Donald v. Williams

Decision Date15 May 1899
Docket NumberNo. 257,257
Citation19 S.Ct. 743,43 L.Ed. 1022,174 U.S. 397
PartiesMcDONALD v. WILLIAMS et al
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

This suit was commenced in the circuit court of the United States for the Southern district of New York. It was brought by the plaintiff, as receiver of the Capital National Bank of Lincoln, Neb., for the purpose of recovering from the defendants, who were stockholders in the bank, the amount of certain dividends received by them before the appointment of a receiver.

Upon the trial of the case the circuit court decreed in favor of the plaintiff for the recovery covery of a certain amount. The defendants appealed from the decree because it was not in their favor, and the plaintiff appealed from it because the recovery provided for in the decree was not as much as he claimed to be entitled to. Upon the argument of the appeal in the circuit court of appeals certain questions of alw were presented, as to which that court desired the instruction of this court for their proper decision.

It appears from the statement of facts made by the court that the bank suspended payment in January, 1893, in a condition of hopeless insolvency, the stockholders, including the defendants, having been assessed to the full amount of their respective holdings; but the money thus obtained, added to the amount realized from the assets, will not be sufficient, even if all dividends paid during the bank's existence were repaid to the receiver, to pay 75 per cent. of the claims of the bank's creditors.

This suit was brought to compel the repayment of certain dividends paid by the bank to the defendants on that part of the capital of the bank represented by their stock of the par value of $5,000, on the ground, alleged in the bill, that each of said dividends was fraudulently declared and paid out of the capital of the bank, and not out of net profits.

A list of the dividends, and the amount thereof, paid by the bank from January, 1885, to July, 1892, both inclusive, is contained in the statement; and it is added that all dividends, except the last (July 12, 1892), were paid to the defendant Williams, a stockholder to the amount of $5,000, from the organization of the bank. The last dividend was paid to the defendant Dodd, who bought Williams' stock, and had the same transferred to his own name December 16, 1891.

When the dividend of January 6, 1889, was declared and paid, and when each subsequent dividend, down to and including July, 1891, was declared and paid, there were no net profits. The capital of the bank was impaired, and the dividends were paid out of the capital, but the bank was still solvent. When the dividends of January and July, 1892, were declared and paid, there were no net profits, the capital of the bank was lost, and the bank actually insolvent.

The defendants, neither of whom was an officer or director, were ignorant of the financial condition of the bank, and received the dividends in good faith, relying on the officers of the bank, and believing the dividends were coming out of the profits.

Upon these facts the court desired the instruction of this court for the proper decision of the following questions:

First question: Can the receiver of a national bank recover a dividend paid not at all out of profits, but entirely out of the capital, when the stockholder receiving such dividend acted in good faith, believing the same to be paid out of profits, and when the bank, at the time such dividend was declared and paid, was not insolvent?

Second question: Has a United States circuit court jurisdiction to entertain a bill in equity brought by a receiver of a national bank against stockholders to recover di idends which, as claimed, were improperly paid, when such suit is brought against two or more stockholders, and embraces two or more dividends, and when the objection that there is an adequate remedy at law is raised by the answer?

Edward Winslow Paige, for appellant.

Theodore De Witt, for appellees.

Mr. Justice PECKHAM, after stating the facts, delivered the opinion of the court.

It will be noticed that the first question is based upon the facts that the bank, at the time the dividends were declared and paid, was solvent, and that the stockholders receiving the dividends acted in good faith, and believed that the same were paid out of the profits made by the bank.

The sections of the Revised Statutes which are applicable to the questions involved herein are set forth in the margin.1

The complainant bases his right to recover in this suit upon the theory that the capital of the corporation was a trust fund for the payment of creditors entitled to a portion thereof, and, having been paid in the way of dividends to the shareholders, that portion can be recovered back in an action of this kind for the purpose of paying the debts of the corporation. He also bases his right to recover upon the terms of section 5204 of the Revised Statutes.

We think the theory of a trust fund has no application to a case of this kind. When a corporation is solvent, the theory that its capital is a trust fund upon which there is any lien for the payment of its debts has in fact very little foundation. No general creditor has any lien upon the fund under such circumstances, and the right of the corporation to deal with its property is absolute, so long as it does not violate its charter or the law applicable to such corporation.

In Graham v. Railroad Co., 102 U. S. 148, 161, it was said by Mr. Justice Bradley, in the course of his opinion, that: 'When a corporation becomes insolvent, it is so far civilly dead that its property may be administered as a trust fund for the benefit of its stockholders and creditors. And a court of equity, at the instance of the proper parties, will then make those funds trust funds which in other circumstances are as much the absolute property of the corporation as any man's property is his.'

And in Hollins v. Iron Co., 150 U. S. 371, 383, 14 Sup. Ct. 127, it was stated by Mr. Justice Brewer, in delivering the opinion of the court, and speaking of the theory of the capital of a corporation being a trust fund, as follows:

'In other words,—and that is the idea which underlies all these expressions in reference to 'trust' in connection with the property of a corporation,—the corporation is an entity, distinct from its stockholders as from its creditors. Solvent, it holds its property as any individual holds his,—free from the touch of a creditor who has acquired no lien; free also from the touch of a stockholder who, though equitably interested in, has no legal right to, the property. Becoming insolvent, the equitable interest of the stockholders in the property, together with their conditional liability to the creditors, places the property in a condition of a trust, first for the creditors, and then for the stockholders. Whatever of trust there is arises from the peculiar and diverse equitable rights of the stockholders, as against the corporation, in its property, and their conditional liability to its creditors. It is rather a trust in the administration of the assets after possession by a court of equity, than a trust attaching to the property, as such, for the direct benefit of either creditor or stockholder.'

And also:

'The officers of a corporation act in a fiduciary capacity in respect to its property in their hands, and may be called to an account for fraud, or sometimes even mere mismanagement in respect thereto; but, as between itself and its creditors, the corporation is simply a debtor, and does not hold its property in trust, or subject to a line in heir favor, in any other sense than does an individual debtor. That is certainly the general rule, and, if there by any exceptions thereto, they are not presented by any of the facts in this case. Neither the insolvency of the corporation, nor the execution of an illegal trust deed, not the failure to collect in full all stock subscriptions, nor all together, gave to these simple-contract creditors any lien upon the property of the corporation, nor charged any direct trust thereon.'

Other cases are cited in the opinion as holding the same doctrine.

In Railway Co. v. Ham. 114 U. S. 587, 594, 5 Sup. Ct. 1081, Mr. Justice Gray, in delivering the opinion of the court, said:

'The property of a corporation is doubtless a trust fund for the payment of its debts, in the sense that when the corporation is lawfully dissolved, and all its business wound up, or when it is insolvent, all its creditors are entitled, in equity, to have their debts paid out of the corporate property before any distribution thereof among the stockholders. It is also true, in the case of a corporation as in that of a natural person, that any conveyance of property of the debtor, without authority of law, and in fraud of existing creditors, is void as against them.'

These cases, while not involving precisely the same question now before us, show there is no well-defined lien of creditors upon the capital of a corporation while the latter is a solvent and going concern, so as to permit creditors to question at the time the disposition of the property.

The bank, being solvent, although it paid its dividends out of capital, did not pay them out of a trust fund. Upon the subsequent insolvency of the bank and the appointment of a receiver, an action could not be brought by the latter to recover the dividends thus paid, on the theory that they were paid from a trust fund, and therefore were liable to be recovered back.

It is contended on the part of the complainant, however, that, if the assets of the bank are impressed with a trust in favor of its creditors when it is insolvent, they must be impressed with the same trust when it is solvent; that the mere fact that the value of the assets of the corporation has sunk below the amount of its debts, although as yet unknown to anybody, cannot possibly make a new contract between the corporation and its creditors. In case of...

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