Donnelley v. United States

Citation48 S.Ct. 400,276 U.S. 505,72 L.Ed. 676
Decision Date09 April 1928
Docket NumberNo. 110,110
PartiesDONNELLEY v. UNITED STATES. Re
CourtUnited States Supreme Court

Messrs. Frank H. Norcross, of Reno, Nev., and Frank M. Hoyt, of Milwaukee, Wis., for Donnelley.

[Argument of Counsel from Pages 506-508 intentionally omitted] The Attorney General and Mrs. Mabel Walker Willebrandt, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the United States.

Mr. Justice BUTLER delivered the opinion of the Court.

Defendant was the prohibition director for Nevada. An information filed in the United States court for that district charged that he, having knowledge of the unlawful possession and transportation of intoxicating liquor by one Curran, did willfully and unlawfully fail to report such violations to the United States attorney. The jury found him guilty, and the court imposed a fine of $500. Alleging various grounds for reversal, he took the case to the Circuit Court of Appeals. That court, acting under section 239 of the Judicial Code (28 USCA § 346), certified to this Court a question concerning which it desired instruction. Defendant submitted the question upon a brief. Later we required the entire record to be sent up, and so brought the case here for decision. The United States filed additional briefs. Oral arguments were made for the respective parties. But defendant failed to submit any other brief or to file any statement of points or specification of errors intended to be urged here. Rule 25, par. 2(e), par. 4. And see rule 11, par. 9. We confine our consideration to the question argued in his brief. Southeastern Express Co. v. Robertson, 264 U. S. 541, 44 S. Ct. 424, 68 L. Ed. 840; Home Benefit Association v. Sargent, 142 U. S. 691, 694, 695, 12 S. Ct. 332, 35 L. Ed. 1160. The substance of the contention is that intentional failure of a prohibition director or other enforcement officer, having knowledge of crimes and offenders against the act, to report them to the United States attorney, is not a punishable offense.

Section 2, title 2, of the National Prohibition Act (chapter 85, 41 Stat. 305, 308; U. S. C. Tit. 27, § 11 (27 USCA § 11)), provides:

'The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, his assistants, agents, and inspectors shall investigate and report violations of this act to the United States attorney for the district in which committed. * * *'

The act does not specifically fix punishment for a violation of that provision. But section 29 (27 USCA § 46) provides that:

'Any person * * * who * * * violates any of the provisons * * * for which offense a special penalty is not prescribed, shall be fined for a first offense not more than $500. * * *'

As there are no common-law crimes against the government (United States v. Eaton, 144 U. S. 677, 12 S. Ct. 764, 36 L. Ed. 591), each case involves the construction of a statute to determine whether the acts or omissions of the accused are denounced as punishable. And regard is always to be had to the familiar rule that one may not be punished for crime against the United States unless the facts shown plainly and unmistakably constitute an offense within the meaning of an act of Congress. United States v. Lacher, 134 U. S. 624, 628, 10 S. Ct. 625, 33 L. Ed. 1080; Todd v. United States, 158 U. S. 278, 282, 15 S. Ct. 889, 39 L. Ed. 982; Fasulo v. United States, 272 U. S. 620, 629, 47 S. Ct. 200, 71 L. Ed. 443. The evidence showed, and the verdict, when read in the light of the court's charge, means, that the jury found that Curran was discovered transporting ten barrels of intoxicating liquor, and that plaintiff in error, with actual knowledge of that violation, intentionally failed to report the crime and offender for prosecution. Plainly that was a violation of duty imposed on him by section 2. And section 29 declares that violators of any provision shall be punished. Taken according to their ordinary meaning, the words used are sufficient to make the facts alleged and found a punishable offense. The rule that penal statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of persons accused is not violated by allowing the language to have its full meaning where that construction is in harmony with the context and supports the policy and purposes of the enactment. United States v. Hartwell, 6 Wall. 385, 395, 18 L. Ed. 830; United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95, 5 L. Ed. 37. Section 3 forbids a narrow or strict construction of the act, and directs that all its provisions 'shall be liberally construed to the end that the use of intoxicating liquor as a beverage may be prevented.'

Diligence and good faith on the part of enforcement officers are essential. The great difficulties always attendant upon efforts to suppress the liquor traffic have been noticed and cited in a number of decisions of this Court. Crane v. Campbell, 245 U. S. 304, 307, 38 S. Ct. 98, 62 L. Ed. 304; Jacob Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U. S. 264, 282, 297, 40 S. Ct. 141, 64 L. Ed. 260; Everard's Breweries v. Day, 265 U. S. 545, 560, 44 S. Ct. 628, 68 L. Ed. 1174; Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U. S. 581, 595, 47 S. Ct. 210, 71 L. Ed. 422, 49 A. L. R. 575. The failure to enforce laws of the States passed to regulate or prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquor was one of the principal reasons for the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment. Violations of such enactments were open and notorious. Connivance and co-operation between officers and offenders frequently existed. Those who drafted and passed the enforcement act knew that national prohibition would be assailed by influences more powerful than those that had embarrassed earlier and less sweeping state laws. Experience had shown that it would not do to leave prohibition enforcement officers free to determine what cases should be prosecuted and what ignored, and that mere imposition of duty to report offenders would not be enough. The infliction of punishment for their intentional violations is an appropriate measure to hold them to the performance of their duties.

The act is comprehensive and discloses a legislative purpose fully to enforce the prohibition declared by the Eighteenth Amendment. National Prohibition Cases, 253 U. S. 350, 40 S. Ct. 486, 64 L. Ed. 946; Corneli v. Moore, 257 U. S. 491, 42 S. Ct. 176, 66 L. Ed. 332; Vigliotti v. Pennsylvania, 258 U. S. 403, 42 S. Ct. 330, 66 L. Ed. 686; Grogan v. Hiram Walker & Sons. 259 U. S. 80, 42 S. Ct. 423, 66 L. Ed. 836, 22 A. L. R. 116; Everard's Breweries v. Day, supra; Lambert v. Yellowley, supra. The forfeitures, fines and imprisonments unquestionably provided for show an intention to compel obedience. Congress was not content to impose duties and merely direct their performance; it diligently provided means for enforcement. An abridged reference to the things denounced as unlawful or expressly forbidden and those by the act commanded to be done will be sufficient to indicate how thoroughly Congress intended to enforce this article. The act prohibits beverages having as much as one-half of one per cent. of alcohol by volume. Section 1 (27 USCA § 1). It declares that no person shall manufacture, sell, barter, transport, import, export, deliver, furnish or possess such liquor except as authorized by the act. Section 3 (27 USCA § 12). Denatured alcohol, medicinal, toilet and other preparations unfit for beverage purposes are not forbidden, if they correspond with the descriptions and limitations specified. Purchase and possession of liquor to make such articles are allowed, but manufacturers are required to procure permits, give bonds, keep records and make reports. Section 4 (27 USCA § 13). No person is allowed without a permit to manufacture, sell, purchase, transport or prescribe liquor, but one may purchase and use it for medicinal purposes when prescribed by a physician. Section 6 (27 USCA § 16). No one but a physician holding a permit may issue a prescription for liquor. And no physician is allowed to prescribe it unless, upon an examination or the best information obtainable, he believes its use as a medicine is necessary and will afford relief from some known ailment. No more than a pint of spirituous liquor shall be prescribed for the same person within ten days, and no prescription shall be filled more than once. Every physician is required to keep a record showing the date of every prescription, the amount prescribed, to whom issued, the purpose or ailment for which it is to be used, the amount and frequency of the dose. No physician may prescribe liquor, and no pharmacist may fill any such prescription, except on blanks furnished by the Commissioner, and pharmacists are required to keep records of prescriptions filled. Sections 7 and 8 (27 USCA §§ 17, 19). No person is allowed to manufacture, purchase for sale, sell or transport liquor without making a permanent record showing prescribed details. Section 10 (27 USCA § 22). Copies of permits to purchase must be preserved by the seller. Section 11 (27 USCA § 23). Manufacturers are required to attach labels showing details concerning liquor made and sold by them. Section 12 (27 USCA § 24). It is unlawful for any person to procure the transportation of liquor without giving the carrier notice of the character of the shipment. No carrier is permitted to transport and no person may receive liquor from a carrier unless there is shown upon the package specified information as to consignor and consignee, and also the number of the permit allowing the transportation. Section 14 (27 USCA § 26). It is unlawful for any consignee to receive or any carrier to deliver any liquor in a container on which appears any statement known to be false. Section 15 (27 USCA § 27). It is unlawful to advertise liquor or to permit a sign advertising it to remain on one's premises (section 17 (27 USCA § 29)), or to advertise or to possess for sale any utensil, substance or recipe intended for use in its unlawful manufacture (section 18 (27 USCA § 30)), or to give any information as to how liquor may be obtained in violation of law (...

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