Dominguez v. Caparra Country Club
| Decision Date | 16 January 2018 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 17-1395 (DRD) |
| Parties | EDUARDO MARTINEZ DOMINGUEZ; MARIA ISABEL GARCIA MANTILLA PLAINTIFFS v. CAPARRA COUNTRY CLUB DEFENDANT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
On March 24, 2017, Eduardo Martinez Dominguez and Maria Isabel Garcia Mantilla (the "Plaintiff") filed the instant Complaint against Caparra Country Club, Inc. (the "Defendant") for violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (hereinafter the "FDCPA"). (Compl., Docket No. 1) Essentially, the Plaintiff seeks the following: (a) a declaration of the rights, duties and liabilities of the parties under the Caparra Country Club membership agreement and applicable regulations, (b) compensatory damages and other relief caused as a result of the Defendant's alleged breach of its contractual obligations and under the FDCPA, and (c) attorney's fees incurred by the Plaintiff in bringing this action. (Id. at 1.)
The event that gave rise to the controversy between the parties occurred on April 28, 2013 when a member of the Defendant Caparra Country Club, Inc. punched the Plaintiff in the face during a party held at the Defendant's facilities. (Id. at 15.) Due to the bodily damages the Plaintiff incurred, on April 28, 2014, the Plaintiff sued the Defendant in Bayamón Superior Court of Puerto Rico (civil case number DDP 2014-0312 (703)) for damages pursuant to Articles 1802 and 1803 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code.1 (Def. Informative Mot at Docket No. 16., Ex. 1.)
According to the instant Complaint, after the incident occurred, the Defendant's comptroller told the Plaintiff that he did not need to continue paying his monthly membership fee until the Board of Directors resolved the matter. (Docket No. 1 ¶15b.) As such, the Plaintiff stopped making payments and requested that he be placed as a passive member, which are members not required to pay monthly membership fees. (Id.) The Complaint alleges that the Defendant nonetheless continue to send Plaintiff invoices specifying the amounts he owed and also stating that he was suspended from the use and enjoyment of the club's facilities. (Id. ¶ 16.) Subsequently, on October 13, 2016, the Defendant sent a letter to the Plaintiff in which the Plaintiff was recognized as a passive member and his account was credited for $6,463.16. (Id. at ¶ 17.) This October 2016 letter also provided the Plaintiff with an option to commit to a payment plan to start making his monthly payments. (Id.) Plaintiff refused to make membership payments. (Id.) On January 19, 2017, Caparra Country Club, Inc. filed a collection complaint against the Plaintiff seeking payment of due membership fees and usage charges before the Guaynabo Municipal Court, case number DECM 2017-0052. (Def. Informative Mot. at Docket No. 16, Ex. 4.) On February 20, 2017, the Plaintiff received a letter from the Defendant signed by its General Manager stating the Plaintiff was expulsed from the club. (Docket No. 1 ¶21.)
As a result of these events, the Plaintiff claims that Defendant did not comply with Article 8 and Article 9 of the club's rules and regulations for expulsing members. (Id. ¶ 18.) Thus, Plaintiff seeks a declaration of the rights and duties of the parties with respect to the Plaintiff's alleged expulsion without constitutional due process and in violation of the rules and regulations of Caparra Country Club, Inc. (Id. ¶ 23.) Likewise, Plaintiffrequests this Court to declare void and null the Defendant's declaration of expulsion against the Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 25.) Essentially, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant's decision to expulse him is a retaliation action arising from the fact that the Plaintiff initiated a suit in state court claiming damages for the incident that occurred at the club's premises during April 2013. (Id. ¶21.) Further, the Plaintiff invokes and seeks relief under the FDCPA by claiming that the collection action commenced by the Defendant in Guaynabo Municipal Court is in violation of the FDCPA as it prohibits debt collectors from engaging in abusive, deceptive and unfair practices. (Id. ¶38; Pl.'s Opp'n to Mot. to Dismiss, Docket No. 13 at 5.) The Complaint alleges that the Defendant engaged the services of an attorney as a debt collector and did not advise nor provided the Plaintiff with the required notice of debt. (Docket No. 1) Lastly, the Plaintiff seeks payment for the damages suffered due to the Defendant's breach of contract. (Id. ¶26-35.)
On June 2, 2017, the Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing this Court lacks jurisdiction to address this claim because the Plaintiff does not properly invoke federal law or constitutional rights. (Def. Mot. to Dismiss, Docket No. 8 at 7.) The Defendant additionally argues that the Complaint should be dismissed on res judicata and collateral estoppel grounds as well as for forum shopping and forum non conveniens. (Id.) The Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on June 30, 2017. (Pl.'s Opp'n to Mot. to Dismiss, Docket No. 13)
A case may be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6). The standard of legal analysis under subsection 12(b)(1) is "similar to that accorded a dismissal for failure to state a claim" under subsection 12(b)(6). Murphy v. United States, 45 F.3d 520, 522 (1st Cir. 1995); Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. Telecomm. Regulatory Bd. of Puerto Rico, 189 F.3d 1, 14 n.10 (1st Cir. 1999) (). However, "[w]hile the court generally may not consider materials outside the pleadings on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it may consider such materials on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion." Gonzalez v. United States, 284 F.3d 281, 288 (1st Cir. 2002).
In a jurisdictional challenge, the burden of proving jurisdiction is with the plaintiff. Murphy v. United States, 45 F.3d at 522; Mercado Arocho v. United States, 455 F. Supp.2d 15, 17 (D.P.R. 2006)("Plaintiff shall meet the burden of establishing the factual predicates of jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.")(internal citations and quotations omitted).
As the First Circuit has explained, "[t]here are two types of challenges to a court's subject matter jurisdiction: facial challenges and factual challenges." Torres-Negron v. J & N Records, LLC, 504 F.3d 151, 162 (1st Cir. 2007). In a facial challenge, the Court considers whether "the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction, and the allegations in [plaintiff's] complaint are taken as true for purposes of the motion.'" Id. (citation omitted). In a factual challenge, however, "'a court's power to make findings of fact and to weigh the evidence depends on whether the factual attack on jurisdiction also implicates the merits of the plaintiff's cause of action.'" Id. (quoting Garcia v. Copenhaver, Bell & Assocs., 104 F.3d 1256, 1261 (11th Cir. 1997). See also Hernandez-Santiago v. Ecolab, Inc., 397 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 2005)("Where a party challenges the accuracy of the pleaded jurisdictional facts, the court may conduct a broad inquiry, taking evidence and making findings of fact."); Valentin v. Hospital Bella Vista, 254 F.3d at 364 (). In other words, in a factual attack, "the plaintiff's jurisdictional averments are entitled to no presumptive weight; the court must address the merits of the jurisdictional claim by resolving the factual disputes between the parties." Id. at 363.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires plaintiffs to provide "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Under Bell Atlantic v. Twombly,550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), a plaintiff must "provide the grounds of his entitlement [with] more than labels and conclusions." See Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011) ()(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (citation omitted). Thus, a plaintiff must, and is now required to, present allegations that "nudge [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible" in order to comply with the requirements of Rule 8(a). Id. at 570; see e.g. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court's inquiry occurs in a two-step process under the current context-based "plausibility" standard established by Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, and Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662. "Context based" means that a Plaintiff must allege sufficient facts that comply with the basic elements of the cause of action. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-679 (). First, the Court must "accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint[,]" discarding legal conclusions, conclusory statements and factually threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. "Yet we need not accept as true legal conclusions from the complaint or 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 268 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. 678) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
Under the second step of the inquiry, the Court must determine whether, based upon all assertions that were not discarded under the first step of...
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