Donna G. v. Saul
| Decision Date | 04 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 17 C 8425,17 C 8425 |
| Parties | DONNA G., Plaintiff, v. ANDREW MARSHALL SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff Donna G.'s claim for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB"). The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 9] is granted in part and denied in part, and the Commissioner's cross-motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 19] is denied.
In October 2013, Plaintiff filed a claim for DIB, alleging disability since June 30, 2012 due to fibromyalgia, short term memory loss, back pain, concentration deficits, speech trouble, asthma, environmental, food and drug allergies, fatigue, plantar fasciitis, chronic sinusitis, TMJ hearing loss, depression, anxiety, and chronic fatigue. Plaintiff later amended her alleged onset date to June 23, 2011. The claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration, after which Plaintiff timely requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), which was held on June 20, 2016. Plaintiff personally appeared and testified at the hearing and was represented by counsel. Vocational expert Ms. Mowry also testified.
On January 12, 2017, the ALJ denied Plaintiff's claim for benefits, finding her not disabled under the Social Security Act. The Social Security Administration Appeals Council then denied Plaintiff's request for review, leaving the ALJ's decision as the final decision of the Commissioner and, therefore, reviewable by the District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Haynes v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 621, 626 (7th Cir. 2005).
Plaintiff's claim was analyzed in accordance with the five-step sequential evaluation process established under the Social Security Act. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The ALJ found at step one that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date. At step two, the ALJconcluded that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease, fibromyalgia, and depression. The ALJ concluded at step three that her impairments, alone or in combination, do not meet or medically equal a Listing. Before step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the RFC:
[T]o lift and/or carry up to 10 pounds occasionally and lighter weights frequently, and has no limitations in her ability to sit throughout an 8 hour workday. The claimant can stand and/or walk for ten continuous minutes, and for a total of two out of eight hours. The claimant needs to alternate her position between sitting, standing, and walking for no more than five minutes after being on her feet for 10 minutes or after sitting for 60. The claimant can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, and she can occasionally stoop, kneel, balance, crouch and crawl, but she can never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds. The claimant is limited to working in non-hazardous environments, i.e., no driving at work, operating moving machinery, working at unprotected heights or around exposed flames and unguarded large bodies of water, and she should avoid concentrated exposure to unguarded hazardous machinery. The claimant is further limited to simple, routine tasks, work involving no more than simple decision-making, no more than occasional and minor changes in the work setting, and work requiring the exercise of only simple judgment. She is further precluded from work involving direct public service, in person or over the phone, although the claimant can tolerate brief and superficial interaction with the public which is incidental to her primary job duties. She is unable to work in crowded, hectic environments. The claimant can tolerate brief and superficial interaction with supervisors and co-workers, but is not to engage in tandem tasks.
(R. 21.)
At step four, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had no past relevant work. At step five, based upon the VE's testimony and Plaintiff's age, education, work experience and RFC, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could perform jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy, leading to a finding that she is not disabled under the Social Security Act.
Under the Social Security Act, a person is disabled if she has an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(a). In order to determine whether a Plaintiff is disabled, the ALJ considers the following five questions in order: (1) Is the Plaintiff presently unemployed? (2) Does the Plaintiff have a severe impairment? (3) Does the impairment meet or medically equal one of a list of specific impairments enumerated in the regulations? (4) Is the Plaintiff unable to perform her former occupation? and (5) Is the Plaintiff unable to perform any other work? 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4).
An affirmative answer at either step 3 or step 5 leads to a finding that the Plaintiff is disabled. Young v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 957 F.2d 386, 389 (7th Cir. 1992). A negative answer at any step, other than at step 3, precludes a finding of disability. Id. The Plaintiff bears the burden of proof at steps 1-4. Id. Once the Plaintiff shows an inability to perform past work, the burden then shifts to the Commissioner to show the Plaintiff's ability to engage in other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. Id.
Section 405(g) provides in relevant part that "[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Judicial review of the ALJ's decision is limited to determining whether the ALJ's findings are supported by substantial evidence or based upon legal error. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2000); Stevenson v. Chater, 105 F.3d 1151, 1153 (7th Cir. 1997). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Skinner v. Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007). This Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner by reevaluating facts, reweighing evidence, resolving conflicts in evidence, or deciding questions of credibility. Skinner, 478 F.3d at 841; see also Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008) () (citation omitted).
The ALJ is not required to address "every piece of evidence or testimony in the record, [but] the ALJ's analysis must provide some glimpse into the reasoning behind her decision to deny benefits." Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 889 (7th Cir. 2001). In cases where the ALJ denies benefits to a Plaintiff, "he must build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion." Clifford, 227 F.3d at 872. The ALJ must at least minimally articulate the "analysis of the evidence with enough detail and clarity to permit meaningful appellate review." Briscoe exrel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 2005); Murphy v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 630, 634 (7th Cir. 2007) (); see Boiles v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2005).
Where conflicting evidence would allow reasonable minds to differ, the responsibility for determining whether a Plaintiff is disabled falls upon the Commissioner, not the court. See Herr v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 178, 181 (7th Cir. 1990). However, an ALJ may not "select and discuss only that evidence that favors his ultimate conclusion," but must instead consider all relevant evidence. Herron v. Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 1994).
Plaintiff alleges the following errors in the ALJ's decision: (1) the ALJ's discussion of the paragraph B criteria was inadequate to support the finding at step 3 that Plaintiff's severe depression did not equal a Listing; (2) the ALJ failed to properly evaluate Plaintiff's fibromyalgia in accordance with SSR 12-2p; (3) the ALJ failed to evaluate Plaintiff's testimony in accordance with SSR 16-3p; (4) the ALJ's RFC assessment failed to account for all of Plaintiff's limitations; (5) the ALJ erred in his evaluation of the medical opinion evidence; and (6) the ALJ improperly relied upon vague testimony from the VE to find that Plaintiff could perform other jobs in the national economy. The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the ALJ committedharmful error in his evaluation of the opinion evidence, and the case must be remanded for that reason.
Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ erred in discounting an opinion rendered jointly by Plaintiff's treating therapist, Mr. Sada, and treating psychiatrist, Dr. Gibbons, both employed at Kenneth Young Center, where Plaintiff began treatment in 2009. The opinion was signed by Mr. Sada on July 14, 2015, and by Dr. Gibbons on August 27, 2015. The opinion states that Mr. Sada began treating Plaintiff on May 4, 2009, and Dr. Gibbons began treating Plaintiff on September 12, 2014, and opines significant mental limitations related to Plaintiff's diagnoses of Bipolar II Disorder and Dysthymic Disorder.
The ALJ treated the opinion entirely as that of Mr. Sada in assigning the opinion little weight, reasoning that Mr....
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