Donald v. United States Enrichment Corp.

• Docket Number: Civil Action 5:23-cv-50-CRS
• Decision Date: 27 November 2023
• Parties: MINNIE ALINE DONALD PLAINTIFF v. UNITED STATES ENRICHMENT CORPORATION et al. DEFENDANTS
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky

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MINNIE ALINE DONALD PLAINTIFF v. UNITED STATES ENRICHMENT CORPORATION et al. DEFENDANTS

Civil Action No. 5:23-cv-50-CRS

United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Paducah Division

November 27, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Charles R. Simpson III, Senior Judge.

Plaintiff Minnie Aline Donald brought this pro se, in forma pauperis lawsuit. This matter is before the Court for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock 549 U.S. 199 (2007). For the following reasons, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's lawsuit.

I. STATEMENT OF CLAIMS

Plaintiff sues the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC), Centrus Energy, the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (Met Life), the Kentucky Workers' Compensation Board, and attorney Mark Edwards. According to Plaintiff, when she left work “because of disability due to chemical exposure” on December 14, 1994, Centrus Energy denied her state workers' compensation which was due to her. DN 1, PageID #: 6. She states that she was only paid shortterm disability benefits for one year and long-term disability benefits for two years. Id. Plaintiff alleges that “they” were supposed to put her on permanent disability until her retirement age but in August 1998, they “stopped . . . and robbed me of my long term disability.” Id. (cleaned up). She further states that she “appealed repeatedly, to no avail.” Id. (cleaned up).

In the relief portion of the Complaint form, Plaintiff refers to a 2001 federal program for workers suffering from illness occasioned by exposure to chemicals. Id. at PageID #: 7. She claims that, rather than helping, the program works against sick workers seeking compensation. Id. She asserts that she only qualifies for medical benefits from this program and that the limit on the amount of available money is “so low I can't get paid any more. Congress need to raise the low limit.” Id.

Plaintiff attaches an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) right-to-sue notice, which was issued on August 24, 2022. DN 1-1, PageID #: 9. It states that the EEOC dismissed her charge because it was not filed timely.^[1] Id.

Plaintiff also attaches an October 23, 2020 decision by an administrative law judge (ALJ) for the Kentucky Department of Workers' Claims denying her workers' compensation claim. Id. at PageID #: 75-86. That document indicates that Plaintiff worked for USEC from January 7, 1991, until December 14, 1994. Id. at PageID #: 75. The ALJ determined that the 20-year statute of limitations ran on December 14, 2014 and barred her claim for benefits related to her chemical exposure filed on August 23, 2019. Id. at PageID #: 85. She attaches a copy of her appeal to the Workers' Compensation Board. Id. at PageID #: 103-06, 107-11.

At the same time that she filed her complaint, Plaintiff also filed a “Motion for Civil Rights Act” (DN 4). It contains allegations against Mark Edwards, an attorney Plaintiff hired in June 1997. She alleges that he filed a class action in federal court but that he missed her “court date,” causing the case to be dismissed. DN 4-1, PageID #: 134-35. According to Plaintiff, Edwards told her that he would refile but she never heard from him again. Id. at PageID #: 135.

Plaintiff's motion indicates that she hired another attorney to sue Edwards for missing her court date. The motion refers to “discrimination” related to Edwards for missing her court date and related to Met Life for denying her benefits. Id. at PageID #: 134. She alleges that Met Life defrauded her, committed perjury, and acted discriminatorily in reckless disregard of her rights. Id. at PageID #: 138-39. She also alleges that Met Life's actions over the last 25 years were “unquestionably wrong.” Id. at PageID #: 139.

Plaintiff then filed an Amended Complaint (DN 5). The Amended Complaint names “Lab Corp. Paducah PSC” (Lab Corp) as a Defendant. DN 5, PageID #: 141. She alleges that on April 19, 2022, she suffered a “left arm nerve injury” causing pain, numbness, and tingling, when a Lab Corp employee shoved a needle into her arm “very hard” while she was having lab work done. Id. at PageID #: 144.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, this Court must review the Complaint. See § 1915(e)(2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d at 608-09. Upon review, this Court must dismiss a case at any time if the Court determines that the action is “frivolous or malicious,” fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. § 1915(e)(2)(B). While a reviewing court must liberally construe pro se pleadings, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982), to avoid dismissal, a complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

III. ANALYSIS

There is a lot going on in Plaintiff's pleadings before the Court. The originating document, her Complaint, lists as Defendants two companies, an insurer, and a state entity -- the Kentucky Workers' Compensation Board -- and she adds an attorney as a Defendant in her “Motion for Civil Rights.” It appears that the genesis for most of her claims stems from her exposure to certain chemicals at work from 1991 to 1994; her later disability resulting from the chemical exposure; her subsequent quest to obtain disability compensation from the insurer; and Edwards's alleged legal malpractice during his representation of her in that quest. Plaintiff's allegations also revolve around her attempts, years later, to obtain Kentucky workers' compensation benefits and to bring an employment-discrimination claim. Additionally, Plaintiff seeks to add an unrelated state-law tort claim against a private laboratory. As set forth below, the Court dismisses all of Plaintiff's claims.

A. Plaintiff's prior suit against Defendants

Before filing this lawsuit (hereinafter Donald II), Plaintiff brought a nearly identical suit, Donald v. Centrus Energy, 5:22-cv-27-TBR (hereinafter Donald I), against Centrus Energy and Met Life.^[2] In fact, pages 5-6 of the Complaint form, which contain the statement-of-claim and relief portions of the Complaint, are identical in both cases except for the date of Plaintiff's signature. Compare Donald I, DN 1, PageID #: 5-6, with Donald II, DN 1, PageID #: 6-7. In Donald I, the Court entered a Memorandum and Order explaining that Plaintiff's Complaint did not meet the pleading standard of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and affording Plaintiff the opportunity to file an amended complaint “to set forth allegations against . . . Defendants.” Donald I, DN 10, PageID #: 349.

Plaintiff filed an amended complaint in Donald I, which also failed to meet the noticepleading standard. The Court dismissed Plaintiff's claims for failure to comply with Rule 8(a)'s pleading standard, and, to the extent she sought to bring an employment-discrimination claim, because she did not have the required EEOC right-to-sue letter to do so. Donald I, DN 16, PageID #: 564-65.

Plaintiff's Complaint (DN 1) in this lawsuit fails to comport with the Rule 8(a) pleading standard for the same reasons set forth in Donald I.^[3] The Court finds it unnecessary, however, to provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to file an amended complaint as set forth below.

B. Motion for Civil Rights Act

Plaintiff's motion (DN 4) does not ask for any specific relief. In fact, it appears to be a continuation of the complaint. The Court, therefore, construes it as a motion to amend the complaint, which the Court GRANTS because no service has yet been made in this case. See Rule 15(a) (“A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course no later than . . . 21 days after serving it[.]”).

C. Claim against Lab Corp

The Court will construe Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (DN 5) as a motion to amend because the Court has already determined that her “Motion for Civil Rights Act” is, in fact, an Amended Complaint. Her motion to amend her Complaint is essentially a duplicate of her motion in Donald I to add Lab Corp as a Defendant. The Court denied her motion to amend in Donald I, because to grant it would result in misjoinder. Donald I, DN 13.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 states in relevant part,

Persons . . . may be joined in one action as defendants if:

(a) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and

(b) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). A federal court may consider many different factors when determining whether civil-rights claims arise from the same transaction or occurrence, including, “the time period during which the alleged acts occurred; whether the acts . . . are related; whether more than one act . . . is alleged; whether the same supervisors were involved, and whether the defendants were at different geographical locations.” Proctor v. Applegate, 661 F.Supp.2d 743, 778 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (internal quotation marks and cite omitted).

As the Court explained in Donald I, it is clear that Plaintiff's claim against Lab Corp does not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as the claims against the other Defendants; nor would it involve any question of law or fact common to all Defendants. As such, allowing Plaintiff to amend to add Lab Corp as a Defendant would result in misjoinder. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion (DN 5).

E. Diversity jurisdiction

Plaintiff's Complaint does not indicate whether she i...