Donaldson v. Barrett, Inc.
| Decision Date | 08 May 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 91-2177,91-2177 |
| Citation | 977 F.2d 572 |
| Parties | NOTICE: Fourth Circuit I.O.P. 36.6 states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Fourth Circuit. Larry DONALDSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DANIEL H. BARRETT, INCORPORATED; Richard Manuell Cole, Defendants-Appellees, and OLD DOMINION FREIGHT LINE, INC.; Caleb Manly Lail, Defendants. . Argued: |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
Argued: Richard David Paugh, Rockville, Maryland, for Appellant. Joseph Doane Roberts, Slenker, Brandt, Jennings & Johnson, Merrifield, Virginia, for Appellees.
On Brief: Gregory M. Wade, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant.
Before MURNAGHAN and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and KAUFMAN, Senior United States District Judge for the District of Maryland, sitting by designation.
Plaintiff below and appellant herein, Larry Donaldson (Donaldson), instituted a diversity 1 negligence action on November 20, 1990, against Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc. (Old Dominion), Caleb Manly Lail (Lail), one of Old Dominion's drivers, and against appellees herein, Daniel H. Barrett, Inc. (Barrett) and Richard Manual Cole (Cole), one of Barrett's employees. Donaldson seeks damages for injuries which he sustained on August 14, 1989 while working in Prince Williams County, Virginia.
After discovery was completed, defendants Barrett and Cole filed a motion to dismiss Donaldson's complaint as barred by the Virginia's Workmen's Compensation Act, Va. Code Ann. § 65.1 (Michie 1987). Memoranda and affidavits were filed by both sides. After oral argument, the district court granted the motion to dismiss of Barrett and Cole, with prejudice. Subsequently, plaintiff moved to dismiss defendants Old Dominion and Lail. The district court also dismissed those defendants with prejudice. In this appeal, Donaldson challenges the district court's dismissal of his action against Barrett and Cole as barred by Virginia's Workmen's Compensation Act.
During the relevant time period, Donaldson was employed by William A. Hazel, Inc. (Hazel), a complete site general contractor. The business of Hazel included clearing land, hauling materials, excavation, sewer and water work, paving, concrete pouring, curb and gutter work, and seeding. The nature of Hazel's business called for the ownership and the use of trucks. Indeed, Hazel owned a fleet of dump trucks which it sometimes used to haul materials in connection with its work. Generally, when Hazel's fleet was inadequate to handle a particular job, Hazel would rent trucks and drivers from other companies.
At the time of Donaldson's accident, Hazel was the general contractor on what the parties call the Clover Hill project in Manassas, Virginia. In performance of that contract, Hazel sometimes used it own trucks to haul materials, including stone, to and from the job site. When Hazel did not have enough available trucks to perform the necessary hauling work on that contract, Hazel hired independent trucking companies, including Barrett, to help it complete the hauling job. On August 14, 1989, one of Barrett's truck drivers, Cole, delivered stone to the job site in connection with the Clover Hill project. After dumping the stone, Cole drove away from the dump site with his truck bed still elevated. The truck bed caught an overhead utility line and snapped the utility pole which swung around and crashed into a nearby vehicle operated by a friend of Donaldson. Donaldson ran to his friend's vehicle. Meanwhile, an Old Dominion truck, traveling down a nearby road, came in contact with the dismantled utility line which was hanging over that road, and caused the pole to swing around again, this time striking Donaldson and seriously injuring him.
Because the district court, in granting appellee's motion to dismiss, considered papers other than pleadings, we review the motion before the district court as we would a motion for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(c), 56. Accordingly, our review of the district court's disposition is de novo, see Charles A. Wright et al., Fed. Prac. and Proc. § 2716 at 643 (1983), and our affirmance is warranted only if upon viewing " 'the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts ... in the light most favorable to[Donaldson],' " Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986) (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)), there are no genuine material issues of fact remaining and Donaldson fails "to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to" his case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
Virginia's Workmen's Compensation Act provides an employee's exclusive remedy for work-related injuries. See Va. Code Ann. § 65.1-40; 3 Stewart v. Bass Construction Co., Inc., 288 S.E.2d 489, 490 (Va. 1982); Feitig v. Chalkley, 38 S.E.2d 73, 75 (Va. 1946). However, the provisions of that Act have been interpreted to mean that a worker injured in the course of his or her employment by someone not his employer has a common law cause of action against that person, if that individual or entity is an "other party" 4 i.e. "a stranger to the trade, occupation, or business in which the plaintiff was involved." Stewart, 288 S.E.2d at 490. Thus, the sole issue raised in this appeal is whether Barrett and its driver Cole 5 were engaged in the same business, trade, or occupation as Donaldson's employer, Hazel. If Barrett and Cole did such work, then they, like Hazel, are statutorily immune from a common law suit by Donaldson for any work-related injury that either or both of them may have caused him, and the district court appropriately dismissed Donaldson's action against them.
Appellant asserts that Barrett was a mere deliveryman and that therefore Barrett, and also its employee Cole, are"other part[ies]" and therefore are not immune from a suit for negligence. Appellant argues that in order to be involved in the same business or trade as Hazel, appellees would have had to perform some act beyond mere delivery, such as unloading or construction.
"Whether a third party is engaged in the trade, occupation, or business of the employer 'depends upon the facts and circumstances in each case, and for that reason the question does not readily yield to categorical or absolute standards.' " Conlin v. Turner's Express, Inc., 331 S.E. 2d 453, 455 (Va. 1985) (quoting Bassett Furniture v. McReynolds, 224 S.E.2d 323, 326 (Va. 1976)). See also Whalen v. Dean Steel Erection Co., Inc., 327 S.E.2d 102, 105 (Va. 1985) ().
In this case, the facts are clear that, in general and with regard to the Clover Hill project in particular, Hazel's business and responsibilities as a general contractor included hauling materials to and from the job site. Moreover, it is not disputed that Hazel owned and used a fleet of trucks for that purpose. Hazel hired Barrett, an independent trucking company, to assist Hazel with its required hauling on the Clover Hill project. Under those circumstances, Barrett was not a "stranger" to the business of Hazel.
In Floyd v. Mitchell, 123 S.E.2d 369 (Va. 1962), the estate of an employee of a construction pipe manufacturer, Glamorgan Pipe and Foundry Company, sued in a wrongful death action the carrier, R.S. Powell, Inc., and the carrier's operator, Henry Mitchell, hired by Glamorgan. Upholding the trial court's dismissal of the estate's action, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia wrote:
Glamorgan's trade, business or occupation was manufacturing pipe and selling and shipping it to its customers. Transporting the pipe to the customers was a necessary element of this business. The loading of the pipe on the vehicles that would carry it to its destination was an essential part of this element of the business ... Glamorgan contracted with Powell to transport the pipe to Glamorgan's customers, a part of Glamorgan's business which Glamorgan could have done with its own employees and its own equipment had it determined that to be a better way. The fact that it engaged Powell, an independent contractor, to transport the pipe did not make Powell and Mitchell, his employee, strangers to Glamorgan's business. They were handling a part of it....
Floyd, 123 S.E.2d at 372. In a more recent Virginia case, Conlin v. Turner's Express, Inc., an employee of Ford Motor Company sued Turner's Express, a hauling company which Ford hired to transport Ford's machinery and parts between its plants, to recover for personal injuries. Justice Stephenson, writing for the Supreme Court of Virginia, determined that Turner's Express was no stranger to the trade, occupation, or business of Ford because "transporting machinery and parts from one plant to another was an essential element of Ford's business." Conlin, 331 S.E.2d at 455. 6 See also Stewart, 288 S.E.2d at 490-91; Williams v. Gresham Co., 111 S.E.2d 498, 503-04 (1959). In the within case, Barrett executed an essential and necessary element of Hazel's business. Moreover, Barrett was performing hauling which Hazel not only "could have done with its own employees and its own equipment," but was to some extent actually so doing with its own employees and trucks. Floyd, 123 S.E.2d at 372. 7
Hipp v. Sadler Materials Corp., 180 S.E.2d 501 (1971), and Burroughs v. Walmont, 168 S.E.2d 107 (1969), are distinguishable from this case for the reasons that the Supreme Court of Virginia identified in Conlin:
In Hipp, a materialman was delivering his products to a building contractor when the builder's employee was injured. The employee sued the materialman. 211...
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