Donaldson v. Temple

• Decision Date: 15 December 1913
• Citation: 80 S.E. 437,96 S.C. 240
• Parties: DONALDSON v. TEMPLE.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

80 S.E. 437

96 S.C. 240

DONALDSON

v.TEMPLE.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Dec. 15, 1913.

1. Fraud (§ 41*)—Deceit—Complaint.

In an action for fraud, it is not necessary that the complaint alleged fraud in direct terms, but it is necessary that all the facts constituting the alleged fraud or from which it is necessarily implied be set up.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Fraud, Cent. Dig. §§ 3G, 37; Dec. Dig. § 41.*]

2. Fraud (§ 43*)—Complaint—Willfulness and Wantonness.

Where, in an action to recover damages for defendant's wrongful refusal to loan plaintiff money with which to make certain improvements on real property, the complaint merely alleged that defendant's neglect to discharge his obligations under the contract was done with willful and wanton intent to injure plaintiff, and in consequence thereof plaintiffs tenant abandoned the same because she was unable to make the necessary improvements as agreed, defendant intending and hoping thereby to force plaintiff to forfeit the property which had been mortgaged to him though it was well worth more than double plaintiff's indebtedness to defendant, it did not state a cause of action for fraud.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Fraud, Cent. Dig. § 37; Dec. Dig. § 43.*]

3. Damages (§ 89*) — Punitive Damages — Breach of Contract.

Where a complaint for breach of contract alleged recklessness, willfulness, and wantonness on defendant's part, but did not allege fraudulent breach, plaintiff could not recover punitive damages.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Damages, Cent. Dig. § 203; Dec. Dig. § 89.*]

4. Damages (§ 89*)—Breach of Contract-Fraud.

In an action for breach of contract, plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages unless the breach is accompanied by a fraudulent act resulting in damage as distinguished from mere fraudulent intent.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Damages, Cent. Dig. § 203; Dec. Dig. § 89.*]

Fraser, J., dissenting in part.

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Dillon County; C. J. Ramage, Special Judge.

Action by Kate E. Donaldson against L. W. Temple. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed.

The following is the complaint referred to in the opinion:

"The above-named plaintiff, complaining of the defendant, alleges:

"I. That heretofore, on or about the 21st day of June, 1906, the plaintiff was, and is now, the owner of two certain lots of land in the town of Dillon, in the county and state aforesaid, with the buildings thereon, and was indebted to the defendant in a sum less than $4,000 and more than $3,000. That on or about said day, one C. M. Pooser was negotiating with this plaintiff for the rent of said two lots and buildings thereon, the same to be used as a hotel, but did not desire to rent same unless certain improve ments and enlargements were made upon said buildings, and this plaintiff, being without funds with which to make said improvements, although she well knew that the making of same would greatly improve her said property and materially increase her income therefrom, and she was therefore anxious to have said improvements made. That the defendant offered and agreed to furnish the necessary funds to make said improvements, not to exceed the sum of $3,000, if this plaintiff would pledge said property as security for the sum of money so to be advanced by him, together with the amount of her aforesaid indebtedness to him. That in order to secure the making of said improvements and a permanent tenant for said property at a lucrative rental, this plaintiff entered into a contract with the said L. W. Temple and C. M. Pooser, a copy of which said contract is hereto attached as a part of this paragraph of this complaint.

"II. That in pursuance of the obligations assumed by her under the aforementioned contract this plaintiff executed to the defendant a deed to the said two lots of land for the purpose mentioned in said contract, which said deed was given by this plaintiff and accepted by the defendant as a security for the plaintiff's indebtedness to him, and for no other purpose, and was intended for nothing more nor less than a mortgage, and this plaintiff has fully discharged and carried out all of her obligations under said contract as far as she is able to do so, and she would have been able to carry them out to the letter, and would have done so, but for the wrongful conduct and unfairness of the defendant herein complained of. That the defendant utterly failed and refused to perform the obligations assumed by him under the aforementioned contract, or any part thereof. He neglected and refused to furnish the money with which to make the improvements on said buildings contemplated by said contract, and same were never made. That said defendant's neglect and refusal to furnish said money was done by him with intent to injure this plaintiff by depriving her of the one means by which she could hope to pay for the indebtedness against said property, hoping thereby to force this plaintiff to forfeit said property to him, although said property was well worth more than double the amount of her indebtedness to him. That the defendant's neglect to discharge his obligations under said contract in utter disregard of the rights of this plaintiff was done with willful and wanton intent to injure this plaintiff. That in consequence thereof the said C. M. Pooser abandoned said property within a few months after said contract was made, although he was willing and ready to carry out his obligations under said contract, if the defendant had discharged his obligations thereunder, and, although thisplaintiff did all in her power to utilize said property and make the same productive of the best possible income, she was utterly unable to realize any fair income therefrom and consequently unable to make her indebtedness to the defendant.

"III. That by reason of the reckless, willful, and wanton acts and conduct of the defendant, as aforesaid, this plaintiff has been damaged in the sum of $9,000. Wherefore this plaintiff demands judgment against the defendant:

"1. That she have judgment against the defendant for the sum of $9,000 as damages.

"2. That the deed heretofore executed by her to the defendant be adjudged to be a mortgage and nothing more.

"3. For an accounting between her and the defendant.

"4. If it be found that she is still indebted to the defendant, then that said property be sold under order of this court and the proceeds applied first to the payment of the amount of said indebtedness and that the balance be paid over to this plaintiff.

"5. If it be found that the defendant is indebted to her, or that accounts are even between them, then that the defendant be required to reconvey said property to this plaintiff, and that she have judgment against the defendant for any balance due her.

"6. That she have judgment against the defendant for the cost and expenses of this action."

Gibson & Muller, of Dillon, and Stevenson & Prince, of Cheraw, for appellant.

Townsend, Rogers & McLaurin, of Dillon, for respondent.

WATTS, J. This was an action by plaintiff against the defendant for $9,000, damages on account of an alleged breach of contract by the defendant. The cause was heard in October, 1912, before Special Judge Ramage and a jury. The question of damages was submitted to a jury and resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff for $3,000. After entry of verdict and decree of court, ordering sale of premises and referring the case to the master for Dillon county for the purpose of an accounting between the plaintiff and defendant, an appeal was taken by the...