Donald v. Smith

• Decision Date: 19 June 1985
• Docket Number: No. 84-476,84-476
• Citation: 105 S.Ct. 2787,472 U.S. 479,86 L.Ed.2d 384
• Parties: Robert McDONALD, Petitioner, v. David I. SMITH
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

472 U.S. 479

105 S.Ct. 2787

86 L.Ed.2d 384

Robert McDONALD, Petitioner,

v David I. SMITH.

No. 84-476.

Argued March 20, 1985.

Decided June 19, 1985.

Syllabus

Respondent filed a libel action against petitioner in a North Carolina state court under the common law of that State, alleging that while respondent was being considered for the position of United States Attorney, petitioner wrote two letters to President Reagan (and sent copies to other Government officials) containing "false, slanderous, libelous, inflammatory and derogatory statements" concerning respondent, and that petitioner knew that the statements were false and maliciously intended to injure respondent by undermining his prospect of being appointed United States Attorney. Seeking compensatory and punitive damages, respondent also alleged, inter alia, that the letters had their intended effect, resulting in his not being appointed, and that his reputation and career as an attorney were injured. Petitioner removed the case to Federal District Court on the basis of diversity of citizenship and then moved for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the Petition Clause of the First Amendment—which guarantees "the right of the people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances"—provided absolute immunity from liability. The District Court held that the Clause does not grant absolute immunity, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Held:

1. The Petition Clause does not provide absolute immunity to defendants charged with expressing libelous and damaging falsehoods in petitions to Government officials. Although the value in the right of petition as an important aspect of self-government is beyond question, it does not follow that the Framers of the First Amendment believed that the Petition Clause provided absolute immunity from damages for libel. In 1845 this Court, after reviewing the common law, held in White v. Nicholls, 3 How. 266, 11 L.Ed. 591, that a petition to a Government official was actionable if prompted by "express malice," which was defined as "falsehood and the absence of probable cause," and nothing has been presented to suggest that that holding should be altered. Nor do the Court's decisions interpreting the Petition Clause in contexts other than defamation indicate that the right to petition is absolute. The Clause was inspired by the same ideals of liberty and democracy that resulted in the First Amendment freedoms to speak, publish, and assemble, and there is no sound basis for granting greater constitutional protection to statements made in a petition than other First Amendment expressions. Pp. 482-485.

2. Under North Carolina common law, damages may be recovered only if petitioner is shown to have acted with "malice," as defined in terms that the North Carolina Court of Appeals considered to be consistent with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686. The Petition Clause does not require the State to expand this privilege into an absolute one. P. 485.

737 F.2d 427 (CA 4 1984), affirmed.

Bruce James Ennis, Jr., Washington, D.C., for petitioner.

William A. Eagles, Washington, D.C., for respondent.

Chief Justice BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to decide whether the Petition Clause of the First Amendment provides absolute immunity to a defendant charged with expressing libelous and damaging falsehoods in letters to the President of the United States.

I

In July 1981, respondent commenced a libel action against petitioner in state court under the common law of North Carolina. Respondent alleged that while he was being considered for the position of United States Attorney, petitioner wrote two letters to President Reagan.¹ The complaint alleges that these letters "contained false, slanderous, libelous, inflammatory and derogatory statements" concerning respondent. App. 4-5. In particular, the complaint states that the letters falsely accused respondent of "violating the civil rights of various individuals while a Superior Court Judge," "fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud," "extortion or blackmail," and "violations of professional ethics." Id., at 5-6. Respondent alleged that petitioner knew that these accusations were false, and that petitioner maliciously intended to injure respondent by undermining his prospect of being appointed United States Attorney.

The complaint alleges that petitioner mailed copies of the letters to Presidential Adviser Edwin Meese, Senator Jesse Helms, Representative W.E. Johnston, and three other officials in the Executive and Legislative Branches.² It further alleges that petitioner's letters had their intended effect: respondent was not appointed United States Attorney, his reputation and career as an attorney were injured, and he "suffered humiliation, embarrassment, anxiety and mental anguish." Id., at 6. Respondent sought compensatory and punitive damages of $1 million.

Petitioner removed the case to the United States District Court on the basis of diversity of citizenship. He then moved for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the Petition Clause of the First Amendment provides absolute immunity. The District Court agreed with petitioner that his communications fell "within the general protection afforded by the petition clause," 562 F.Supp. 829, 838-839 (MDNC 1983), but held that the Clause does not grant absolute immunity from liability for libel. The Fourth Circuit, relying on this Court's decision in White v. Nicholls, 3 How. 266, 11 L.Ed. 591 (1845), affirmed.³ 737 F.2d 427 (1984).

We granted certiorari, 469 U.S. 1032, 105 S.Ct. 502, 83 L.Ed.2d 394 (1984), and we affirm.

II

The First Amendment guarantees "the right of the people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." The right to petition is cut from the same cloth as the other guarantees of that Amendment, and is an assurance of a particular freedom of expression. In United States v. Cruikshank, 2 Otto 542, 92 U.S. 542, 23 L.Ed. 588 (1876), the Court declared that this right is implicit in "[t]he very idea of government, republican in form." Id., at 552. And James Madison made clear in the congressional debate on the proposed amendment that people "may communicate their will" through direct petitions to the legislature and government officials. 1 Annals of Cong. 738 (1789).

The historical roots of the Petition Clause long antedate the Constitution. In 1689, the Bill of Rights exacted of William and Mary stated: "[I]t is the Right of the Subjects to petition the King." 1 Wm. & Mary, Sess. 2, ch. 2. This idea reappeared in the Colonies when the Stamp Act Congress of 1765 included a right to petition the King and Parliament in its Declaration of Rights and Grievances. See 1 B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights—A Documentary History 198 (1971). And the Declarations of Rights enacted by many state conventions contained a right to petition for redress of grievances. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights (1776).

Although the values in the right of petition as an important aspect of self-government are beyond question, it does not follow that the Framers of the First Amendment believed that the Petition Clause provided absolute immunity from damages for libel. Early libel cases in state courts provide no clear evidence of the nature of the right to petition as it existed at the time the First Amendment was adopted; these cases reveal conflicting views of the privilege afforded expressions in petitions to government officials.

The plaintiff in the Vermont case of Harris v. Huntington, 2 Tyler 129 (1802), brought a libel action complaining of the defendant's petition to the legislature that he not be reappointed as a justice of the peace. The court, based on its understanding of "the right of petitioning the supreme power," granted the defendant's request for an "absolute and unqualified immunity from all responsibility." Id., at 139-140. This absolute position of the Vermont court reflected an early English view,⁴ but was not followed by the courts of other States. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Clapp, 4 Mass. 163, 169 (1808). Indeed, Justice Yeates of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated in Gray v. Pentland, 2 Serg. & R. 23 (1815), that

"an individual, who maliciously, wantonly, and without probable cause, asperses the character of a public officer in a written or printed paper, delivered to those who are invested with the power of removing him from office, is responsible to the party injured in damages, although such paper is masked under the specious cover of investigating the conduct of such officer for the general good. Public policy demands no such sacrifice of the rights of persons in an official capacity, nor will the law endure such a mockery of its justice." Id., at 25 (emphasis in original).

In White v. Nicholls, supra, this Court dealt with the proper common-law privilege for petitions to the Government. The plaintiff in White brought a libel action based on letters written by Nicholls urging the President of the United States to remove the plaintiff from office as a customs inspector. The Court, after reviewing the common law, concluded that the defendant's petition was actionable if prompted by "express malice," which was defined as "falsehood and the absence of probable cause." Id., at 291. Nothing presented to us suggests that the Court's decision not to recognize an absolute privilege in 1845 should be altered; we are not prepared to conclude, 140 years later, that the Framers of the First Amendment understood the right to petition to include an unqualified right to express damaging falsehoods in exercise of that right.⁵

Nor do the Court's decisions interpreting the Petition Clause in contexts other than defamation indicate that the right to petition is absolute. For example, filing a complaint in court is a form of petitioning activity; but "baseless litigation is not immunized by the First...