Dominguez v. City of Council Bluffs, Iowa

• Decision Date: 13 August 1997
• Docket Number: Civil No. 1-96-CV-90050.
• Citation: 974 F.Supp. 732
• Parties: Edward P. DOMINGUEZ, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF COUNCIL BLUFFS, IOWA, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa

974 F.Supp. 732

Edward P. DOMINGUEZ, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF COUNCIL BLUFFS, IOWA, Defendant.

Civil No. 1-96-CV-90050.

United States District Court, S.D. Iowa, Western Division.

August 13, 1997.

Larry J. Melcher, Council Bluffs, IA, Bernard J. Monbouquette, Ruth W. Beyerhelm, Omaha, NE, for plaintiff.

Robert L. O'Brien, Council Bluffs, IA, for defendant.

ORDER

PRATT, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment filed in this court on July 14, 1997. The Defendant seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim asserting discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 et seq. [ADA]. Plaintiff filed an Objection to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on July 29, 1997 and Defendant filed a Reply on August 6, 1997. This motion is considered fully submitted.

Having reviewed the motion, the submissions of the parties, the pleadings, and the applicable law, this court is of the opinion that Defendants' motion for summary judgment should be granted in part and denied in part.

I. Background

The following facts are either undisputed or viewed in light most favorable to the nonmoving party for the motion being considered. See United States v. City of Columbia, Mo., 914 F.2d 151, 153 (8th Cir. 1990); Woodsmith Publishing Co. v. Meredith Corp., 904 F.2d 1244, 1247 (8th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff began working for Defendant on April 27, 1992. He was injured in a job-related accident on or about June 24, 1994, which resulted in permanent injury to his left foot. On March 17, 1995, Plaintiff's position was terminated.

Plaintiff alleges that on June 30, 1995, he applied for a Utility Worker II position with Defendant for which he was qualified, despite the physical restrictions in his left foot. He was not hired for the position. He claims that on July 31, 1995, he discovered that a less-qualified applicant was hired instead.¹

On May 29, 1996, Plaintiff filed a charge of disability discrimination with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission [ICRC] and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [EEOC]. Plaintiff's charge of discrimination against City of Council Bluffs, Iowa provided the following statement of "particulars":

I. I was first hired by the above-named Respondent in May 1992. I injured my foot in a work-related accident and was later discharged. On or about June 30, 1995, I applied for the position of Utility Worker II. On July 31, 1995, I learned that an applicant with no seniority or prior work experience with the Respondent was hired for the Utility Worker II position.

II. Respondent gave me no reasons for the action taken against me.

III. I believe I was discriminated against because of my disability in violation of Title I² of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 in that Respondent denied me employment for the position of Utility Worker II.³

Plaintiff was issued a Right-to-Sue Letter from the EEOC on August 22, 1996. He filed the present action in this Court on November 20, 1996, within the 90-day limitation. Plaintiff's complaint alleges that the City of Council Bluffs, Iowa discriminated against him in hiring due to his disability in violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101, et seq. [ADA]. Defendant now moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff's complaint on the basis that Plaintiff failed to timely file his charge with the EEOC.

II. Applicable Law

Summary judgment is properly granted when the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Walsh v. United States, 31 F.3d 696, 698 (8th Cir. 1994) The moving party must establish its right to judgment with such clarity there is no room for controversy. Jewson v. Mayo Clinic, 691 F.2d 405, 408 (8th Cir. 1982).

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact based on the pleadings depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits, if any. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Once this showing has been made, the non-moving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings, but must set forth specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257, 106 S.Ct. at 2514-15. An issue is "genuine," if the evidence is sufficient to persuade a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. "As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material.... Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Id.

III. Analysis

Plaintiff maintains that he was discriminated against in employment by Defendant in violation of the ADA. Specifically, he claims that he was not hired for a position for which he was qualified and another non-disabled applicant with less experience was hired for that same position. Plaintiff alleges that his disability is the injury to his left foot resulting from the work-related accident in 1994.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff may not allege claims of employment discrimination under the ADA because he failed to file a timely charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). In order to properly address Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, the court must address the question of timeliness in regards to Plaintiff's claim brought under each title. Then, the court will deal with the question of which statute of limitations to apply to Title II cases brought in federal court.

A. Claims Brought Under Title I of the ADA

This court agrees that an employee making a claim under Title I of the ADA (which tracks the procedures for Title VII actions) is required to timely file an EEOC charge. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a); 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(e); Wagner v. Texas A & M Univ., 939 F.Supp. 1297 (S.D.Tex.1996); Osborn v. E.J. Brach, Inc., 864 F.Supp. 56 (N.D.Ill.1994); Montgomery v. Atlanta Family Restaurants, Inc., 752 F.Supp. 1575 (N.D.Ga.1990). Plaintiff failed to do this and thus Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in regards to Plaintiff's claim under Title I should be granted.

In Iowa, where there is a state agency, the Iowa Civil Rights Commission (ICRC), designated for consideration of discrimination claims, a claimant has 300 days after an unlawful employment practice to file his EEOC charge. See Winters v. Iowa State Univ., 768 F.Supp. 231, 237 (N.D.Ill. 1991), aff'd 962 F.2d 11, cert. denied 506 U.S. 923, 113 S.Ct. 344, 121 L.Ed.2d 260, and rehearing denied 506 U.S. 1016, 113 S.Ct. 648, 121 L.Ed.2d 576. To determine the operative date to begin the limitations period, the court must first identify the "unlawful employment practice" challenged by the complaint. Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 257, 101 S.Ct. 498, 503, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980). For purposes of measuring the limitations period, "[t]he proper focus is upon the time of the discriminatory act[]." Ricks, 449 U.S. at 258, 101 S.Ct. at 504. Thus, in this case, the statute of limitations period began when Plaintiff was notified that he was not hired for the Utility Worker II position.

Even if the court assumes that Plaintiff was first notified of this employment decision on July 31, 1995, when he discovered that another applicant had been hired by defendant, he would have been required to file a charge with the EEOC by May 28, 1996. He filed his charge on May 29, 1996, one day past the limitations period.⁴

Plaintiff claims that he filed a charge of discrimination with the City of Council Bluffs Human Relations Commission during the week of March 13, 1995.⁵ The court finds no relevance to this alleged filing date as Plaintiff's Complaint refers to discrimination in hiring on or about July 31, 1995. March 31, 1995 is about four months prior to this date.

Thus, Plaintiff's claim under Title I of the ADA is untimely and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, in regards to this claim, should be granted.

B. Claims Brought Under Title II of the ADA

However, the court's analysis can not end here as Plaintiff also asserts his disability discrimination claim under Title II of the ADA.⁶ The threshold issue in this case, then, is whether Plaintiff may file an employment discrimination action under Title II of the ADA. Title II, of the ADA, provides:

Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity [including any ... local government], or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity. [emphasis added]

42 U.S.C. § 12132.

A review of cases reveals that the eighth circuit court has not yet addressed the question of whether Title II creates a cause of action for employment discrimination. At least three other circuit courts, however, have addressed this issue and all have ruled that Title II is applicable to employment actions. See e.g. Holbrook v. City of Alpharetta, Ga., 112 F.3d 1522 (11th Cir.1997); Doe v. University of Maryland Medical System Corp., 50 F.3d 1261 (4th Cir.1995); Smith v. Barton, 914 F.2d 1330, 1338 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1217, 111 S.Ct. 2825, 115 L.Ed.2d 995 (1991).

Additionally, the majority of the federal district courts which have ruled on this issue have held that Title II is applicable in employment causes of action. See e.g., Hernandez v. City of Hartford, 959 F.Supp. 125, 129 (D.Conn.1997); Winfrey v. City of Chicago, 957 F.Supp. 1014, 1022-23 (N.D.Ill.1997); Wagner, 939...