Donaldson v. Temple

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
• Writing for the Court: WATTS
• Citation: 80 S.E. 437,96 S.C. 240
• Parties: DONALDSON v. TEMPLE.
• Decision Date: 15 December 1913

80 S.E. 437
96 S.C. 240

DONALDSON
v.
TEMPLE.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Dec. 15, 1913.

[80 S.E. 437]

1. Fraud (§ 41*)—Deceit—Complaint.

In an action for fraud, it is not necessary that the complaint alleged fraud in direct terms, but it is necessary that all the facts constituting the alleged fraud or from which it is necessarily implied be set up.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Fraud, Cent. Dig. §§ 3G, 37; Dec. Dig. § 41.*]

2. Fraud (§ 43*)—Complaint—Willfulness and Wantonness.

Where, in an action to recover damages for defendant's wrongful refusal to loan plaintiff money with which to make certain improvements on real property, the complaint merely alleged that defendant's neglect to discharge his obligations under the contract was done with willful and wanton intent to injure plaintiff, and in consequence thereof plaintiffs tenant abandoned the same because she was unable to make the necessary improvements as agreed, defendant intending and hoping thereby to force plaintiff to forfeit the property which had been mortgaged to him though it was well worth more than double plaintiff's indebtedness to defendant, it did not state a cause of action for fraud.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Fraud, Cent. Dig. § 37; Dec. Dig. § 43.*]

3. Damages (§ 89*) — Punitive Damages — Breach of Contract.

Where a complaint for breach of contract alleged recklessness, willfulness, and wantonness on defendant's part, but did not allege fraudulent breach, plaintiff could not recover punitive damages.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Damages, Cent. Dig. § 203; Dec. Dig. § 89.*]

4. Damages (§ 89*)—Breach of Contract-Fraud.

In an action for breach of contract, plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages unless the breach is accompanied by a fraudulent act resulting in damage as distinguished from mere fraudulent intent.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Damages, Cent. Dig. § 203; Dec. Dig. § 89.*]

Fraser, J., dissenting in part.

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Dillon County; C. J. Ramage, Special Judge.

Action by Kate E. Donaldson against L. W. Temple. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed.

The following is the complaint referred to in the opinion:

"The above-named plaintiff, complaining of the defendant, alleges:

"I. That heretofore, on or about the 21st day of June, 1906, the plaintiff was, and is now, the owner of two certain lots of land in the town of Dillon, in the county and state aforesaid, with the buildings thereon, and was indebted to the defendant in a sum less than $4,000 and more than $3,000. That on or about said day, one C. M. Pooser was negotiating with this plaintiff for the rent of said two lots and buildings thereon, the same to be used as a hotel, but did not desire to rent same unless certain improve ments and enlargements were made upon said buildings, and this plaintiff, being without funds with which to make said improvements, although she well knew that the making of same would greatly improve her said property and materially increase her income therefrom, and she was therefore anxious to have said improvements made. That the defendant offered and agreed to furnish the necessary funds to make said improvements, not to exceed the sum of $3,000, if this plaintiff would pledge said property as security for the sum of money so to be advanced by him, together with the amount of her aforesaid indebtedness to him. That in order to secure the making of said improvements and a permanent tenant for said property at a lucrative rental, this plaintiff entered into a contract with the said L. W. Temple and C. M. Pooser, a copy of which said contract is hereto attached as a part of this paragraph of this complaint.

"II. That in pursuance of the obligations assumed by her under the aforementioned contract this plaintiff executed to the defendant a deed to the said two lots of land for the purpose mentioned in said contract, which said deed was given by this plaintiff and accepted by the defendant as a security for the plaintiff's indebtedness to him, and for no other purpose, and was intended for nothing more nor less than a mortgage, and this plaintiff has fully discharged and carried out all of her obligations under said contract as far as she is able to do so, and she would have been able to carry them out to the letter, and would have done so, but for the wrongful conduct and unfairness of the defendant herein complained of. That the defendant utterly failed and refused to perform the obligations assumed by him under the aforementioned contract, or any part thereof. He neglected and refused to furnish the money with which to make the improvements on said buildings contemplated by said contract, and same were never made. That said defendant's neglect and refusal to furnish said money...