Donnell v. City of Cedar Rapaid, Iowa

• Decision Date: 01 June 2006
• Docket Number: No. 05-CV-49-LRR.,05-CV-49-LRR.
• Citation: 437 F.Supp.2d 904
• Parties: Gerald D. DONNELL, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CEDAR RAPIDS, IOWA, and Pat Engel, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

437 F.Supp.2d 904

Gerald D. DONNELL, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CEDAR RAPIDS, IOWA, and Pat Engel, Defendants.

No. 05-CV-49-LRR.

United States District Court, N.D. Iowa, Cedar Rapids Division.

June 1, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

John C. Conger, Lawrence L. Marcucci, Marcucci & Conger, PLC, West Des Moines, IA, for Plaintiff.

William J. Wright, Cedar Rapids Attorney's Office, Cedar Rapids, IA, for Defendants.

ORDER

READE, District Judge.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

                I. INTRODUCTION ....................................................... 908
                  II. PRIOR PROCEEDINGS ................................................. 908
                III. JURISDICTION ....................................................... 909
                  IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ........................... 909
                

                V. SUMMARY JUDGMENT FACTS .............................................. 909
                     A. The Local Rules ................................................. 909
                     B. The Facts ....................................................... 910
                     1. Background ...................................................... 910
                     2. 150 Thompson Drive SE ........................................... 910
                     3. Other discoveries ............................................... 911
                     4. Ordered off the job ............................................. 911
                     5. "Blowing the Whistle" to the Mayor .............................. 912
                     6. Lins HVAC citations ............................................. 912
                     7. Engel arrives ................................................... 913
                     8. "Closing out" permits ........................................... 913
                     9. Kathy Graham .................................................... 914
                     10. "Blowing the Whistle" to state officials ....................... 915
                     11. Termination .................................................... 916
                     12. Arbitration .................................................... 918
                 VI. RES JUDICATA ....................................................... 918
                     A. General Principles: Arbitration, Federal Court Litigation and
                Claim Preclusion .............................................. 919
                         1. McDonald v. City of West Branch, Mich. ...................... 919
                         2. Other Supreme Court cases ................................... 920
                     B. Application: Preclusion of Pendent State Law Claims ............. 920
                        1. The Arguments ................................................ 920
                        2. Analysis ..................................................... 921
                VII. THE MERITS ......................................................... 924
                     A. Count I: Iowa Code § 70A.29 ................................ 924
                     B. Count II: Common Law Wrongful Discharge ......................... 927
                     C. Count III: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ................................ 927
                        1. The City ..................................................... 928
                        2. Engel ........................................................ 930
                           a. Qualified Immunity ........................................ 930
                           b. Causation ................................................. 931
                VIII. CONCLUSION ........................................................ 931
                

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Motion") (docket no. 13).

II. PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

On February 1, 2005, Plaintiff Gerald D. Donnell filed a three-count Petition and Jury Demand against Defendants City of Cedar Rapids, Iowa ("City") and Pat Engel in the Iowa District Court in and for Linn County. Plaintiff claims Defendants, his employer and his supervisor, illegally fired him from his job as a mechanical inspector because he "blew the whistle" on cronyism in the City's Building and Zoning Department ("Department").

In Count I, Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated Iowa's whistle-blower statute, Iowa Code section 70A.29 (2005). In Count II, Plaintiff alleges common-law wrongful discharge. In Count III, Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by terminating him for engaging in activity protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.

On March 4, 2005, Defendants filed an Answer, in which they deny the substance of Plaintiff's Petition. Defendants assert a number of affirmative defenses, including qualified immunity and res judicata. On March 14, 2005, Defendants removed the case to this court.

On March 3, 2006, Defendants filed the instant Motion. On March 27, 2006, Plaintiff filed a Resistance. On April 4, 2006, Defendants filed a Reply.

On May 31, 2006, the court heard oral argument on the Motion. Lawrence L. Marcucci represented Plaintiff. William J. Wright represented Defendants. The court finds the Motion fully submitted and turns to consider it now.

III. JURISDICTION

Defendants invoke this court's federal question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."). Count 3, in which Plaintiff contends Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arises under a law of the United States. The court has supplementary jurisdiction over Counts 1 and 2. See id. § 1367(a) ("[T]he district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action with such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy...."). But see id. § 1367(c) (granting district court discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims under certain circumstances).

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment is appropriate if the record shows "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "An issue of fact is genuine when `a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party' on the question." Woods v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 409 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir.2005) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). A fact is material when it is a fact that "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The court must view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and afford it all reasonable inferences. See McCoy v. City of Monticello, 411 F.3d 920, 922 (8th Cir. 2005); Woods, 409 F.3d at 990.

Procedurally, the moving party bears "the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record which show a lack of a genuine issue." Hartnagel v. Norman, 953 F.2d 394, 395 (8th Cir.1992) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). Once the moving party has successfully carried its burden under Rule 56(c), the nonmoving party has an affirmative burden to go beyond the pleadings and by depositions, affidavits, or otherwise, designate "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see, e.g., Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Janis v. Biesheuvel, 428 F.3d 795, 799 (8th Cir. 2005). The nonmoving party must offer proof "such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

V. SUMMARY JUDGMENT FACTS

A. The Local Rules

Local Rule 56.1(d) requires the moving party to file a response to the resisting party's statement of undisputed material facts, "in which the moving party expressly admits, denies, or qualifies each of the resisting party's numbered statements of fact." LR 56.1(d). Moreover,

[a] reply to an individual statement of material facts that is not expressly admitted must be supported by references to those specific pages, paragraphs, or parts of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, exhibits and affidavits that support the moving party's refusal to admit the statement, with citations to the appendix containing that part of the record.

Id. "The failure to reply, with appropriate citations to the appendix, to an individual statement of material fact constitutes an admission of that fact." Id.

The City does not expressly admit, deny or qualify many of its responses to Plaintiffs statement of undisputed material facts. Indeed, the City does not expressly deny any of Plaintiffs proposed undisputed material facts. Instead, the City repeatedly responds, in blanket fashion, that "Plaintiffs allegations ... are not material."

The Local Rules require a party to admit, deny or qualify an individual numbered statement of fact. Id. They do not permit a party to respond that the statement is "not material," see id., because it is not within the province of the parties to determine the relevance of the facts for purposes of a summary judgment motion.¹ The City has effectively failed to reply to Plaintiffs numbered statements of material fact; by responding in this fashion, the City completely avoids its obligation to provide the court with citations to the appendix containing the portions of the record that support its refusals to expressly admit Plaintiffs individual assertions of fact.

Accordingly, the court finds the City has violated the Local Rules. As a sanction, the court deems the City's responses of "not material" as failures to reply and considers Plaintiffs corresponding proposed individual statements of material fact to be admitted for purposes of this summary judgment motion. Id.

B. The Facts

As viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the nonmoving party, and affording Plaintiff all reasonable inferences, the facts are these:

1. Background

Plaintiff is an experienced mechanical inspector. He has extensive knowledge of city ordinances and related building codes.

On December 10, 2001, the City hired Pla...