Dombrowski Living Trust v. Morgantown Prop. Owners Ass'n, Inc., 2150391
| Decision Date | 16 September 2016 |
| Docket Number | 2150391 |
| Citation | 229 So.3d 239 |
| Parties | THE DOMBROWSKI LIVING TRUST v. MORGANTOWN PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. |
| Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
Alabama Supreme Court 1160210
J. Bradford Boyd Hicks of Stone, Granade & Crosby, P.C., Daphne, for appellant.
Jon David Terry of Bains & Terry, Bessemer, for appellee.
This appeal involves, among other things, whether an easement was created based on a notation on a subdivision plat and judicial redemption of property sold for unpaid ad valorem taxes. The Dombrowski Living Trust ("the DLT") appeals from a judgment of the Baldwin Circuit Court ("the trial court") in favor of Morgantown Property Owners Association, Inc. ("MPOA"), denying its request to judicially redeem property located in Baldwin County that had been sold for unpaid ad valorem taxes. This matter was tried based on stipulated evidence, and our review is de novo. We affirm the judgment of the trial court, although not for the reasons expressed in the judgment.
The materials submitted by the parties reveal the following pertinent facts. The property in dispute in this case is a 10.63-foot-wide strip of land ("the disputed property") within the Morgantown subdivision ("the subdivision"), a neighborhood of residential homes on lots located along the coast of the Gulf of Mexico ("the Gulf") in Gulf Shores. Morgantown, Inc., was the initial developer of the subdivision. It divided the initial development of the subdivision into two phases, Phase I and Phase II. In 1992, as a part of Phase II, Morgantown, Inc., recorded a plat depicting lots 1 through 14 along the coast of the Gulf. Those lots varied from 90 to 100 feet in width. In April 1993, Morgantown, Inc., conveyed lots 1 through 9 in Phase II to Stewart & Nelson Development Co., Inc. ("SNDC"). Harris Stewart, Jr., testified on behalf of SNDC as an officer of the company. In order to increase the number of lots that could be sold in Phase II, SNDC resubdivided lots 1 through 9 of Phase II into 75-foot-wide lots. All of those lots had direct beach access to the Gulf. As a part of the resubdivision, the area of land forming the disputed property was created between the lots identified in the resubdivision as lot 6A and lot 7. The plat for the new lots was recorded in the Baldwin Probate Court at slide 1442A. The area of land forming the disputed property was marked on the plat with the following notation without further explanation: "Private Walking Easement." The evidence shows that the disputed property was separately assessed for ad valorem property taxes.
In October 1993, SNDC conveyed lot 9 of Phase II to an entity unrelated to this litigation. In March 1994, SNDC conveyed lot 8 of Phase II to individuals not related to this litigation. Both deeds referenced the plat of Phase II as recorded at slide 1442A.
In August 1994, SNDC conveyed the disputed property and lots 6A and 7 to Phillip Dombrowski. Before the closing of the sale of the lots, Dombrowski sent correspondence to Stewart requesting that SNDC "vacate" the purported easement located on the disputed property. By letter dated August 11, 1994, Stewart stated that SNDC did not object to a vacation of the easement. No further action was taken in an effort to vacate the purported easement on the disputed property.
Following the August 1994 conveyance, ad valorem property taxes on the disputed property continued to be assessed against SNDC instead of Dombrowski. The ad valorem taxes were not paid, and in May 1996 the State Land Commissioner obtained title to the disputed property. In April 2001, Stewart purchased the disputed property from the State Land Commissioner at a tax sale. Stewart informed Dombrowski at some point in 2001 of his purchase of the disputed property. The deed Stewart obtained from the State Land Commissioner was not recorded until November 28, 2007. On May 14, 2009, Stewart conveyed the disputed property to Morgantown Development Co., Inc., a company in which he served as the president. That same day, Morgantown Development Co., Inc., conveyed the disputed property to MPOA.
On January 4, 2000, Dombrowski conveyed lot 6A to a purchaser unrelated to this litigation. In March 2001, Dombrowski conveyed lot 7 and his interest in the disputed property to the DLT. The deed from Dombrowski to the DLT also purported to include lot 6A, but it is undisputed that Dombrowski no longer had title to lot 6A at the time of the transfer of lot 7.
On June 4, 2013, the DLT, of which Dombrowski is a cotrustee with his wife, filed a complaint against MPOA in the trial court, seeking to judicially redeem and quiet title to the disputed property.1 MPOA filed an answer in which it asserted the affirmative defenses of estoppel and laches, among others, and a counterclaim seeking a judgment declaring the rights of the parties to the disputed property. Both MPOA and the DLT filed motions for a summary judgment. The trial court denied each party's motion for a summary judgment on April 28, 2015.
The trial court scheduled a trial for July 29, 2015. On July 20, 2015, the trial court entered a scheduling order by agreement of the parties. In that order, the trial was canceled. In lieu of a trial, the parties agreed, among other things, to submit "cross motions for summary judgment with accompanying trial briefs" by a certain date. The parties also agreed to the specific evidentiary materials that would be submitted with the motions. The order also provided, in part:
Both MPOA and the DLT submitted materials with supporting documentation, as contemplated by the scheduling order. In its submission, MPOA asserted that the August 1994 deed from SNDC that conveyed lot 6A, lot 7, and the disputed property to Dombrowski was void because, it said, "by filing the plat of the Resubdivision of Phase II in the Baldwin County Probate Court, with the [d]isputed property shown thereon, and then selling lots with reference to said easement prior to the 1994 conveyance to Dombrowski, the developer dedicated and/or vested said lot owners with a right to use the easement for beach access, a right which could not be sold, destroyed or vacated without such lot owner's consent." MPOA further argued that § 35–2–53, Ala. Code 1975, sets forth specific procedures by which a plat may be vacated and that it "required all lot owners who had purchased lots in the Resubdivision of Phase II to execute and record a written instrument vacating the private disputed property at issue prior to the 1994 conveyance thereof to Dombrowski, in order for the 1994 conveyance to be valid." According to MPOA, the disputed property was intended to be dedicated for the benefit of all lot owners in the subdivision but not for the benefit of the general public. MPOA asserted that the easement on the disputed property was never vacated and that MPOA was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. MPOA attached to its submission, among other things, the master plat for the subdivision, slide 1442A, the 1994 deed to Dombrowski, the 1993 and 1994 deeds conveying lots 8 and 9 of Phase II, and deposition testimony.
In the DLT's submission, it asserted that there had been no proper dedication of the disputed property to the public and that, therefore, there was nothing to be vacated. The DLT also asserted that the disputed property was not part of the designated common areas of the subdivision that had been specifically established in the plats for the benefit of all the property owners in the subdivision. The DLT asserted that MPOA had previously acknowledged that the disputed property was not owned or controlled by MPOA because, it asserted, MPOA had entered into an agreement with Morgantown Development Co., Inc., in 2009 in which MPOA had received title to the disputed property as well as to another purported easement titled in the name of Morgantown Development Co., Inc.
The DLT also argued that it was entitled to judicially redeem the disputed property because, it asserted, since 1994 the disputed property had been "used, occupied, and peaceably possessed by [the DLT] and the Dombrowski family as part of their beach front property on the Gulf of Mexico." The DLT asserted that evidence of its possession "includes, without limitation, repeatedly enhancing dunes after hurricanes, constructing and installing fencing, moving sand to the [disputed property] when allowed by the Alabama Department of Environmental Management, planting sea oats and planting other prescribed vegetation." The DLT attached to its submission, among other evidence, various deeds, the master plat for the subdivision, deposition testimony, and affidavits.
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