Dolce v. Gamberdino

• Decision Date: 03 May 1978
• Docket Number: No. 77-320,77-320
• Citation: 60 Ill.App.3d 124,376 N.E.2d 273,17 Ill.Dec. 274
• Parties: , 17 Ill.Dec. 274 Viola C. DOLCE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Nello P. GAMBERDINO and LeRoy W. Gudgeon, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 273

376 N.E.2d 273

60 Ill.App.3d 124, 17 Ill.Dec. 274

Viola C. DOLCE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Nello P. GAMBERDINO and LeRoy W. Gudgeon, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 77-320.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Third Division.

May 3, 1978.

Donald H. Elliott, Chicago, for plaintiff-appellant; Francis X. Riley, Chicago, of counsel.

Angelo Ruggiero, Chicago, for defendant-appellee Nello P. Gamberdino.

French & Rogers, Michael C. Kominiarek, Chicago, of counsel, for defendant-appellee, LeRoy W. Gudgeon.

JIGANTI, Presiding Justice:

The plaintiff, Viola C. Dolce, appeals a ruling which dismissed her action for legal malpractice as barred by the statute of limitations. Her complaint alleged that the defendants, Nello P. Gamberdino and LeRoy W. Gudgeon, while individually acting as her attorneys, failed to prosecute a Workmen's Compensation claim relating to her husband's death.

On February 17, 1970, the plaintiff's husband, Sare R. Dolce, died in an accident at work. The plaintiff is the executor of her husband's will and his sole devisee and legatee. At the time of his death, both the plaintiff and her husband were represented by Gamberdino.

On January 6, 1971 the plaintiff sent a letter to Gamberdino dismissing him as her attorney. She asked him to bill her for his services to that date and instructed him to turn over all papers to Gudgeon, her new attorney. She suggested that the attorneys could arrange a time for the transfer.

On February 17, 1971, one year from the death of the plaintiff's husband, the statute of limitations for filing a Workmen's Compensation claim for the incident expired. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 48, par. 138.6(c)(3).) Neither Gamberdino nor Gudgeon filed a claim in the plaintiff's behalf, nor advised the plaintiff of the possibility of the claim.

On March 18, 1974, the plaintiff's present counsel informed the plaintiff of the Workmen's Compensation claim and the fact that the defendants' failure to file it could constitute legal malpractice.

On February 17, 1976 five years from the day the statute of limitations ran on the Workmen's Compensation claim, the plaintiff instituted this action against Gamberdino for legal malpractice.

On May 13, 1976, the plaintiff filed her first amended complaint, adding Gudgeon as a defendant. A second amended complaint alleged legal malpractice against both Gamberdino and Gudgeon as a result of their failure to file a Workmen's Compensation claim. The plaintiff asserted she lacked knowledge of any right to file such a claim and that she lacked any opportunity to discover such right until she had been advised of the possibility by her present counsel. In the circuit court both defendants successfully asserted the statute of limitations as a bar to the plaintiff's action against them.

The plaintiff asserts that legal malpractice cases are governed by section 15 of the Illinois Limitations Act: " * * * actions on unwritten contracts, expressed or implied, * * *, and all civil actions not otherwise provided for, shall be commenced within 5 years next after the cause of action accrued." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 83, par. 16.) She states that since the complaint was filed on February 17, 1976, five years from the Workmen's Compensation deadline, her action against each of the defendants is timely. In any event, she contends, in matters involving legal malpractice, a court must apply the "discovery rule," computing the limitations period from the time a plaintiff actually knows or should have known of the existence of injury. Under this rule, since it was not until March, 1974 that she first learned of the malpractice, she had until March, 1979 in which to file her action.

Actions involving legal malpractice, grounded on the contractual attorney-client relationship, come within the five year limitations period of section 15. (Kohler v. Woolen, Brown & Hawkins (1973), 15 Ill.App. 455, 459, 304 N.E.2d 677, 679; Maloney v. Graham (1912), 171 Ill.App. 409, 411; Wilson v. LeFevour (1974), 22 Ill.App.3d 608, 609, 317 N.E.2d 772, 773.) Traditionally, such a cause of action arises at the time of the negligent act, when the attorney breaches his duty to act skillfully and diligently in representing the plaintiff. Maloney at 411; see also Annot. 18 A.L.R.3d 978.

Applying this rule to the plaintiff's action against Gamberdino for his failure to prosecute the Workmen's Compensation claim, we find that the action is barred by the statute of limitations. The plaintiff discharged him as her attorney on January 6, 1971, several weeks prior to the time the Workmen's Compensation filing period ended. After this discharge Gamberdino had no authority to act in the plaintiff's behalf. (See Hannah v. Hannah (1968), 94 Ill.App.2d 372, 375, 236 N.E.2d 783, 785; Haring v. Godbersen (1957), 13 Ill.App.2d 95, 97, 141 N.E.2d 90, 92; Fleener v. Fleener (1970), 133 Ill.App.2d 118, 122, 263 N.E.2d 879, 882.) He, therefore, had no further duty to the plaintiff. The arrangements for the transfer of papers do not operate to extend his liability. Any responsibility Gamberdino might have had to inform the plaintiff and her new attorney about the pending Workmen's Compensation limitations date must be calculated from January 6, 1971.

The cause against Gudgeon in the Workmen's Compensation matter is similarly barred. The plaintiff's complaint, dated May 13, 1976, is untimely since it was filed more than five years after Gudgeon's alleged negligence in failing to meet the Workmen's Compensation February 17, 1971 deadline.

Further, in this particular case, the "discovery rule," which computes the statute of limitations from the time the plaintiff learns or should have learned of the injury, should not be used to extend the period in which the plaintiff may file the action. This cause of action did not accrue when the plaintiff asserts she learned of her injury. The circumstances of the application of the discovery rule are limited:

"When the personal injury is not discoverable or reasonably discoverable the Illinois courts have noted the injustice of barring a cause of action before the injured party knows that he has it and have postponed the running of the statute of limitations to avoid injustice. (Citation.)" (Emphasis added.) Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Sal E. Lobianco & Son Co., Inc. (1976), 43 Ill.App.3d 765, 770, 357 N.E.2d 621, 625, aff'd sub nom. West American Insurance Co. v. Sal E. Lobianco & Son Co., Inc. (1977) 69 Ill.2d 126, 370 N.E.2d 804; see also Lincoln-Way Community High School Dist. 210 v. Village of Frankfort (1977), 51 Ill.App.3d 602, 608, 367 N.E.2d 318, 323.

Here, where the plaintiff, by her own admission, was aware of her injury almost two years in advance of the running of the statute of limitations, there is no question of an unjust impediment. As noted by Justice John Paul Stevens, in interpreting the section 15 statute of limitations relating to property damage "(u)ntil * * * a claim is at least five years old (measured from the date the claim "accrued" in a traditional sense) there is no need for any discovery rule." (Gates Rubber Co. v. USM Corporation (7th Cir., 1975), 508 F.2d 603, 613; cf. C. F. Scott, For Whom the Time Tolls-Time of Discovery and The Statute of Limitations (1976), 64 Ill.B.J. 330-31.) The traditional methods of determining accrual of a cause of action have not been rejected. (See West American Insurance Co. v. Sal E. Lobianco & Son Co., Inc. (1977), 69 Ill.2d 126, 12 Ill.Dec. 893, 370 N.E.2d 804.) The discovery rule is the exception to the traditional rules, to be applied only when the discovery occurs after the statute of limitations has run or when discovery occurs at a time so near the running that the action, for all practical reasons, has been barred before a party has learned of the accrual.

The purpose of the statute of limitations is "to discourage the presentation of stale claims and to encourage diligence in the bringing of actions." (Tom Olesker's Exciting World of Fashion, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. (1975), 61 Ill.2d 129, 137, 334 N.E.2d 160, 164.) The discovery rule unavoidably prolongs the time between the alleged tortious incidents and trial, increasing the risk of questionable evidence and the threat of interminable liability. Therefore, it is applied to alleviate the injustice of barring a suit before a person learns of an injury only when its use would not unreasonably distort the purpose of the statute of limitations. (Cf., Rozny v. Marnul (1969), 43 Ill.2d 54, 70, 250 N.E.2d 656, 664.) In the present case, the plaintiff could have filed her claims against the attorneys well within the traditional limitations period. She chose to delay the filings in both cases until after this time had elapsed....