Dolan v. Lt. Joseph P. Kennedy Inst., Inc.
| Decision Date | 17 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:18-cv-822-RCL |
| Parties | MARY DOLAN, Plaintiff, v. LT. JOSEPH P. KENNEDY INSTITUTE, INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
UNDER SEAL
The Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Washington declined to renew Mary Dolan's contract as a special-education teacher at a school run by Catholic Charities — the Lt. Joseph P. Kennedy Institute. In this suit alleging unlawful retaliation, the parties offer two dichotomous narratives to explain why. Ms. Dolan claims that she lost her job at the Institute because she fought back against the Institute's unlawful withholding of speech therapy from students; she describes the Institute as bent on saving money and squelching dissent. Catholic Charities claims that it chose not to renew Ms. Dolan's contract because she mismanaged classroom staff, kept her classroom in disarray, and failed to follow protocols when organizing a field trip; it describes Ms. Dolan as behaving unprofessionally and inappropriately. Because resolving this case requires a factfinder to assess the credibility of competing evidence in weighing those two narratives and determining why the Institute did not renew Ms. Dolan's contract, summary judgment is inappropriate.
Ms. Dolan, however, has established one element of her claims: in not renewing her contract, Catholic Charities took an adverse employment action against her.
Ms. Dolan moved for partial summary judgment (ECF No. 32). Upon consideration of the motion, opposition (ECF No. 39), and reply (ECF No. 40), and all other papers of record, the Court will grant in part and deny in part the motion by separate order.
The defendants moved to exclude Ms. Dolan's expert and strike her expert report (ECF No. 25). Upon consideration of the motion, opposition (ECF No. 26), and reply (ECF No. 27), the Court will deny the motion by separate order.
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (known as "IDEA") requires the District of Columbia to afford a free and appropriate public education to all children within its jurisdiction. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412. To meet that obligation, the District must "provid[e] personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction." Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 203 (1982).
Under the statute, the District is obligated to devise Individualized Education Programs ("IEPs") for each eligible child, mapping out specific educational goals and requirements in light of the child's disabilities and matching the child with a school capable of fulfilling those needs. If no suitable public school is available, the District must pay the costs of sending the child to an appropriate private school.
Jenkins v. Squillacote, 935 F.2d 303, 304-05 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). The District must periodically review each student's IEP, ordinarily in a meeting with the student's IEP team— composed of his parent, teachers, school district representative, service providers, and other appropriate experts. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(a)(2), (d)(1)(B), (d)(4)(A).
The Institute is a non-public school that provides special education to students referred from the District of Columbia Public Schools system ("DCPS"). Dolan Evid., Ex. 4; Defs. Evid., Ex. 14 ¶ 6. Catholic Charities owns and operates the Institute, Answer ¶ 3 (ECF No. 7), and the Institute's principal reports to Catholic Charities management, Adon Dep. 68:22-69:3 (ECF No. 39-2). Catholic Charities employs all of the Institute's teachers, administrators, and other staff; the Institute itself has no employees. Defs. Evid., Ex. 14 ¶ 3. During the 2016-17 school year, under the leadership of principal Paris Adon and assistant principal Abby Brandt, the Institute educated nearly three dozen students, Adon Dep. 159:4-8, and employed dedicated special education teachers and other staff, including classroom aides known as paraprofessionals, see id. at 223:10-18 (). To provide that education, the Catholic Charities and the Institute received federal funds. Defs. Evid., Ex. 14 ¶¶ 4-5.
This suit concerns, in part, the education and services the Institute provided to two students, whom the parties and the Court refer to as Student K and Student M to protect their anonymity. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2. Each had an IEP to address his or her educational needs. Student K suffers from selective mutism, Witte Dep. 90:16-22 (ECF No. 39-7), and her IEP initially required speech therapists to consult with Student K's teachers about treating that condition, id. at 94:1-6. Student M has autism, Dolan Evid., Ex. 13 at 4, and his IEP required that he receive speech therapy, id. at 21. Student M also had a behavioral management plan governing how the Institute responded to his sometimes-aggressive behavior. Dolan Evid., Ex. 14.
In June of 2016, Catholic Charities hired Ms. Dolan on a one-year contract to serve as a special-education teacher at the Institute. Defs. Evid., Ex. 13. She taught social studies andEnglish during the 2016-17 school year. See Dolan Dep., 48:2-5 (ECF No. 39-4). At the end of March 2017, Dr. Adon decided not to renew Ms. Dolan's contract. Adon Dep., 16:20-17:2.
The parties disagree as to why Dr. Adon made that decision. In her motion, Ms. Dolan points to three events that she says led the school to end her employment: (1) reporting to Ms. Brandt that Student M was not receiving his required speech services, (2) objecting to the DCPS speech pathologist's recommendation to remove Student K's speech services at her annual IEP review meeting, and (3) reporting to Ms. Brandt that a paraprofessional restrained Student M. But Dr. Adon says he declined to reappoint Ms. Dolan because she could not work with the paraprofessionals, because she failed to follow protocols in arranging a field trip, and because she kept her classroom in a state of disarray. See Adon Dep. 14:16-15:7. Dr. Adon, however, also says that Ms. Dolan's inability to communicate with DCPS officials at Student K's IEP meeting played a role in his decision. See id.
One year after Dr. Dolan informed Ms. Dolan that Catholic Charities would not renew her contract, Ms. Dolan filed this action. She alleged causes of action under the D.C. Human Rights Act, D.C. Code § 2-1402.61, the Employees of District Contractors and Instrumentality Whistleblower Protection Act ("Whistleblower Act"), D.C. Code § 2-223.02, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. 93-112, Title V, § 504, 87 Stat. 394.
Ms. Dolan's motion seeks summary judgment on her Human Rights and Whistleblower Act claims. She also seeks partial summary judgment on two of the elements of her Rehabilitation Act claims — that she engaged in protected activity and that Catholic Charities took an adverse employment action against her.
The parties have completed fact discovery, but the Court granted the defendants' motion to stay expert discovery until it resolves the pending motion in limine. See Order, Jan. 14, 2020 (ECF No. 29).
The Court grants summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The moving party bears the burden of showing its entitlement to summary judgment; the moving party, however, must simply show that the non-moving party has not produced enough evidence to meet its burden at trial. See Celolex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
The Court construes facts and makes inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). If the parties disagree about material facts, the Court must credit the non-moving party's version. Robinson v. Pezzat, 818 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Facts, however, are disputed only if a reasonable jury could believe either side of the dispute. See Scott, 550 U.S. at 380. A fact is material if it is necessary to the Court's decision. See Johnson v. Perez, 823 F.3d 701, 705 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
If the Court cannot grant a motion for summary judgment in full, it may also grant what the rules refer to as partial summary judgment to resolve all or part of a non-dispositive claim or defense. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Jackson v. Att'y Gen., No. CV 18-26 (JEB), 2020 WL 1911540, at *4 (D.D.C. Apr. 20, 2020); 11 Moore's Federal Practice Civil § 56.02 (2020) ( ). An order granting partial summary judgment on an element of a claim is interlocutory and serves to streamline a trial, much like a Rule 16 pretrial order. SeeJackson, 2020 WL 1911540, at *4 () (quoting Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v. Nat'l Retirement Fund, 778 F.3d 593, 606 (7th Cir. 2015)); see also 10B Charles Allan Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2737 (4th ed., 2020).
While neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor the Federal Rules of Evidence expressly provide for motions in limine, the Court may allow such motions "pursuant to the district court's inherent authority to manage the course of trials." Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4 (1984). In ruling on a motion in limine, the Court appropriately determines whether evidence is admissible at trial but should not resolve factual disputes or weigh evidence. Graves v. District of Columbia, 850 F. Supp. 2d 6, 10-11 (D.D.C. 2011). "[T]he Court has broad discretion to make judgments about whether proffered evidence is sufficiently relative or overly prejudicial." Barnes v....
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