Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. v. Boockvar

Decision Date23 August 2020
Docket NumberNo. 2:20-cv-966,2:20-cv-966
Citation481 F.Supp.3d 476
Parties Donald J. TRUMP FOR PRESIDENT, INC., et al., Plaintiffs v. Kathy BOOCKVAR, in her capacity as Secretary of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania
OPINION

J. Nicholas Ranjan, United States District Judge

Plaintiffs in this case are President Trump's reelection campaign, the Republican National Committee, and several other Republican congressional candidates and electors. They filed this suit, alleging federal and state constitutional violations stemming from Pennsylvania's recent implementation of a mail-in voting plan.

In their complaint, Plaintiffs point to the 2020 primary election, where "no excuse" mail-in voting was first implemented in Pennsylvania, and describe an election plagued by chaos. They say the primary was a "hazardous, hurried, and illegal implementation of unmonitored mail-in voting which provides fraudsters an easy opportunity to engage in ballot harvesting, manipulate or destroy ballots, manufacture duplicitous votes, and sow chaos." [ECF 234, ¶ 1]. They fear the same will occur in the November general election, where much more, of course, is at stake.

According to Plaintiffs, Pennsylvania's mail-in voting plan is not just bad, but unconstitutional. They say it is a product of overreach by the Pennsylvania Secretary of the Commonwealth, Kathy Boockvar, that will lead to "vote dilution" (i.e. , if unlawful votes are counted, then that "dilutes" lawful votes). They also allege that because of the patchwork, inconsistent implementation of the Secretary's guidance across Pennsylvania's 67 counties, equal-protection principles are violated. Due to the imminent election, and at Plaintiffs’ request, the Court ordered expedited discovery and scheduled an evidentiary hearing in mid-September, where Plaintiffs would be required to present evidence of these constitutional violations.

Defendants are Secretary Boockvar and all 67 county boards of elections in Pennsylvania. Several organizations have also intervened claiming a stake in the election.1 Many of these Defendants and Intervenors have moved to dismiss, arguing that the Court lacks the legal authority to decide this case. They argue that Plaintiffs lack standing; that their claims are moot, unripe, or legally flawed; and that venue is improper in this District. Short of dismissal, Defendants argue that the Court should "abstain" from deciding the merits and temporarily stay the case, so that the state courts can resolve many of these same issues that are pending before them.

After carefully considering the arguments raised by the parties, the Court finds that the appropriate course is abstention, at least for the time being. In other words, the Court will apply the brakes to this lawsuit, and allow the Pennsylvania state courts to weigh in and interpret the state statutes that undergird Plaintiffs’ federal-constitutional claims.

Under the abstention doctrine set forth in R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co. , 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941), federal courts decline to decide federal-constitutional claims if (1) doing so requires interpretation of "unsettled questions of state law,"; (2) permitting resolution of the unsettled state-law questions by state courts would "obviate the need for, or substantially narrow the scope of adjudication of the constitutional claims"; and (3) an "erroneous construction of state law would be disruptive of important states policies[.]" Chez Sez III Corp. v. Township of Union , 945 F.2d 628, 631 (3d Cir. 1991).

Here, most of Plaintiffs’ federal claims turn on interpretations of the Pennsylvania election code, as amended by Act 77, and allegations that Secretary Boockvar's guidance violates it. Because Act 77 was only recently enacted, in October 2019, no Pennsylvania state court has interpreted the provisions on which Plaintiffs rely. What's more, for nearly all these claims, the correct interpretation of the statutory text is unclear. And while Plaintiffs do assert one facial constitutional challenge and allege a few violations of statutory provisions that are probably not ambiguous, these claims are intertwined with those that are less clear. Thus, the state court's resolution of the uncertain questions could narrow even these claims, or at least cause Plaintiffs to present them in a different posture. Under these exceptional circumstances, the mandatory elements of Pullman abstention are satisfied.

Discretionary considerations also weigh heavily in favor of abstention. With a national election less than three months away, several parallel proceedings pending in state court, and all this unfolding amid an unprecedented pandemic that has paralyzed much of the world, this Court cannot afford to issue a decision that could be rendered advisory, unnecessary, or erroneous if the Pennsylvania courts adopt a different interpretation of ambiguous state law. Additionally, state-court resolution of these uncertain statutory issues would not merely remove ambiguity from, or narrow the scope of, Plaintiffs’ federal claims—it may afford Plaintiffs any relief they are entitled to. Indeed, if Plaintiffs are right, a state court could simply decide whether Defendants’ conduct violates the election code and, if it does, enjoin it on that basis. Conversely, a state-court finding that Secretary Boockvar's guidance was lawful could defeat, or at least play a critical role in the Court's analysis of, Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims that are based on that guidance.

For these reasons, discussed in detail below, the Court is persuaded that the important principles underlying the Pullman abstention doctrine—federalism, comity, constitutional avoidance, error prevention, and judicial efficiency—all weigh strongly in favor of letting state courts decide predicate disputes about the meaning of Pennsylvania's state election code.

The Court will thus grant Defendantsmotions to the extent that they request Pullman abstention, and otherwise stay all proceedings until the Pennsylvania courts have weighed in on the unsettled state-law issues. To be clear, the Court is not abdicating its responsibility to decide the federal-constitutional issues that are potentially presented by the case. Rather, the Court is waiting until the state courts have interpreted the predicate statutory provisions, which may avoid the need for the Court to hear Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, or at least change the dimension of those claims. Once that has happened, if any of Plaintiffs’ federal claims remain viable, Plaintiffs may return to this Court to re-start proceedings for those claims to be heard.

BACKGROUND
I. Factual background.2

Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief from certain policies allegedly adopted by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and its county election boards. Plaintiffs believe these policies are at odds with the Pennsylvania election code and violate their rights under the federal and state constitutions. See [ECF 234].

A. Secretary Boockvar's guidance.

On June 2, 2020, Pennsylvania held a primary election—the first since the legislature's adoption of "no excuse" mail-in voting under Act 77. [Id. at ¶ 91]. In anticipation of that election, Secretary Boockvar issued three sets of "guidance" to the various county election boards. This guidance purported to "define both what is required by Act 77 and what is permissible under Act 77 or some other portion of the Election Code." [Id. at ¶ 117]. The relevant guidance provided as follows:

1. Guidance on verifying mail-in and absentee ballots without an objection.

First, according to Secretary Boockvar's January 10, 2020, guidance, "[a] county board of elections cannot decline [a] voter's application for a mail-in or absentee ballet [sic], unless there is a bona fide objection to the mail-in or absentee ballot application." [Id. at ¶ 118] (emphasis in original).

During the recent primary election, several counties relied on Secretary Boockvar's guidance and approved all applications for absentee or mail-in ballots without acting to verify each applicant's qualifications absent a "bona fide objection." [Id. at ¶ 121].

2. Guidance on "drop boxes" and other ballot-collection locations.

Second, the Secretary's guidance also stated that "county election boards may provide for mail-in and absentee application processing and balloting at more than one [county elections office] located within county borders." [Id. at ¶ 122]. Further, the Secretary advised that "[w]hen choosing a location for the [county elections office], counties should consider, at a minimum, ... choos[ing] locations that serve heavily populated urban/suburban areas, as well as rural areas," including locations "near heavy traffic areas such as commercial corridors, large residential areas, major employers and public transportation routes." [Id. ].

During the recent primary election, about 20 county election boards followed the Secretary's guidance by permitting absentee and mail-in ballots to be returned to locations such as shopping centers, parking lots, fairgrounds, parks, retirement homes, college campuses, fire halls, municipal government buildings, and elected officials’ offices. [Id. at ¶ 126]. In most cases, ballots were collected at these locations by using "unmonitored and/or unsecured drop-off boxes" or similar means. [Id. at ¶ 129].

Additionally, the Philadelphia County Board of Elections partnered with a non-partisan group to implement a mobile mail-in ballot drop-off initiative to collect absentee and mail-in ballots from non-disabled voters within Philadelphia County. [Id. at ¶ 127]. And the Delaware County Board of Elections authorized third-party delivery of absentee and mail-in ballots to any polling location on Election Day through "unmonitored" drop-boxes, where voters would "not be required to check in with the [poll] workers." [Id. at ¶ 128]. Delaware County also allowed voters who...

To continue reading

Request your trial
7 cases
  • Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. v. Bullock
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Montana
    • September 30, 2020
    ...Court to follow the abstention path paved by the Western District of Pennsylvania in a similar case. See Trump for President, Inc. v. Boockvar , 481 F.Supp.3d 476 (W.D. Pa. 2020). But the Court finds this case distinguishable. While not determinative, a compelling justification for abstenti......
  • Jackson Purchase Energy Corp. v. Marshall Cnty.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky
    • April 19, 2021
    ...court construction of the state-law issue before a federal court will entertain her claim."); Trump for President, Inc., v. Boockvar , 481 F.Supp.3d 476, 489, 499-500, 503 (W.D. Penn. 2020) (citing Artway v. Attorney General of State of N.J. , 81 F.3d 1235, 1270 (3d Cir. 1996) ). While this......
  • Murray v. City of Phila.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • August 25, 2020
  • Jackson Purchase Energy Corp. v. Marshall Cnty.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky
    • April 19, 2021
    ...court construction of the state-law issue before a federal court will entertain her claim.); Trump for President, Inc., v. Boockvar, 481 F.Supp.3d 476, 489; 499-500; 503 (W.D. Penn. 2020) (citing Artway v. Attorney General of State of N.J., 81 F.3d 1235, 1270 (3d Cir. 1996). While this acti......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT