Dominguez v. Francisco Dominguez Masonry, Inc.

Citation2022 NCCOA 447
Decision Date05 July 2022
Docket NumberCOA21-641
PartiesMELCHOR ZAPATA DOMINGUEZ, Employee, Plaintiff, v. FRANCISCO DOMINGUEZ MASONRY, INC., Employer, BUILDERS MUTUAL INSURANCE CO., Carrier, Defendants.
CourtCourt of Appeal of North Carolina (US)

Heard in the Court of Appeals 5 April 2022.

Appeal by defendants from opinion and award entered 10 June 2021 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission, I.C. No. 499636

The Bricio Law Firm, P.L.L.C., by Francisco J. Bricio, for plaintiff-appellee.

Lewis &Roberts, PLLC, by Jeffrey A. Misenheimer and Brian R Taylor, for defendants-appellants.

ZACHARY, JUDGE.

¶ 1 Francisco Dominguez Masonry, Inc., and Builders Mutual Insurance Co. ("Builders Mutual" and collectively "Defendants") appeal from an Opinion and Award of the North Carolina Industrial Commission granting Plaintiff Melchor Zapata Dominguez's claim for additional medical compensation for his right knee conditions. After careful review, we affirm the Commission's Opinion and Award.

Background

¶ 2 Plaintiff began his employment as a brick mason with Francisco Dominguez Masonry, Inc., in 2004. His job required him to regularly "bend his knees, squat, kneel and do heavy lifting." On 20 December 2004, Plaintiff began experiencing pain and swelling in his right knee, and on 22 February 2005, he was diagnosed with two occupational diseases of his right knee.

¶ 3 On 31 January 2005, Defendants began providing medical compensation to Plaintiff. By Opinion and Award entered 14 May 2007, the Full Commission warded Plaintiff treatment for his right knee conditions and indemnity compensation for his medical expenses. Defendants issued indemnity compensation for Plaintiff's right knee conditions through 13 December 2013 and medical compensation for Plaintiff's right knee conditions through 5 June 2015.

¶ 4 Upon determining that an indemnity check for $329.24 payable to Plaintiff and dated 14 July 2011 remained uncashed and outstanding, Builders Mutual contacted Plaintiff by letter dated 18 August 2017 to inquire whether "these funds [were] still due." Builders Mutual further informed Plaintiff that if he did not reply by 18 October 2017, the unclaimed funds would be escheated to the State of North Carolina. On or about 28 August 2017, Plaintiff requested via the enclosed response form that Builders Mutual issue a replacement check because he never received the original; Builders Mutual issued a replacement check dated 19 September 2017.

¶ 5 On 12 February 2018, Plaintiff filed a Form 33 requesting a hearing on the issue of additional medical compensation for his right knee conditions. Defendants denied treatment and moved to dismiss the claim, asserting that Plaintiff's request was time-barred by N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-25.1 and 97-47. In an interlocutory Opinion and Award entered 26 September 2018, the deputy commissioner denied Defendants' motion to dismiss, concluding that the 19 September 2017 replacement check constituted a payment pursuant to § 97-25.1, which rendered Plaintiff's claim for additional medical compensation timely.

¶ 6 On 17 December 2019, the deputy commissioner issued an Opinion and Award ordering Defendants to authorize and pay for the ongoing medical treatment of Plaintiff's compensable right knee conditions. Defendants appealed to the Full Commission, which affirmed the deputy commissioner's decision by Opinion and Award entered 10 June 2021. Defendants timely appealed from the Full Commission's Opinion and Award.

Discussion

¶ 7 On appeal, Defendants argue that the Full Commission erred by concluding that Plaintiff's claim for additional medical compensation was not time-barred pursuant to N.C Gen. Stat. § 97-25.1 (2021).

I. Standard of Review

¶ 8 "The standard of review in workers' compensation cases has been firmly established by the General Assembly and by numerous decisions of this Court." Richardson v. Maxim Healthcare/Allegis Grp., 362 N.C. 657, 660, 669 S.E.2d 582, 584 (2008), reh'g denied, 363 N.C. 260, 676 S.E.2d 472 (2009). "[O]n appeal from an award of the Industrial Commission, review is limited to consideration of whether competent evidence supports the Commission's findings of fact and whether the findings support the Commission's conclusions of law." Id.

¶ 9 The Commission's findings of fact "are conclusive upon appeal when supported by competent evidence, even when there is evidence to support a finding to the contrary.... Where no exception is taken to a finding of fact, the finding is presumed to be supported by competent evidence and is binding on appeal." Workman v. Rutherford Elec. Membership Corp., 170 N.C.App. 481, 485-86, 613 S.E.2d 243, 247 (2005) (citation omitted). The Commission's conclusions of law, however, are reviewed de novo. Walker v. K&W Cafeterias, 375 N.C. 254, 258, 846 S.E.2d 679, 682 (2020).

II. Analysis

¶ 10 Defendants maintain that the Full Commission erred by determining that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-25.1 did not bar Plaintiff's claim for additional medical compensation, in that "the replacement check d[id] not constitute payment of compensation" pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-25.1, and therefore its issuance "did not 'restart' the limitations period[.]" We disagree.

¶ 11 Section 97-25.1 provides, in relevant part:

The right to medical compensation shall terminate two years after the employer's last payment of medical or indemnity compensation unless, prior to the expiration of this period, either: (i) the employee files with the Commission an application for additional medical compensation which is thereafter approved by the Commission, or (ii) the Commission on its own motion orders additional medical compensation.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-25.1 (emphasis added).

¶ 12 In the present case, the Commission made the following unchallenged findings of fact:

4. The most recent payment that [Builders Mutual] has made for medical treatment for Plaintiff's compensable right knee conditions was on June 5, 2015. Defendants also paid weekly temporary total disability ("TTD") compensation to Plaintiff in this claim, beginning with his right knee surgery on February 1, 2010. ....
6. The latest period for which Defendants paid Plaintiff TTD compensation was for November 28, 2013 through December 4, 2013, via a check dated December 3, 2013.
7. On August 18, 2017, [Builders Mutual] sent Plaintiff a letter stating that [Builders Mutual]'s review of its records revealed that a TTD check dated July 14, 2011 had never been cashed and was still outstanding. The letter asked Plaintiff to review his records and determine "if these funds are still due." On or about August 28, 2017, Plaintiff returned the letter to [Builders Mutual], checking the box for "The original check was never received; please reissue."
8. On September 19, 2017, [Builders Mutual] voided the July 14, 2011 TTD check and issued a new check to Plaintiff in the amount of $329.24, covering TTD compensation for the period from July 11 through July 17, 2011.
11. On February 12, 2018, Plaintiff filed the instant Form 33 Request that Claim Be Assigned for Hearing, seeking additional medical treatment for his right knee conditions.

¶ 13 Plaintiff contends that Defendants' last payment of medical or indemnity compensation was 19 September 2017-less than two years before Plaintiff submitted his 12 February 2018 claim for additional medical compensation-and that his claim was thus timely. By contrast, Defendants maintain that the last payment of medical or indemnity compensation was 5 June 2015, and that Plaintiffs 12 February 2018 application for additional medical compensation was therefore time-barred, in that the two-year limitations period ended in 2017. Accordingly, the question before us is whether a corrective payment constitutes a "last payment" for purposes of the N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-25.1 limitations period.

¶ 14 When appellate courts engage in statutory interpretation, our primary task is "to ensure that the legislative intent is accomplished. The best indicia of legislative purpose are the language of the statute, the spirit of the act, and what the act seeks to accomplish." Radzisz v. Harley Davidson of Metrolina, Inc., 346 N.C. 84, 88-89, 484 S.E.2d 566, 569 (1997) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "[T]he workers' compensation statutes should be liberally construed whenever possible to avoid denying benefits based on narrow interpretations of its provisions ...." Robertson v. Hagood Homes, Inc., 160 N.C.App. 137, 142, 584 S.E.2d 871, 874 (2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶ 15 "Statutory interpretation begins by examining the plain and ordinary meanings of words in the statute. When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction, and the courts must give it its plain and definite meaning." Key Risk Ins. Co. v. Peck, 252 N.C.App. 127, 130, 797 S.E.2d 354, 356 (2017) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). An appellate court "should avoid adding a provision to a statute that has been omitted, which it believes ought to have been embraced[.]" Robertson, 160 N.C.App. at 142, 584 S.E.2d at 874 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶ 16 Here, using the "plain and ordinary meaning" of the statute's terms, Key Risk Ins. Co., 252 N.C.App. at 130, 797 S.E.2d at 356, Plaintiff's right to additional medical compensation had not yet terminated when he filed his Form 33. Plaintiff filed his claim for additional medical compensation on 12 February 2018, less than a year after he received the last payment of compensation from Defendants, via check dated 19 September 2017. In that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-25.1 provides that an employee's "right to medical compensation shall terminate two years after the employer's...

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