Dolgencorp LLC v. Sica

Decision Date13 September 2022
Docket NumberCivil Action 22-cv-04269 (FLW)
PartiesDOLGENCORP LLC, Petitioner, v. ERIC SICA, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

NOT FOR PUBLICATON

OPINION

Hon Freda L. Wolfson U.S. Chief District Judge.

This action arises out of discrimination, retaliation, and constructive termination claims brought by Respondent Eric Sica (Respondent or “Sica”) in New Jersey Superior Court against Petitioner Dolgencorp LLC (Petitioner or “Dollar General”) among other defendants, under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“LAD”) following his termination by Dollar General.[1]In the instant matter, because Respondent executed an arbitration agreement before commencing employment at Dollar General, Dollar General petitions this Court to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration agreement under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C § 4. For the reasons stated below, the Court denies the petition to compel without prejudice and directs the parties to conduct limited discovery, in accordance with direction from the Magistrate Judge, on the limited issue of Sica's mental capacity to enter into an arbitration agreement.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The relevant facts are derived from Respondent's underlying Complaint, the parties' declarations and the arbitration agreement. Respondent, a New Jersey citizen, is a former employee of the Point Pleasant New Jersey Dollar General and was hired by the company on October 30, 2020. Respondent alleges that Dollar General was made aware of his disabilities, including learning disabilities, hearing loss, and vision impairment resulting from a spinal meningitis diagnosis at birth, prior to the commencement of his employment, because he noted in his job application that he collects social security disability benefits and could only work a certain number of hours per week. (State Action Compl., p. 2.) On October 26, 2020, Respondent allegedly executed an arbitration agreement (the “Agreement”) with Dollar General prior to starting his employment. (See Arbitration Agreement, dated Oct. 26, 2020, (“Agreement”), Ex. A.) Although Respondent allegedly recalls filling out certain online onboarding documents before commencing his employment, he claims that he does not recall signing the Agreement. (See Eric Sica Affidavit, (“Sica Aff.”), ¶ 13.)

With regard to the Agreement, which is two pages in length, the first two sentences direct the applicant to [p]lease read this entire document carefully,” and “take your time and consult with an attorney if necessary,” because [t]his is an important document that concerns legal rights.” (Agreement, p. 1.) Under these sentences, the Agreement states in pertinent part:

Dollar General . . . has a process for resolving employment related legal disputes with employees that involves binding arbitration. This Dollar General Employee Arbitration Agreement (“Agreement”) describes that process and constitutes a mutually binding agreement between you and Dollar General, subject to opt out rights described at the end of this Agreement. You agree that, with the exception of certain excluded claims described below, any legal claims or disputes that you may have against Dollar General, its parent and subsidiary corporations, employees, officers and directors arising out of your employment with Dollar General or termination of employment with Dollar General . . . will be addressed in the manner described in this Agreement.

(Id.) The Agreement then proceeds to define arbitration and describe how employees may begin the arbitration process under the Agreement. (Id.) Under the heading “Rules and Procedures,” the Agreement notes that [b]y agreeing to participate in binding arbitration, [the employee] and Dollar General acknowledge and agree to the following,” including, that the employee “expressly waive[s] [his or her] right to file a lawsuit in court against Dollar General.” (Id. at pp. 1-2.) The agreement also states that the employee “waive[s] [his or her] right to a jury trial.” (Id. at p. 2.) Further, towards the bottom of the Agreement, it notes that the employee has the opportunity to opt out of the Agreement within 30 days of commencing employment, but will be bound by the Agreement if he or she continues to work for Dollar General. (Id.) Finally, at the bottom of the Agreement, a box is checked indicating agreement with the terms of the Agreement and Respondent's printed initials “EMS” appear next to the date October 26, 2020. (Id.)

Following Respondent's termination from Dollar General, Respondent filed a complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Ocean County, against Dollar General, alleging disability discrimination, retaliation, and constructive termination in violation of the LAD. Specifically, Respondent alleges that despite informing defendant Sharon Betz of his disabilities upon commencing his employment, she allegedly told him, among other things, that he was “too slow” and “taking too long” when he restocked shelves. (State Action Compl., p. 2.) Further, Respondent claimed that when he submitted a formal complaint of harassment against Betz, defendant Brian Mankin took no material actions to address Respondent's complaint. After formally complaining about Betz, Respondent alleges that Betz, in front of coworkers and customers, berated Respondent and falsely accused him of “not doing anything.” (Id. at p. 3.) As a result, Respondent claimed that Dollar General constructively terminated his employment. (Id.) In response to Respondent's Complaint in state court, Petitioner informed Respondent of the Agreement and requested consent to stay the state court action pending arbitration. Respondent refused to consent to stay the action or submit his claims to arbitration. Thereafter, Petitioner filed the instant petition, here, to compel. (ECF No. 3.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1, et seq., establishes “a strong federal policy in favor of the resolution of disputes through arbitration.” Flintkote Co. v. Aviva PLC, 769 F.3d 215, 219 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Century Indem. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 584 F.3d 513, 522 (3d Cir. 2009)). Congress passed the FAA specifically to ‘reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements . . ., and to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.' Teamsters Local 177 v. United Parcel Service, 966 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289 (2002)).

Section 4 of the FAA sets forth the procedure through which a court evaluates petitions to compel arbitration. That section provides, in relevant part:

A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court . . . for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement .... The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement If the making of the arbitration agreement... be in issue, the court shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof.

9 U.S.C. § 4. Where the issue can be decided without extrinsic evidence, courts apply the Rule 12(b)(6) standard to the face of the pleadings. However, where extrinsic evidence is necessary, courts permit discovery and decide the issue on a summary judgment standard, pursuant to Rule 56. If a genuine issue of material fact remains, summary judgment will be denied and the issues will be tried. See Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, L.L.C., 716 F.3d 764, 771 (3d Cir. 2013).

Although a party may request a jury trial when issues regarding arbitrability are “in issue,” 9 U.S.C. § 4, [a] party resisting arbitration . . . ‘bears the burden of showing that he [or she] is entitled to a jury trial.' Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Stuart, 85 F.3d 975, 983 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing Dillard v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 961 F.2d 1148, 1154 (5th Cir. 1992)). To that end, the party requesting a jury trial must “submit evidentiary facts showing that there is a dispute of fact to be tried.” Oppenheimer & Co., Inc. v. Neidhardt, 56 F.3d 352, 358 (2d Cir. 1995); see Stuart, 85 F.3d at 983-84 (party must demonstrate a “genuine” issue); see also Great Earth Cos., Inc. v. Simons, 288 F.3d 878, 888-89 (6th Cir. 2002).

Before compelling arbitration, a court must determine: (1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists, and (2) whether the particular dispute falls within the scope of that agreement.” Trippe Manufacturing Co. v. Niles Audio Corp., 401 F.3d 529, 532 (3d Cir. 2005).

III. DISCUSSION

Respondent opposes Dollar General's petition on three bases. First, Respondent argues that this Court does not have jurisdiction over this action. Second, Respondent argues that the motion to compel violates N.J.S.A. 10:5-12.7(a)-(b). Third, Respondent claims that the Agreement is unenforceable because he did not possess the mental capacity to enter into the Agreement. The Court addresses each argument, in turn.

A. The Court Has Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over the Instant Action

Contrary to Respondent's position, the Court has jurisdiction over the instant petition. Respondent argues that this Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over this case because the FAA alone, does not create jurisdiction, and there is no complete diversity jurisdiction. (Respondent's Br. at 3.) According to Respondent, although Petitioner is a citizen of Tennessee, complete diversity...

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