Dominguez v. Archuleta

• Decision Date: 13 January 2015
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 13-cv-01576-REB
• Parties: FRANCISCO DOMINGUEZ, Applicant, v. LOU ARCHULETA, Warden, F.C.F., and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF COLORADO, Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Colorado

FRANCISCO DOMINGUEZ, Applicant, v. LOU ARCHULETA, Warden, F.C.F.,and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF COLORADO, Respondents.

Civil Action No. 13-cv-01576-REB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

January 13, 2015

District Judge Robert E. Blackburn

ORDER ON APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Blackburn, J.

This matter is before me on the pro se Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ("Application") [#1]¹ filed on June 14, 2013, by Francisco Dominguez (Applicant"). Respondents filed an Answer [#23], and Applicant filed a Traverse [#24].

After reviewing the pertinent portions of the record, including the Application, the Answer, the Traverse, and the state court record [#'s 21 and 22], I conclude that the Application should be denied.

I. Background

Applicant entered into a plea agreement on March 16, 1998. Pursuant to the agreement, Applicant agreed to plead guilty to second degree murder in return for whichhe would be subject to a thirty-six year sentencing cap. Pre-Answer Resp [#9-9 at 6]. On March 17, 1998, the court held a providency hearing during which Applicant pled guilty to second degree murder, and the court accepted his plea. Id. Subsequently on March 27, 1998, the court held a hearing about a letter that Applicant had sent to the trial court after the providency hearing. Id. In the letter, Applicant states he had entered a guilty plea due to pressure from his defense attorneys, but he was not guilty and wanted appointment of a new attorney. Id. After appointment of a new attorney, the court held a hearing on the motion to withdraw the guilty plea on May 5, 1998, and denied the motion. Id. On May 20, 1998, Applicant was sentenced to the department of corrections for a term of thirty-six years. Id.

On October 7, 1999, the Colorado Court of Appeals (CCA) affirmed Applicant's conviction and sentence, [#9-8], and on March 13, 2000, the Colorado Supreme Court (CSC) denied Applicant's petition for certiorari review [#9-6]. Subsequently, Applicant filed several post-trial motions alleging various claims for relief, but he appealed only one of the motions, a Colo. R. Crim. P. 35(c) postconviction motion. [#9-5]. The trial court's denial of the Rule 35(c) motion was affirmed on appeal by the CCA, [#9-4], and Applicant's petition for certiorari review was denied on April 29, 2013, [#9-2].

Applicant filed this Application on June 14, 2013. I conducted a preliminary review and dismissed Claims Two and Three as procedurally barred from federal habeas review. [#16]. The claims for relief that remain are

(1) Denial of due process and ineffective assistance of counsel when his defense attorneys coerced him to plead guilty; and

(2) Denial of due process because the interpreter did not properly interpret the plea advisement and ineffectiveassistance of counsel when his defense attorneys failed to address the allegedly flawed interpretation.

II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

I must construe and have construed the Application liberally because Applicant is not represented by an attorney. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). However, I cannot act and have not acted as an advocate for a pro se litigant. See Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110.

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) provides that a writ of habeas corpus may not be issued with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court, unless the state court adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

I review claims of legal error and mixed questions of law and fact pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). See Cook v. McKune, 323 F.3d 825, 830 (10th Cir. 2003). The threshold question pursuant to § 2254(d)(1) is whether Applicant seeks to apply a rule of law that was clearly established by the Supreme Court at the time his conviction became final. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000). The review under § 2254(d) "is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the prisoner's claim on the merits." Cullen v. Pinholster, ---- U.S. ----, 131 S. Ct. 1388,1398 (2011). "Finality occurs when direct state appeals have been exhausted and a petition for writ of certiorari from this Court has become time barred or has been disposed of." Greene v. Fisher, ---- U. S. ----, 132 S.Ct. 38, 44 (2011) (citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 321, n. 6 (1987).

Clearly established federal law "refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. Furthermore,

clearly established law consists of Supreme Court holdings in cases where the facts are at least closely-related or similar to the case sub judice. Although the legal rule at issue need not have had its genesis in the closely-related or similar factual context, the Supreme Court must have expressly extended the legal rule to that context.

House v. Hatch, 527 F.3d 1010, 1016 (10th Cir. 2008).

If there is no clearly established federal law, that is the end of my inquiry under § 2254(d)(1). See id. at 1018. If a clearly established rule of federal law is implicated, I must determine whether the state court's decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of that clearly established rule of federal law. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 404-05.

A state-court decision is contrary to clearly established federal law if: (a) "the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases"; or (b) "the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [that] precedent." Maynard [v. Boone], 468 F.3d [665,] 669 [(10th Cir. 2006)] (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 405). "The word 'contrary' is commonly understood to mean 'diametrically different,' 'opposite in character or nature,' or 'mutually opposed.' " Williams, 529 U.S. at 405 (citation omitted).

A state court decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law when it identifies the correct governing legal rulefrom Supreme Court cases, but unreasonably applies it to the facts. Id. at 407-08. Additionally, we have recognized that an unreasonable application may occur if the state court either unreasonably extends, or unreasonably refuses to extend, a legal principle from Supreme Court precedent to a new context where it should apply. Carter [v. Ward], 347 F3d. [860,] 864 [10th Cir. 2003] (quoting Valdez [v. Ward, 219 F.3d [1222] 1229-30 [10th Cir. 2000]).

House, 527 F.3d at 1018.

My inquiry under the "unreasonable application" clause is an objective one. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 409-10. "[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather that application must also be unreasonable." Id. at 411. "[A] decision is 'objectively unreasonable' when most reasonable jurists exercising their independent judgment would conclude the state court misapplied Supreme Court law." Maynard, 468 F.3d at 671. In addition,

evaluating whether a rule application was unreasonable requires considering the rule's specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations. [I]t is not an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by [the Supreme] Court.

Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786, 562 U.S. 86 (Jan. 19, 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). I "must determine what arguments or theories supported or . . . could have supported[ ] the state court's decision" and then "ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] Court." Id. "[E]ven a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion wasunreasonable." Id. (citation omitted). "Section 2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Under this standard, "only the most serious misapplications of Supreme Court precedent will be a basis for relief under § 2254." Maynard, 468 F.3d at 671. Furthermore,

[a]s a condition for obtaining habeas corpus relief from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.

Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786-87.

I review claims of factual errors pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). See Romano v. Gibson, 278 F.3d 1145, 1154 n. 4 (10th Cir. 2002). Section 2254(d)(2) allows a court to grant a writ of habeas corpus only if the state court decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. Pursuant to § 2254(e)(1), I must presume that the state court's factual determinations are correct, see Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 592-93 (1982), and Applicant bears the burden of rebutting the presumption by clear and convincing evidence, see Houchin v. Zavaras, 107 F.3d 1465, 1470 (10th...