dolan

• Decision Date: 28 February 1928
• Citation: 107 Conn. 342,140 A. 745
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: DOLAN v. DOLAN.

140 A. 745

107 Conn. 342

DOLAN v. DOLAN.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

February 28, 1928

Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; Edward M. Yeomans Judge.

Action for recovery of real and personal property, accounting, other equitable relief, and damages by Michael Dolan against Alice Dolan, tried to the court. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Error, judgment reversed, and cause remanded, with direction.

James B. Henry, of Hartford, for appellant.

Frederic J. Corbett, of Hartford, for appellee.

Argued before WHEELER, C.J., and MALTBIE, HAINES, HINMAN, and BANKS JJ.

HAINES, J.

The appellant seeks many changes in the finding, and has brought before us all the evidence in the case, including exhibits of two savings bank accounts. A study of this evidence discloses that, with two exceptions, none of the findings objected to were made without evidence to support them, and should stand. Paragraph 16 of the finding states that the work at the Ambassador Apartments continued for four years, but the evidence seems to be undisputed that it was five years, and this change is made accordingly. Paragraph 27 states that the deposits which the defendant made in the Society for Savings represented money obtained from her various employments. By the later addition of paragraph 33 to the finding, this is shown to be incorrect, and it is stricken out. the initial deposit of $500 in 1912 was money handed to the defendant by the plaintiff, being part of the proceeds of the sale of his tobacco farm. None of the additions to the finding which the appellant now seeks are admitted or undisputed facts, save in three instances.

These facts are undisputed: From 1909 to 1917 the earnings of the husband after he sold the farm were $10 to $12 per week, but afterward, to 1926, his wages were $32.50 per week, and have been so to date. From 1917 to 1926, the defendant did little remunerative work, though deriving some income from the sale of fruit, eggs, and chickens. Paragraphs 2 and 4 of the appellant's claims are added to the finding to the extent indicated. The appellant also asks that a summary of the savings bank deposits as shown by the exhibits be added. It appears from these that the defendant deposited the following sums in the years indicated: In 1913, $30; 1915, $10; 1916, $40; 1917, $130; 1919, $750; 1920, $500; 1921, $840; 1923, $1,122; 1924, $600; 1925, $400; 1926, $1,150. These were in addition to certain other sums traced to real estate transactions or other sources, and, in addition to the initial deposit of $500 which is already found by the trial court to have been the husband's money. This summary is added, and with these changes the finding stands.

The husband handed nearly all his income to his wife, who mixed those moneys with her own derived from various sources, and kept no account, but paid all household expenses, and deposited the balance in the savings bank in her own name. It is clear that the earnings of both parties were very moderate from the time of the marriage until the husband obtained his position as janitor of the Ambassador Apartments in 1917. From an earning capacity of $12 to $15 per week, his income then rose to $32.50 per week, with rent, heat, light, milk, and ice free, and this continued at the time of the suit. The savings deposits clearly reflected this change in the family circumstances. Aside from the $500 of the husband's money with which the savings account was opened, the total deposits from 1912 to 1917 were but $80. On August 1st following, however, $130 was deposited, and the total deposits to the time of the suit amounted to more than $5,400. The striking significance of these facts is emphasized by the lack of any other adequate explanation of this vastly increased prosperity and capacity for saving than the husband's increased earnings. On the facts before us, it is obvious that the fund now in question has resulted from the combined incomes of both husband and wife. The fact is also found that there was never any agreement between these parties as to these moneys which were saved. Under these circumstances, the judgment in favor of the wife can only be supported upon the theory that the money which the husband handed her was intended by him as a gift to her. In the absence of facts to rebut the conclusion, the law would presume as a fact that that was the intention. Fox v. Shanley, 94 Conn. 350, 357, 109 A. 249; Wilson v. Warner, 89 Conn. 243-245, 93 A. 533; Corr's Appeal, 62 Conn. 403, 407, 26 A. 478; 3 Pomeroy, Equity (4th Ed.) § 1041.

Whether the trial court was justified in relying on this presumption and rendering judgment that this fund belonged to the wife depends, therefore, upon what is disclosed by the amended finding of facts. From this it appears that out of the combined incomes the wife, by mutual agreement, first paid all the household expenses. When there was a surplus over and above what was needed for this purpose, she deposited it in the savings bank, taking the deposit book in her own name. With the fund so created, including the $500 which the husband had received from the sale of his farm, the wife, with his knowledge, bought the Madison avenue property. The title to this property was taken in her name; also it appears, by mutual agreement, the husband's reason being " because the defendant would be better satisfied, and not quarrel with the plaintiff as long as it was in the name of the defendant," and the plaintiff said to the conveyancer, " Put it in her name, and we will have peace in the family."

It further appears that this property was transferred to the wife " as a home for both the plaintiff and the defendant." All this is inconsistent with, and clearly rebuts, any presumption that the surrender of title to the wife and her possession of either cash or real estate was intended by the husband as a gift to her. If the fund belonged to the wife, the consent of the husband to the plan of putting the real estate in her name would have been wholly unnecessary. It is at least a fair, if not a necessary, inference from the foregoing facts that the title would not have been so taken without that consent, and save for the reasons he gave for doing so. They were living together as husband and wife. Each was well aware that the money with which the purchase was being made had been accumulated by their joint efforts; the husband had earned and furnished most of the money, and the wife, by thrift, had saved it, and a home was now being bought for their joint use and benefit. We can find nothing in the situation which indicates that either party then looked upon the property as that of the wife alone; nor is it in any way suggested that their individual interests were to be aliquot parts or dependent upon the amounts which each had personally furnished in cash.

Both apparently recognized that the fund in the hands of the wife was made up of moneys of each which had been pooled for their joint benefit in maintaining their home and paying the current...