Donaldson v. Clark
| Citation | 786 F.2d 1570 |
| Decision Date | 22 April 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 85-8270,85-8270 |
| Parties | , 4 Fed.R.Serv.3d 694 Jurldine A. DONALDSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Paul V. CLARK, et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
James W. Howard, R. David Ware, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff-appellant.
Charles R. Adams III, Ft. Valley, Ga., for Clark.
Alvin McDougald, Ft. Valley, Ga., for Harris.
Kathryn Allen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, Ga., for Wilcox.
Gregory Homer, Ft. Valley, Ga., for Wilder.
Katherine M. Kalish, Macon, Ga., for Shelley.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia.
Before JOHNSON and HATCHETT, Circuit Judges, and ALAIMO *, Chief District Judge.
This case arose out of a state court domestic relations case that originated in the Superior Court of Peach County, Georgia. In the state court action, 56-year-old plaintiff-appellant Jurldine A. Donaldson was sued for divorce by her 81-year-old husband Jarrell H. Donaldson. They had been married less than one year. While that case was pending, Jurldine A. Donaldson filed the instant case in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia under 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983. The Section 1983 complaint alleged that various individuals conspired to unlawfully expedite the divorce proceedings and restrain plaintiff from visiting and perhaps reconciling with her husband, thereby depriving her of a "liberty" interest without due process of law. The alleged civil conspirators and defendants in this Section 1983 action were: Superior Court of Peach County Judges Walker P. Johnson and Tommy Day Wilcox; State Court Magistrates George W. Harris and John W. Smisson; Deputy Sheriff Joe L. Wilder of the Peach County Sheriff's Department; and private individuals Paul V. Clark, Sara C. Clark, Eugene Shelley, and Ruby Shelley.
The plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Magistrate Smisson and Judge Walker Johnson from the action. The district court issued an order granting summary judgment on behalf of all the remaining defendants. The court also imposed sanctions against plaintiff's attorney under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This appeal is from the district court's judgment granting summary judgment and awarding sanctions under Rule 11.
Jarrell H. Donaldson ("Jarrell") was married to Annie Donaldson ("Annie") from 1959 until her death in August 1982. Annie had a son and daughter by a prior marriage: Eugene Shelley, who married Ruby Shelley; and Sara Clark, who married Paul Clark. Jurldine A. Donaldson ("Jurldine") lived next door to Jarrell and Annie, and worked as a nurse's aide in a nursing home where Annie lived at times during her last few years. To some extent, Jurldine also took care of Jarrell during that time. About a year before Annie's death, Jurldine's husband died and Jurldine moved from Georgia to the State of Washington. She continued to inquire periodically about Annie's health. A few months after learning of Annie's death, Jurldine moved back to Fort Valley, Georgia.
In November 1982, Jarrell conveyed title to his house and ten acres of land to Paul Clark, reserving a life estate to himself. Jarrell executed a general power of attorney to Paul Clark. Jarrell also conveyed all his personal property irrevocably to Paul Clark as trustee to manage, invest, and pay all income to Jarrell, as well as such of the principal as he might need. Finally, Jarrell provided that the corpus of the trust, valued at $92,114, was to be paid to Sara Clark upon Jarrell's death.
Jurldine and Jarrell married in July 1983. At the time of the marriage she was about 55 and he, about 80. Sometime prior to the marriage, Ruby Shelley had told Jurldine about Jarrell's prior conveyances of his property. Shortly after the marriage, Jurldine began to inquire about the prior transfers. In September 1983, Jarrell revoked the power of attorney to Paul Clark; shortly thereafter, Jarrell gave Jurldine a power of attorney. By March 1984, Jurldine had engaged the services of lawyer Robert E. Lanyon and through Mr. Lanyon had requested information from Paul Clark concerning the prior conveyances.
While Jurldine was in Texas during the first week of April 1984, Ruby Shelley took Jarrell to a lawyer who prepared a complaint for divorce, which was filed in the Georgia state court. Jarrell also moved for a protective order restraining Jurldine from coming in, on, or near the home in which Jarrell had a life estate. Judge Walker P. Johnson granted this restraining order and set the matter for a hearing.
Later in April, Jurldine, through lawyer James W. Howard, filed an answer to the divorce complaint. In her answer Jurldine alleged that her marriage to Jarrell was not irretrievably broken, and that his signature on the complaint for divorce "was made under duress and/or induced by fraud." The case was assigned to Judge Tommy Day Wilcox, and later to Judge Walker P. Johnson. During the course of the vigorously contested divorce proceedings, Jurldine had restrictions on her right to visit her husband.
According to Jurldine's Section 1983 complaint in the district court, at various points in the proceeding the state judges issued orders which were irregular and which evidenced their participation in a conspiracy to circumvent the normal judicial proceedings and grant the divorce. Among the alleged irregularities were that the state judges each moved the divorce proceeding ahead of other matters on the trial calendars; and that, although Jarrell had been declared incompetent at a prior stage of the proceeding, the court sua sponte declared Jarrell "competent" in the absence of any evidence that Jarrell's condition had changed. Jurldine alleges that the sole explanation for this sua sponte ruling was that, without this ruling, Jarrell could not have been permitted to prosecute the divorce action. Jurldine contends that these "irregular" rulings evidenced the judges' intent to "expedite" the divorce proceedings. Unquestionably, these judges' acts of which Jurldine complained were all committed within a judicial capacity and in connection with a divorce proceeding over which the judges had jurisdiction.
Jurldine also contended in her complaint that, while the divorce proceedings were pending, Eugene and Ruby Shelley and Paul and Sara Clark took actions to prevent Jurldine from visiting Jarrell. Jurldine argues that these actions evidenced the participation of these defendants in a conspiracy with the judges to prevent a reconciliation between Jarrell and Jurldine. Jurldine claims that this conspiracy resulted in the deprivation of her "liberty" interest in preserving her marriage.
Jurldine's complaint in the district court charged that there was further evidence of a widespread conspiracy to interfere with her marital relationship. Several months prior to Jarrell's filing for divorce, Jurldine reported to Detective Joe Wilder that her son had sold Jarrell's boat and had converted the proceeds to his own use. Before Magistrate George W. Harris, Jurldine signed an affidavit alleging that her son committed the crime of conversion. Magistrate Harris issued an arrest warrant for Jurldine's son, Jerry Goins. Jurldine subsequently had the warrant withdrawn, stating that she forgot she had sold the boat to her son.
On April 13, 1984, the same date on which Jurldine filed her answer to the divorce complaint, Magistrate Harris signed an affidavit before Magistrate John W. Smisson alleging that Jurldine had committed the offense of false swearing. Detective Wilder also signed an affidavit on that date before Magistrate Harris, alleging that Jurldine had committed the offense of falsely reporting a crime. Magistrates Harris and Smisson both issued warrants for Jurldine's arrest, and she was arrested a few days later. After a preliminary hearing before Magistrate Smisson, the case was bound over to the grand jury.
Jurldine contends that, through Jurldine's daughter-in-law, Magistrate Harris relayed information to Jurldine that she could avoid criminal prosecution if she did not contest the pending divorce proceedings. Jurldine contends that Magistrates Harris and Smisson and Detective Wilder were therefore involved in the conspiracy to interfere with Jurldine's marital relationship with Jarrell.
In November 1984, while the divorce proceedings were pending and three days before a scheduled hearing in the state court, Mr. Howard filed the present case on behalf of Jurldine in federal district court. Jurldine sought actual and punitive damages and asked the district court to enjoin the pending divorce proceedings.
Upon receipt of the complaint, the district court contacted plaintiff's attorney and orally requested that he submit a brief on the issue of the federal court's jurisdiction. In December 1984 Mr. Howard submitted such a brief, which stated that the state court proceeding itself was depriving plaintiff of her constitutional privacy, liberty, contract, and marital rights. The district court then sent a letter to Mr. Howard stating that counsel should (1) bring to the court's attention a case showing that the court had jurisdiction over the matters involved, and (2) serve the defendants with the complaint. The defendants were served in the first week of January 1985. The defendants filed motions to dismiss and for an award of attorneys' fees.
The district court then sent a letter to all counsel in the case, advising that the court intended to schedule a hearing on Judge Wilcox's motion to dismiss "as soon as a written response has been received from the plaintiff." The court apparently informed plaintiff that a written response was due on a certain date. In its letter to counsel, the court wrote, "Plaintiff should realize that no extensions of time will be granted for the filing of such a response." The court also wrote that, at the hearing, the...
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