Dold v. Snohomish Cnty.

Decision Date29 December 2022
Docket Number2:20-cv-00383-JHC
PartiesJENNIFER DOLD, ET AL., Plaintiffs, v. SNOHOMISH COUNTY, ET AL., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Washington
MEMORANDUM OPINION RE: CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

John H. Chun United States District Judge.

I Introduction

This case arises from a tragic and fatal interaction between two Snohomish County Sheriff deputies, deputy Cody McCoy and deputy Bryson McGee, and Alexander Dold. Following a struggle between the deputies and Mr. Dold-during which the deputies tased Mr. Dold, applied a chokehold, and used other means of force-Mr. Dold died. Plaintiffs Jennifer Dold (Mr. Dold's sister, acting in her capacity as the representative of Mr Dold's estate) and Kathy Duncan (Mr. Dold's mother acting in her personal capacity) sued deputy McGee, deputy McCoy, and Snohomish County. Plaintiffs assert causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and under Washington state law. See Dkt. # 50 (operative complaint).

The parties filed five motions for summary judgment or partial summary judgment. Dkt. ## 58, 61, 63, 67, 75. On December 9 2022, the Court issued an order stating its conclusions on each of those five motions. Dkt. # 134. The Court:

(1) Denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Negligent Retention Claim. Dkt. # 58.
(2) Granted in part and denied in part Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Causation and Color of Law Elements of the Excessive Force Claim. Dkt. # 61. The Court granted the motion as to the “color of law” element of the claim but denied it as to the “causation” element of the claim.
(3) Denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Warrantless Entry Claim. Dkt. # 63.
(4) Granted in part and denied in part the deputies' Motion for Summary Judgment. Dkt. # 67. The Court granted the motion as to the warrantless entry claim but denied the motion as moot as to the wrongful death claim and the state law qualified immunity argument.
(5) Granted in part and denied in part the County's Motion for Summary Judgment. Dkt. # 75. The Court granted the motion as to the failure to train claims (both the Monell claim and the right to companionship claim). The Court denied the motion as to the negligent retention claim.

Id. In that order, the Court said that it would issue a separate memorandum opinion explaining the reasoning behind its conclusions. This is the Court's memorandum opinion.

II Background

On March 21, 2017, Alexander Dold was living with his mother Kathy Duncan, at their home in Snohomish, Washington. Dkt. # 63 at 2. Mr. Dold was 29 years old and had twice been hospitalized for schizophrenia. Id. at 2-3. That evening, Mr. Dold and Ms. Duncan got into an argument when he insisted that she owed him money. Id. As detailed below, Mr. Dold became angry, hitting Ms. Duncan in the face and shoving her on the couch. Mr. Dold then left for several hours. During that period, Ms. Duncan concluded that Mr. Dold needed to be admitted to a hospital in order to get back on his medications. Id. at 3.

Mr. Dold then returned to the house, left again to get a snack from a local gas station, and then returned to the house a second time around 9 p.m. Id. Ms. Duncan called the Snohomish County Department of Mental Health and asked them to send a mental health professional to evaluate Mr. Dold, but the Department refused to do so. Id. They told her to call 911 instead. Ms. Dold went to a nearby store, where she called 911. Id.

Ms. Duncan told the 911 operator about the nature of the situation. She told the operator: that her son had not taken his medication, that he was “tossing around the house tonight,” that he “just went over the line,” that he gave Ms. Duncan “a fat lip,” that he “hit [her],” and that he could have “done more damage than he did.” Dkt. # 76 at 19-20, 25 (911 transcript); see also Id. at 27 ([Y]ou don't throw your mom around the house and hit her.”). But Ms. Duncan also explained that she wanted the officers to take Mr. Dold to the hospital, explained that Mr. Dold “was calm now,” that she wanted the deputies to approach without sirens, and that nobody needed emergency aid. Id. at 20-22. She told the 911 operator that she was returning to the home. Id. at 23. However, it appears undisputed that many of the details provided by Ms. Duncan during the 911 call were not conveyed to the deputies.

Deputies Bryson McGee and Cody McCoy received information a little after 9 p.m. from police radio dispatching them to a “physical domestic” altercation. Dkt. # 64 at 32. The dispatcher told the deputies that there was a “male verbal and physical” at the house. Dkt. # 76 at 29. The dispatcher added that “RP [reporting person] is advising source is mental and off meds, requests a silent approach.” Id. The dispatcher told the deputies that the [s]uspect will be Alexander Dold, last seen in the house. RP left the house to call and thinks suspect will take off if he knows RP called.” Id. The deputies also recall being told that “a male and a female were physical” and that “the male was schizophrenic or something and off his medication and the mom . . . had requested that he go for a psych eval.” Dkt. # 64 at 32. Deputy McGee testified that he was told that Ms. Duncan was returning to the home. Id. at 43-44. Deputy McGee also stated that he knew that Mr. Dold “assaulted his mother,” that he “hadn't been on his medication,” that he had “some kind of mental item going on,” and that Ms. Duncan wanted Mr. Dold to be taken to the hospital. Id. at 50-51. But the deputies could not recall whether they knew if Mr. Dold was armed or if there was an ongoing fight inside the home. Id. at 54.

About 30 minutes after the 911 call, the deputies arrived at the home and approached the front door. Dkt. # 63 at 4. Neither deputy recalls hearing any noise (aside from ambient background noise) coming from the house. Dkt. # 64 at 49, 123. The deputies knocked on the door. The deputies said [s]omething to the effect of ‘police.' Id. at 55. Mr. Dold then opened the door. According to deputy McGee, Mr. Dold opened the door “only a couple of feet . . . it wasn't wide open and it wasn't closed,” and stood inside the house “by the threshold” of the door. Id. at 59.

Deputy McGee explained to Mr. Dold that they had been dispatched because Ms. Duncan had called about him. Dkt. # 63 at 6. Deputy McGee asked if he could “come in and talk to [Ms. Duncan].” Dkt. # 64 at 69. Mr. Dold declined, responding “something to the effect of she's fine.' Id. Deputy McGee says that he could not see Ms. Duncan, nor could he confirm whether she was hurt or needing help. But he says that he heard Ms. Duncan say, “I'm here” in a “fearful, afraid, [and] scared” manner. Id. at 67; see also Dkt. # 76 at 88-89 (deputy McCoy observing that Ms. Duncan “looked scared”). During the interaction, deputy McGee asked Mr. Dold to step outside the home. Dkt. # 64 at 75. Mr. Dold declined: “No, I'll talk to you from here.” Id. at 127. Both deputies testified that Mr. Dold admitted to having shoved Ms. Duncan on the couch earlier that day. Id. at 71. Unlike deputy McGee, deputy McCoy testified that he could see Ms. Duncan through the window and that he observed her talking on the phone. Id. at 126. Deputy McCoy added that deputy McGee asked if Ms. Duncan could “come out,” but Mr. Dold told the officers “no, she's not coming out.” Dkt. # 76 at 85.

At some point, Mr. Dold “started to kind of shut the door.” Dkt. # 64 at 72. As Mr. Dold tried to close the door, deputy McGee put his foot “on the doorjamb” to prevent it from closing. Id. at 74. The deputies applied additional pressure to force the door open. The deputies then entered the home and declared that Mr. Dold was under arrest. Id.

At this point in the encounter, the parties' descriptions of events begin to diverge. The deputies testified that Mr. Dold punched deputy McGee in the face “right as [he] was stepping in or at that point in the threshold of the door.” Id. at 83. Deputy McGee also testified that Mr. Dold tried to grab the deputy's gun “a few times.” Id. at 86. Plaintiffs dispute this, suggesting that Mr. Dold did not punch the deputies or try to grab their guns (and more generally, Plaintiffs assert that Mr. Dold's resistance to arrest was far less than the deputies claim). Deputy McCoy fired a taser dart (which hit Mr. Dold in the chest), and a fight between the deputies and Mr. Dold ensued. Dkt. # 63 at 10.

Mr. Dold then “turned around and made a run for a back bedroom,” and both deputies followed him. Dkt. # 64 at 87. Once in the bedroom, the deputies found Mr. Dold on the bed (the parties dispute Mr. Dold's exact positioning on the bed, and whether that positioning was threatening or in preparation of a fight). Id. at 89. The deputies contend that Mr. Dold began thrashing and flailing, “swinging his arms and kicking his feet” in a manner that made contact with deputy McGee “a few times.” Id. at 92-93. Deputy McGee fired his taser. Deputy McGee placed his knee on Dold's cheek to pin his head to the ground and applied “closed fist strikes to his face.” Dkt. # 63 at 11.

Sometime during the struggle, Mr. Dold made it to his feet, and the parties moved back toward the porch. Id. Deputy McGee then tried to apply a chokehold called a “lateral vascular neck restraint” (LVNR) in order to render him unconscious. Id. Though Mr. Dold did lose consciousness, he began to regain consciousness as deputy McCoy tried to apply restraints to Mr. Dold. At that point the deputies began to apply additional physical pressure to Mr. Dold. They placed their body weight on him, maintained some form of a chokehold, hit Mr. Dold with a baton, and bent his fingers back. Id. at 11-12. (The parties strenuously dispute...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT