Don Rich Corp. v. Rossini
| Decision Date | 27 December 1983 |
| Citation | 1 Conn.App. 120,468 A.2d 1273 |
| Parties | DON RICH CORPORATION v. Richard ROSSINI et al. |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Dennis M. Laccavole, Bridgeport, for appellant (plaintiff).
Michael A. Dowling, Ridgefield, for appellees (defendants).
Before TESTO, HULL and DUPONT, JJ. TESTO, Judge.
The named plaintiff, Don Rich Corporation, was dissolved prior to the filing of this negligence action. The real party in interest is the Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company (Hartford A & I). The trial court denied the plaintiff's motion to substitute Hartford A & I as the party plaintiff and granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The ground for the defendants' motion was that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to the dissolution of the plaintiff corporation and that judgment should, therefore, be rendered as a matter of law. The plaintiff has appealed 1 from both decisions.
This action was commenced by the plaintiff corporation on March 27, 1980, after it had been dissolved on January 31, 1979. The plaintiff corporation sought money damages for the alleged negligence of the defendants. The defendants answered the complaint and pleaded as a special defense the incapacity of the plaintiff to sue because of its dissolution as of January 31, 1979. Instead of replying to the special defense, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint in which it set forth that the action was being pursued by way of subrogation, the real party in interest being the plaintiff's insurer, Hartford A & I. With the amended complaint, the plaintiff filed a motion to substitute the insurer as party plaintiff. The defendants answered the amended complaint and claimed by way of special defense that a lease between the parties absolved the defendants of liability.
Section 33-378(a) of the General Statutes specifically states that "[d]issolution terminates the corporate existence of the dissolved corporation." There is no question that in the present case the Don Rich Corporation was dissolved on January 31, 1979. A dissolved corporation, however, has been given the right by statute to bring an action: "Any action or proceeding by or against a dissolved corporation may be prosecuted or defended by the corporation in its corporate name ...." General Statutes § 33-378(e). Although there was no genuine issue concerning the dissolution of the plaintiff, it was error for the trial court to grant the defendants' motion for summary judgment since the plaintiff had a statutory...
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River Dock and Pile, Inc. v. O and G Industries, Inc., 14222
...We therefore reject the defendant's claim that the plaintiff lacked standing to pursue this action. Cf. Don Rich Corporation v. Rossini, 1 Conn.App. 120, 122-23, 468 A.2d 1273 (1983) (corporation allowed under General Statutes § 33-378(e) to maintain action brought after The judgment is rev......
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Clark-Franklin-Kingston Press, Inc. v. Romano
...time its rights were forfeited, especially where the plaintiff believed it was dealing with a corporation. Don Rich Corporation v. Rossini, 1 Conn.App. 120, 122, 468 A.2d 1273 (1983). Generally, one who has dealt with either a de facto or a de jure corporation is estopped to deny its corpor......
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Haddad v. Francis
...may be prosecuted or defended by the corporation in its corporate name...." General Statutes § 33-378(e); Don Rich Corporation v. Rossini, 1 Conn.App. 120, 122, 468 A.2d 1273 (1983). The court has no quarrel with the defendant's pronouncements of law. On the facts of this case, as establish......
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