Donahue v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
| Decision Date | 01 December 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 2-483A114,2-483A114 |
| Citation | 456 N.E.2d 751 |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
| Parties | Shirley DONAHUE, Appellant, v. YOUNGSTOWN SHEET & TUBE COMPANY, Appellee. |
Joseph P. Allegretti, Barry D. Sherman, Hammond, for appellant.
George E. Bloom, James E. Schreiner, Hammond, for appellee.
Shirley Donahue (Donahue) appeals the Industrial Board of Indiana's decision to deny her Workmen's Compensation claim. The Board concluded that her injuries did not result from an accident which arose out of and in the course of her employment as a commissary employee for Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company (Youngstown). The sole issue before us on appeal is whether Donahue's injuries arose out of and in the course of her employment.
The parties stipulated the following relevant facts:
On October 17, 1978, plaintiff was employed by defendant at an average weekly wage in excess of the maximum for workmen's compensation purposes; that on said date she sustained accidental injuries of which defendant had notice; that defendant denied liability therefore under workmen's compensation;
....
IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED that plaintiff's injuries were sustained on October 17, 1978, at approximately 10:19 p.m., on Dickey Road, a four lane public thoroughfare, located in the City of East Chicago, Indiana, running generally in a northwesterly-southeasterly direction; that plaintiff was crossing Dickey Road as a pedestrian in a general southwesterly direction when struck by a motor vehicle in the inner northwesterly bound lane; that at said time and place, plaintiff had finished her work with defendant, had punched out, and was going to her motor vehicle parked along the southwesterly curb of Dickey Road; that there were automatic traffic control signals at the point where plaintiff was crossing Dickey Road.
IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED that the issues to be determined are whether or not plaintiff sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of her employment, and if appropriate, the amount of permanent partial impairment resulting from said accidental injury together with the sum of $3,138.65 representing plaintiff's out-of-pocket medical expenses. 1
The Board purported to summarize the evidence which was presented in addition to the stipulations:
EVIDENCE
ROBERT L. LIPPMAN, Engineer, testified regarding his preparation of certain drawings which were subsequently used in witnesses testimony.
Plaintiff, SHIRLEY DONAHUE, testified regarding her employment and as to her procedures for clocking in and out throughout her employment with Defendant: that on October 17, 1978, Plaintiff was employed at Defendant's pipe mill canteen as a counterman which involved general cafeteria duties; that her employment duties were limited to that area and she had no duties with Defendant outside the canteen area. Plaintiff further testified that at the time in question she had voluntarily parked her automobile at the curb on Dickey Road and while crossing the street to her vehicle was struck by another vehicle in Dickey Road after she had clocked out; and that she was not directed by Defendant to park her vehicle along Dickey Road.
RAYMOND HAYES, JR., an employee of the Defendant's Engineering Department, testified that Defendant's premises do not include Dickey Road; that Dickey Road is a public street neither owned nor maintained by Defendant; that the traffic signals along Dickey Road near the tin mill gate are located on public property and not on property owned by Defendant.
RICHARD O. PRUITT, Plaintiff's Supervisor on October 17, 1978, at the pipe mill canteen, testified that although the normally designated clockhouse is at the pipe mill, some employees by choice punch out at the tin mill gate; that the employees were not instructed to punch out at the tin mill gate; that Plaintiff had no employment duties away from the pipe mill canteen and that her duties never required the use of an automobile.
JOSEPH J. CRNARICH, Workmen's Compensation Administrator for Defendant, testified that the offending driver, Jeffrey Slivka, was not an employee of Defendant on or about October 17, 1978.
Additionally, the following exhibits were admitted into evidence: Plaintiff's Exhibits "A" through "F" being six (6) colored photographs depicting on October 17, 1978, the intersection at approximately 3001 Dickey Road, East Chicago, Indiana; the ingresses and egresses of the J & L plant at said intersection; traffic control lights; and miscellaneous buildings located at and near said intersection; Plaintiff's Exhibits "G" through "J" were entered by stipulation of the parties; said exhibits being an aerial map of Defendant's complex in East Chicago, Indiana, and detailed and scaled drawings of the complex depicting building, bridges, roads and factories located on said Defendant's complex, including Plaintiff's Exhibit "H" which is a scaled drawing of the area West of the number one (1) tin mill depicting Dickey Road and the intersection where subject matter accident occurred; employment office parking lot; visitors parking lot on South side of Dickey Road near subject matter intersection; and employees parking lot located approximately four hundred (400) to six hundred (600) feet from subject matter intersection.
In reaching its decision, the Board found and emphasized that Donahue had completed her duties and clocked out, that she had left Youngstown's premises, that she was crossing a public street, that she was not directed to park her vehicle on Dickey Road, and that she was struck by a non-employee.
Our analysis of [Donahue's] contention proceeds from the threshold appellate perspective that it is not this court's prerogative to weigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses; in our review of the Board's findings and conclusions, we may consider only that evidence which tends to support its determination, together with any uncontradicted adverse evidence. Only when the evidence leads inalterably to a conclusion contrary to that reached by the Board will its decision be disturbed. (Emphasis added). (Citations Omitted).
Talas v. Correct Piping Co., Inc., (1982) Ind., 435 N.E.2d 22, 26.
Our review has revealed that the Board erroneously ignored uncontradicted evidence and failed to consider admissions made by Youngstown pertaining to the location and control of traffic signals at the intersection where Donahue was hit.
Prior to the initial hearing on Donahue's claim, her counsel filed requests for admissions. When the defendant failed to make a timely response, the hearing officer ruled that the issues raised in the requests were admitted. Therefore, the following facts were before the Board:
[A]ll traffic control signals located at the intersection of 3001 Dickey Road, East Chicago, Indiana, are located on the defendant's property.
[A]ll traffic control signals located at the defendant's old plant entrance, located at 3001 Dickey Road, are maintained by the defendant through a maintenance contract with New Era Corporation.
Additionally, Richard Pruitt, Donahue's supervisor, testified his employees were instructed to clock out at the time clock located on the side of the defendant's plant where they had worked on any given day. The plant was divided into two sections which were referred to as the "steel-side" and the "tin mill side". The steelside clockhouse was at the pipe mill and the tin mill side clockhouse was at the tin mill gate on Dickey Road.
However, Pruitt also testified that he was aware Donahue had punched out at the tin mill clockhouse on more than one occasion. In response to being asked whether the employee had a choice of which clockhouse to use, Pruitt responded that the employees were not told which clockhouse to use. He also stated that his employees were not allowed to use parking lots near the tin mill clockhouse. There was a parking lot across Dickey Road from the tin mill entrance and one within the plant adjacent to the tin mill clockhouse. The nearest available lot was 400 to 600 feet west of the tin mill entrance and clockhouse. 2
Pruitt also explained that Donahue worked a 2:30 p.m. to 10:30 p.m. shift at the canteen.
We first note that a determination of whether an employee's injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment is especially dependent on the facts and circumstances of each case. E.g. L.W. Edison, Inc. v. Teagarden, (1981) Ind.App., 423 N.E.2d 709; Prater v. Indiana Briquetting Corporation, (1969) 253 Ind. 83, 251 N.E.2d 810. In Prater, Justice Hunter aptly described the analysis involved in resolving this issue and discussed several factors to be considered. To summarize, liability in a situation such as the facts in the case at bar present [sic] depends on the finding of a casual relation between the accident and the employment. The actual situs of the injury, although a consideration, is not controlling. Also to be considered are the conditions and circumstances existing at the time, the type of activity in which the injured party was engaged when injured and its relationship to his duties as an employee, the reasonableness of such act in relation to the sum total of conditions and circumstances constituting the work setting, and the knowledge and acquiescence of the employer in certain situations where acts, incidental to employment, are being done in violation of the rules and the employer has knowledge or could reasonably be expected to know, yet does nothing to halt such infringements.
Applying this reasoning to Donahue's case, we are led to a conclusion contrary to the Board's decision. Donahue was engaged in an act incidental to her employment, clocking out; she was following an employees' custom in clocking out at the tin mill. Her supervisor was aware of the employees' custom and given the location of available employee parking, he should have been aware these employees were parking on Dickey Road to reach the tin...
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