Donnell v. National Guard Bureau, Civ. A. No. 82-3232.

• Decision Date: 24 May 1983
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 82-3232.
• Citation: 568 F. Supp. 93
• Parties: Frank DONNELL, Plaintiff, v. NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

568 F. Supp. 93

Frank DONNELL, Plaintiff, v.NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU, et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 82-3232.

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

May 24, 1983.

Emmanuel D. Akpan, Washington, D.C., for plaintiff.

Robert C. Seldon, Asst. U.S. Atty., Thomas C. Wright, Asst. to the Gen. Counsel, Dept. of the Army, Washington, D.C., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JUNE L. GREEN, District Judge.

This action is before the Court on defendants' motion to dismiss.Defendants allege that venue is improper in this judicial district.In addition, the nine individuals named as parties seek dismissal because they have not been personally served.Finally, five of the individual defendants argue that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them.For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that venue is not proper in this district, and transfers this case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.

Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., ("Title VII") alleging racial discrimination affecting terms of his employment.

Plaintiff is a civilian employed by the National Guard Bureau's Office of Human Resources in Falls Church, Virginia, as an equal employment opportunity official.Defendants in this action are the National Guard Bureau and nine individuals who allegedly participated in making discriminatory employment decisions affecting plaintiff.

Suits brought under Title VII are subject to a special provision governing venue.Such suits

may be brought in any judicial district in the state in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed, in the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered, or in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice, but if the respondent is not found within any such district, such an action may be brought within the judicial district in which the respondent has his principal office.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).This provision controls any other venue provision governing actions in federal court.Stebbins v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,413 F.2d 1100(D.C.Cir.), cert. denied,396 U.S. 895, 90 S.Ct. 194, 24 L.Ed.2d 173(1969)(Stebbins).Defendants argue that venue is not proper in the District of Columbia because the alleged unlawful acts were committed in Virginia, the relevant employment records are located there, and plaintiff would be employed there had the alleged acts not been committed.

Plaintiff asserts that contrary to defendants' contention, the alleged acts of discrimination were committed in the District of Columbia, at the National Guard Bureau and the U.S. Army Military District of Washington(AMDW).He asserts that these two organizations are located in the District of Columbia, on the basis of the letterhead address on letters he received.Defendants point out that while the mailing address for the National Guard Bureau is Washington, D.C., the physical location of that organization is in the Pentagon, located in Arlington, Virginia.Third Affidavit of Thomas C. Wright, ¶ 2("Third Wright Affidavit").Furthermore, defendants assert that although three individual defendants signed letters on the letterhead of the AMDW because they are under the AMDW organizationally, their principal place of business is in the Pentagon.Id.Finally, defendants assert that any decisions concerning plaintiff's responsibilities in the Office of Human Resources were made at the Columbia Pike Office Building in Falls Church, Virginia, or at National Guard Headquarters in Arlington, Virginia.Affidavit of Thomas C. Wright, ¶ 4("Wright Affidavit").Defendants do not deny that two officials of the Civilian Personnel Directorate and one official of the Equal Employment Opportunity branch of the AMDW work in the District of Columbia.

Venue determinations of where a claim arose are based on a "commonsense appraisal" of events having operative significance in the case.Lamont v. Haig,590 F.2d 1124, 1134(D.C.Cir.1978).Title VII determinations of the locus of disputed employment practices should be examined in a similar vein.It seems clear that a substantial part, if not all, of the employment practices challenged in this action were committed in Virginia at the National Guard Bureau office where plaintiff is employed.While the decisions of individuals at the Equal Employment Opportunity branch and the Civilian Personnel Directorate of the AMDW may have had an impact on plaintiff's situation, the focus...