Doles v. Hilton

• Decision Date: 19 February 1887
• Citation: 3 S.W. 193,48 Ark. 305
• Parties: DOLES v. HILTON ET AL
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

3 S.W. 193

48 Ark. 305

DOLES v. HILTON ET AL

Supreme Court of Arkansas

February 19, 1887

APPEAL from Lincoln Circuit Court, Hon. JOHN A. WILLIAMS, Judge.

Judgment affirmed.

D. H Rousseau, for appellant.

The question is, had the probate court, under Mansf. Dig., sec 1362, power to remove the disabilities of the minors, and is the act constitutional? The court certainly had jurisdiction and the order was not a nullity. It might have been voidable but not void; it was a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, and could not be attacked collaterally; it should have been assailed either by a direct proceeding or appeal. As long as the judgment stands it is the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction 11 (Ark. 519; 12 ib., 84); and cannot be attacked collaterally. 19 Ark. 499; 31 ib., 31; 25 ib., 52; 13 ib., 177.

There is nothing in the constitution of 1868 to prohibit the passage of the act. Section 5, article 7, clothed the legislature with power to pass the act, and this court will not question the expediency or inexpediency of it.

Harrison & Harrison, for appellees.

The order of the probate court removing the disabilities of appellees was a nullity. They were manifestly incompetent "to transact business in general." The legislature never contemplated any such absurd act, and never intended to confer any power to do it.

In construing statutes the real intention will always prevail over the letter, especially when the latter would lead to palpable injustice, contradiction and absurdity. 1 Kent's Com., 462; 1 Black. Com., 59-62; 8 Coke, 118 a; Bac. Abr. Statute (1); Potter's Dwan. on Stat., 184 et seq.; 16 Gratt., 9; 35 Ark. 56; 34 ib., 264.

Even if the deed was only voidable, the infants had the right to avoid it after arriving of age, and this they did by bringing this suit. Mere acquiescence after they became of age, and the failure sooner to sue, was not a confirmation of it. 10 Pet. 58; 11 Johns., 442-3; 11 Serg. & R., 311; 15 Mass. 220; 3 M. & Selev., 482; Ewell's Lead. Cases, 128.

OPINION

BATTLE, J.

John I. Matthews departed this life intestate, seized in fee of a certain tract of land in Lincoln county, in this state, and left Willis G. Hilton, Ida Johnson and Mattie Lettish, his children and only heirs at law, him surviving. These heirs and children were minors when their father died. During their minority they applied to the Lincoln probate court for an order to remove their disabilities as minors, so as to allow and empower them to sell and convey their interest in this tract of land. The Lincoln probate court, at its April term in 1872, granted this application, and made an order according to the prayer thereof. At the time this order was made they were, respectively, twelve, ten and seven years of age. About this time they sold and conveyed the land to Moses DeBaunne and Mort M. Mesler. After they arrived of age they brought this action against Carlton Doles to recover the possession thereof. Doles answered and claimed title and possession through DeBaunne, Mesler and plaintiffs. Plaintiffs recovered judgment for the land, and defendant appealed.

The only question in the case is, was the order of the Lincoln probate court a valid order?

Section one of the act, under which this order was made, reads as follows:

"That the court of probate in and for the several counties in this state shall have power, in its discretion, to authorize any person who is a resident of the country, and who is under twenty-one years of age, to transact business in general, or any particular business specified, in like manner and with the same effect as if such act or thing was done by a person above that age, and every act done by any person so authorized shall have the same force and effect in law and equity as if done by a person of full age; and letters testamentary or of administration or guardianship, may be granted to any such person, if otherwise entitled by law, to have and to hold such fiduciary trust with like effect as if granted to a person over twenty-one years of age."

In the construction of all statutes the real intention of the law-giver, when accurately ascertained, should prevail over the literal sense of the terms. The intention is to be deduced from a view of the whole, and of every part of a statute, taken and compared together, and from other statutes in pair materia. "If the language," said this court in Reynolds v. Holland, 35 Ark. 56, "be plain, unambiguous and uncontrolled by other parts of the act, or other acts or laws upon the same subject, the court cannot give it a different meaning to subserve a public policy, or to maintain its constitutional validity. The question for the courts is not what would be wise, politic and just, but what did the legislature really mean to direct. This narrow circle embraces and circumscribes the whole ambit of the court, although within that it may move very freely in catching the intention. It may disregard the literaly meaning of the words, when it is obvious from the act itself the use of the word has been a clerical error, or that the legislature intended it in a sense different from its common meaning."

Mr. Blackstone, in speaking of the rules of interpretation of laws, says: "The fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the legislator is by exploring his intentions at the time when the law was made, by signs the most natural and probable. And these signs are either the words, the context, the subject matter, the effects and consequence, or the spirit and reason of the law."

Again he says: "As to the effects and consequences, the rule is, that where words bear either none, or a very absurd insignification, if literally understood, we must a little deviate from the received sense of them. Therefore the Bolognian law, mentioned by Puffendorf, which enacted 'that whoever drew...