Dominguez v. Figueroa Sancha

Citation373 F.Supp.3d 333
Decision Date07 February 2019
Docket NumberCIVIL NO. 12-1707 (PG)
Parties Danny DOMINGUEZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Jose FIGUEROA SANCHA, et al., Defendants.
CourtUnited States District Courts. 1st Circuit. District of Puerto Rico

Heriberto Guivas-Lorenzo, Guivas & Quinones Law Offices, Aguada, PR, for Plaintiffs.

Claudia Mariela Izurieta-Berrios, Ivonne Cruz-Serrano, Melissa Massheder-Torres, Department of Justice of Puerto Rico, Idza Diaz-Rivera, P. R. Department of Justice, Yadhira Ramirez-Toro, Department of Justice Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, San Juan, PR, Jaime J. Zampierollo-Vila, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Del Rio, TX, for Defendants.

OMNIBUS OPINION AND ORDER

JUAN M. PEREZ-GIMENEZ, SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiffs Danny Dominguez and Elionai Fernandez sued Defendants Minerva Ramos ("ADA Ramos") and Dennis Morales Rodriguez ("Officer Morales") (collectively, "Defendants") for alleged violations of their rights under the Fourth Amendment.1 Docket No. 1. They specifically claim that Defendants launched a civil rights conspiracy to detain and prosecute Plaintiffs without warrants or probable cause. Plaintiffs now seek compensatory and punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 20. They also invoke the court's supplemental jurisdiction over their Puerto Rico law claims under the Commonwealth's Constitution and Article 1802 of the Civil Code, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 5141. Id. at 21.

Before the court are Defendants' motions for summary judgment (Docket Nos. 93 and 98) and Plaintiffs' oppositions (Docket Nos. 122 and 135). Defendants filed supplemental motions (Docket Nos. 144 and 145) and Plaintiffs replied (Docket Nos. 150 and 151). After a careful review of the motions, the evidence on record and the applicable law, the court DENIES Defendants' motions.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure the court must grant a motion for summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (a). "A dispute is genuine if the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in the favor of the nonmoving party. A fact is material if it has the potential of determining the outcome of the litigation." Dunn v. Trs. of Bos. Univ., 761 F.3d 63, 68 (1st Cir. 2014) (internal citation omitted).

The movant has the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact with definite and competent evidence. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) ) (identifying record and other supporting materials available at the summary judgment stage). If the movant presents a properly supported motion, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to show the existence of a genuine factual dispute. Geshke v. Crocs, Inc., 740 F.3d 74, 77 (1st Cir. 2014) (citing Borges ex rel. S.M.B.W. v. Serrano-Isern, 605 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2010) ). The non-movant must thus "identify[ ] competent evidence in the record sufficient to create a jury question." Tobin v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 775 F.3d 448, 450-51 (1st Cir. 2014).

At the summary judgment juncture, the court must examine the record as a whole, view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant and indulge that party with all reasonable inferences to be derived from the facts. McGrath v. Tavares, 757 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2014) ; Rochester Ford Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 287 F.3d 32, 38 (1st Cir. 2002). Unsupported and conclusory allegations, on the other hand, should be disregarded. See McGrath, 757 F.3d at 25. The court "may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence[,]" as those are jury functions—not those of a judge. Reeves v. Sanderson PlumbingProducts, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 135, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000).

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The court gleaned the following facts from the parties' summary judgment submissions and, when necessary, from the allegations in the complaint (Docket No. 1). In the interest of thoroughness, the court also adopts and incorporates by reference the factual and procedural backgroun d set forth in Section I of the Opinion and Order from September 30, 2014 (Docket No, 40). Dominguez v. Sancha, 50 F.Supp.3d 117, 121-124 (D.P.R. 2014).

When Mr. Ricardo Rodriguez Tirado skipped bail in New Jersey and fled to Puerto Rico, the bail bond company, Speedy Bailbonds, hired two bounty-hunting Plaintiffs, Dominguez and Fernandez, to locate and bring the fugitive back to New Jersey. ADA Ramos' Statement of Uncontested Material Facts ("SUMF I") (Docket No. 94) ¶¶ 1-2, 6-7, 9-11. On May 4, 2011, Plaintiffs arrived in Aguadilla, Puerto Rico, "registered" their firearms at the airport and headed out on their mission. SUMF I ¶¶ 12 & 14. They rented a car, a hotel room and, at some point, met with Angel Diaz, an off-duty PRPD officer who would help them locate the fugitive. SUMF I ¶¶ 20 & 24.

On May 5, 2011, Dominguez, Fernandez and Diaz drove by the house where they hoped to find Mr. Rodriguez and, lo and behold, saw him there. SUMF I ¶ 52 Rodriguez's mother, Angelica Tirado ("Ms. Tirado"), was also present. SUMF I ¶¶ 20 & 22. Plaintiffs apprehended the fugitive. SUMF I ¶ 26. As they were leaving, Mr. Rodriguez asked Ms. Tirado to contact his attorney, Jose Fernandez Irizarry ("attorney Irizarry"). SUMF I ¶ 23. Plaintiffs left with Mr. Rodriguez and took him back to their hotel room. SUMF I ¶ 26. Ms. Tirado followed through and called attorney Irizarry, who procured the help of his prosecutor friend, ADA Ramos. Docket No. 1 at ¶ 57.

Plaintiffs maintain that ADA Ramos then took a series of actions that led to their arrest. First, she advised Ms. Tirado to file a complaint against the bounty hunters. Then, she called the San Sebastian Police Station and instructed officers to stop the bounty hunters from flying out of the jurisdiction that day. Id. at ¶¶ 58-62. The evidence suggests that ADA Ramos also spoke with PRPD Officer Jesus A. Morales,2 apprised him of Ms. Tirado's impending visit and asked him to draft a criminal complaint. Docket No. 105-1; Docket No. 136-3 at 24.

Later that day, Ms. Tirado arrived at the San Sebastian police station and signed the complaint. After the complaint was processed, Defendant – and PRPD Officer – Dennis Morales took over. At the time, Officer Morales was assigned to the Homicide Division and stationed in Aguadilla, near the airport from where Plaintiffs would leave. Dennis Morales' Statement of Uncontested Material Facts ("SUMF II") (Docket No. 99) ¶¶ 60-62.

While Plaintiffs waited for their outbound flight, they received a phone call from Officer Morales warning that criminal charges would be filed against them. SUMF I ¶ 34; SUMF II ¶¶ 40-44. The bounty hunters went to the local Police Station in Aguadilla to sort matters out, but instead, they were arrested and charged with kidnapping, aggravated assault and possession of firearms. SUMF I ¶ 36; SUMF II ¶ 46.See also Docket No. 1 at ¶ 74 (alleging that they were charged with four felonies: kidnapping, aggravated illegal trespassing, illegal possession of a firearm and illegal use of a firearm). Plaintiffs were held overnight. SUMF II ¶ 49. Throughout his dealings with Plaintiffs, Officer Morales maintained that the instructions were coming from "above."3 See, e.g., OSUMF I ¶ 57.

On May 6, Plaintiffs were taken before a magistrate judge for a Rule 6 hearing. The magistrate found probable cause for Plaintiffs' arrest and ordered them to stay under house arrest in Puerto Rico until conclusion of criminal proceedings. SUMF II ¶¶ 50-52 & 57; Docket No. 1 ¶¶ 73-74, 79. The preliminary hearing was held 45 days later, from June 20 to June 21, 2011, at which time the court found no probable cause on any of the charges against Dominguez and Fernandez. SUMF I ¶ 72; SUMF II ¶¶ 58. The prosecution "appealed" that determination, a move Plaintiffs steadfastly attribute to ADA Ramos. On August 26, 2011, the reviewing court reached the same no probable cause determination.4 SUMF I ¶¶ 73-74; SUMF II ¶ 59. The court notified its final judgment dismissing all charges against Dominguez and Fernandez one month later, on September 27, 2011 to be exact.

III. DISCUSSION
A. Compliance with Local Rule 56

Local Rule 56(c) states that a non-movant's opposing statement of material facts "shall admit, deny or qualify the facts supporting the motion for summary judgment," and in so doing, shall support each denial or qualification by particularized record citations. L. CV. R. 56(c) (D.P.R. 2009). If a party improperly controverts the facts, the district court "is free, in the exercise of its sound discretion, to accept the moving party's facts as stated." Advanced Flexible Circuits, Inc. v. GE Sensing & Inspection Techs. GmbH, 781 F.3d 510, 521 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting Caban Hernandez v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 486 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2007) ).

Local Rule 56 does allow an opposing party to provide additional facts, but in a separate section. L. CV. R. 56(c) (emphasis added). The case law on this is clear: "a party may not include numerous additional facts within its opposition to the moving party's statements of uncontested facts." Malave-Torres v. Cusido, 919 F.Supp.2d 198, 207 (D.P.R. 2013). See also Carreras v. Sajo, Garcia & Partners, 596 F.3d 25, 32 (1st Cir. 2010) (upholding the district court's decision to disregard additional facts not included in a separate section). Repeatedly, the First Circuit has held that litigants ignore Local Rule 56 at their peril. Caban Hernandez, 486 F.3d at 7.

Here, Plaintiffs' opposing statements of fact do not strictly comply with the requirements of Local Rule 56(c) because many of their qualifications and denials border on "additional facts" that, per the summary judgment rules, should have been included in a separate section. Dockets No. 123 & 136. Withal, their opposing statements facts are supported with...

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