Donahue v. Department of Employment Sec., 351-81

• Decision Date: 21 December 1982
• Docket Number: No. 351-81,351-81
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court
• Parties: , 8 Ed. Law Rep. 1022 Glennis DONAHUE, et al. v. DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY.

Page 1244

454 A.2d 1244

142 Vt. 351, 8 Ed. Law Rep. 1022

Glennis DONAHUE, et al. v. DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY.

No. 351-81.

Supreme Court of Vermont.

Dec. 21, 1982.

James Suskin, Montpelier, for plaintiffs-appellees.

Robert J. Kurrle, Montpelier, for defendant-appellant.

Matthew R. Gould, Montpelier, for defendant-appellee.

Before BARNEY, C.J., and BILLINGS, HILL, UNDERWOOD and PECK, JJ.

UNDERWOOD, Justice.

The Vermont School Board Association Insurance Trust, Inc. [Trust], representing all of the employers, various school districts, involved in this case, appeals a decision of the Employment Security Board [Board]. The Board ruled that the claimants, all nonprofessional workers including teachers' aides, school bus drivers, crossing guards and other positioned employees paid on an hourly basis, were entitled to unemployment benefits for the weeks ending December 29, 1979, February 23, 1980, and April 19, 1980. These three weeks constitute the traditional Christmas, mid-winter, and spring vacations observed by public schools within the State of Vermont.

As grounds for appeal the Trust contends that (1) the claimants were not unemployed within the meaning of the Unemployment Compensation Act, 21 V.S.A. ch. 17, during the vacation periods in question, and (2) the claimants were not available for work within the meaning of the Act during the vacation periods in question. We disagree and affirm.

The facts in this case are undisputed. During the weeks in question the schools were closed and the claimants did not perform any work for and did not receive any remuneration from their respective employers or others. The claimants had worked full time for their employers prior to recesses and returned to work with their same employers after each recess. The claimant's relationship with his or her employer had not been severed by these regularly scheduled vacation period recesses.

All of the claimants filed claims for unemployment benefits at their local unemployment offices for one or more of the three recess weeks involved. Before completing any required forms, each claimant was directed to go to the local Job Service office. Each claimant went in person and furnished personnel at that office with the requisite information. In addition, each claimant declared his/her availability for temporary work during each of the one week recesses involved. In accordance with Department of Employment and Training procedures relating to individuals on temporary, short-term layoffs, complete formal registration with the Job Service was deferred in each case. By virtue of the deferral, the likelihood that any of the claimants would have been referred to a suitable job during the one week recesses was decreased.

Thereafter, each claimant returned to his/her local unemployment compensation office and filed a claim for benefits. After completing and executing these claim forms, the claimants were issued Continued Claim Cards. As directed, the claimants completed and submitted their cards on which, and in response to two of the questions printed thereon, they certified that they had been able to work and that they had not refused any offer of or referral to work during the week at issue.

On the basis of the information which was provided to the local unemployment compensation office personnel, all claimants either received benefits or were credited with having served the required one week waiting period during the weeks at issue.

I.

21 V.S.A. § 1301(9)(A) deems a person to be totally unemployed in any week "during which he performs no services and with respect to which no wages are earned by him." The Trust contends that although the claimants may technically have satisfied the literal requirements of this section, they are not unemployed in regard to its general purposes. As to what exactly these general purposes might be, the Trust does not venture. We note, however, that the underlying purposes of unemployment legislation are to remove economic disabilities and distress resulting from involuntary unemployment, In re Potvin, 132 Vt. 14, 17, 313 A.2d 25, 27 (1973), and to assist those workers who become jobless for reasons beyond their control. Schneider v. Vermont Employment Security Board, 133 Vt. 187, 189, 333 A.2d 104, 105 (1975). Thus, since the Unemployment Compensation Act is remedial legislation, "a claimant should not be excluded from the provisions of the Act unless such an exclusion is clearly intended by law." Wallace v. Department of Employment Security, 134 Vt. 513 514, 365 A.2d 517, 518 (1976). To adopt the Trust's position, that the claimants in the instant case are not "unemployed," would violate this principle.

Nevertheless, the Trust asserts that since the employment relationships between the claimants and their employers were not severed during the one week layoffs and since the claimants expected to and did return to work for their employers at the end of the one week layoffs, they should not be considered "unemployed" within the meaning of the statute. In support of its contention, the Trust cites In re Platt, 130 Vt. 329, 292 A.2d 822 (1972). We find, however, that Platt offers no support to justify the Trust's position.

In Platt, this Court denied unemployment benefits to a claimant who had for several years worked at employment that required services to be performed on a two weeks on, two weeks off basis. While noting that "[i]n a non-technical use of the term, the [claimant] is not 'unemployed,' " we went on to state that "[t]he [claimant] satisfies the literal language of" 21 V.S.A. § 1301(9)(A), the statute which defines the term "unemployed." Id. at 332, 292 A.2d at 824-25. We then concluded, however, that to be eligible for unemployment compensation benefits, more is required: 21 V.S.A. § 1343(a) requires a claimant to be available for work. Id. Our holding that the claimant was ineligible for benefits was based upon our conclusion that he failed to meet the availability requirement. Id. at 333, 292 A.2d at 825. In light of this, and in...