Donaldson, In re

• Decision Date: 06 February 1969
• Citation: 75 Cal.Rptr. 220,269 Cal.App.2d 509
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: In re David Reuben DONALDSON, a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. James D. MERCER, Chief Probation Officer of the County of El Dorado, Petitioner and Respondent, v. David Reuben DONALDSON, Objector and Appellant. Civ. 11918.

Page 220

75 Cal.Rptr. 220

269 Cal.App.2d 509

In re David Reuben DONALDSON, a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

James D. MERCER, Chief Probation Officer of the County of El Dorado, Petitioner and Respondent, v. David Reuben DONALDSON, Objector and Appellant.

Civ. 11918.

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

Feb. 6, 1969.

Hearing Denied April 2, 1969.

Paul Petrozzi, Court Appointed Counsel, Sacramento, for appellant.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., by Edsel W. Haws and Arnold O. Overoye, Deputy Atty. Gen., Sacramento, for respondent.

REGAN, Associate Justice.

The vice principal at Ponderosa High School in Placerville, upon being told by a student that she could purchase speed or methedrine pills at the school, advised her to make the purchase. The purchase of three pills was made, the pills were delivered to the vice principal, and the seller identified as defendant herein, a student of the school who was 15 years of age. Thereupon the vice principal searched defendant's book locker and found four half cigarettes made of marijuana and a plastic bag containing marijuana. The search was without a warrant and without defendant's consent. The school administration retained the combinations to all student lockers and by means of master keys entered them from time to time to examine their contents for articles detrimental to the student body.

Defendant appeals from a judgment finding him to be a ward of the juvenile court (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 602), in that he violated section 11530 of the Health and Safety Code (possession of marijuana).

Defendant contends that prejudicial error was committed by the court in admitting into evidence the cigarettes and plastic bag which had been obtained by an unlawful search and seizure carried out by a school official upon appellant's locker, since the school official was in fact a governmental official within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

The People, in a two-pronged argument, assert that the vice principal stands In loco parentis and has joint control over the locker and also is a private person as to whom the Fourth Amendment has no application.

In Stapleton v. Superior Court, 70 A.C. 101, 103--104, 73 Cal.Rptr. 575, 577, 447 P.2d 967, 969, the court states:

'The Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures applies to the states, and evidence obtained in violation of that amendment is inadmissible in state courts. (Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (84 A.L.R.2d 933).) The Fourth Amendment does not apply, however, to searches by private individuals (Burdeau v. McDowell (1921) 256 U.S. 465, 41 S.Ct. 574, 65 L.Ed. 1048 (13 A.L.R. 1159).)'

In Stapleton, supra, it is pointed out that because the search there was clearly part of a joint operation by police and the private individual it was tainted with state action and consequently violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition. We find no joint operation by police and the school official in the case before us.

In People v. Superior Court, 70 A.C. 129, 135, 74 Cal.Rptr. 294, 298, 449 P.2d 230, 234, the court, in deciding whether or not section 1538.5 of the Penal Code is available to effect suppression of evidence Not obtained as the result of a search or seizure by a government agent, and concluding the section is not applicable, states: '(T)he standard or test of reasonableness is that required by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. (See, e.g., Cooper v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 58, 61--62, 87 S.Ct. 788, 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (733--734).) Settled principles of constitutional law make the Fourth Amendment applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment which prohibits a state from depriving 'any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.' The conduct of a person not acting under the authority of a state is not proscribed by the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments of the federal Constitution. There are no state standards for 'search and seizure' by a private citizen who is not acting as an agent of the state or other governmental unit. Therefore, acquisition of property by a private citizen from another person cannot be deemed reasonable or unreasonable (People v. Randazzo (1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 768, 775--776, 34 Cal.Rptr. 65, cert. den. 377 U.S. 1000, 84 S.Ct. 1933, 12 L.Ed.2d 1050; People v. Johnson (1957) 153 Cal.App.2d 870, 873--878, 315 P.2d 468), and a motion to suppress evidence so obtained cannot be made on the ground that its acquisition constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure under section 1538.5.

'Furthermore, it is clear from the available legislative history that section 1538.5 was intended to apply to suppression of evidence obtained by government agents.'

We find the vice principal of the high school not to be a governmental official within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment so as to bring into play its prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Such school official is one of the school authorities with an obligation to maintain discipline in the interest of a proper and orderly school operation, and the primary purpose of the school official's search was not to obtain convictions, but to secure evidence of student misconduct. That evidence of crime is uncovered and prosecution results therefrom should not of itself make the search and seizure unreasonable.

The vice principal testified that after being advised of the purchase of the speed or methedrine pills he decided to search the locker for more of the pills, resulting in the finding of the marijuana;...