Donnelly Garment Co. v. International LGW Union, 2924.

• Decision Date: 13 August 1937
• Docket Number: No. 2924.,2924.
• Parties: DONNELLY GARMENT CO. et al. v. INTERNATIONAL LADIES' GARMENT WORKERS' UNION et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri

20 F. Supp. 767

DONNELLY GARMENT CO. et al. v. INTERNATIONAL LADIES' GARMENT WORKERS' UNION et al.

No. 2924.

District Court, W. D. Missouri, W. D.

August 13, 1937.

Reed & Ingraham and Hogsett, Murray, Trippe & Depping, all of Kansas City, Mo., for plaintiffs.

Frank P. Walsh and Jerome Walsh, both of Kansas City, Mo., for defendant International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union.

Clif Langsdale and Charles V. Garnett, both of Kansas City, Mo., for various defendants.

OTIS, District Judge.

Certain of the defendants have moved to dismiss the bill and for dissolution of the restraining order which heretofore has been issued. The motion to dismiss admits for present purposes the facts alleged by plaintiffs. The statement of facts which follows is formulated from the allegations in the bill. It would be quite unfair, of course, to intimate that the moving defendants admit finally the truth of the facts alleged.

One of the plaintiffs, the Donnelly Garment Company, manufactures ladies' garments and sells its products throughout the United States. In its factory in Kansas City it gives employment to hundreds of individuals. Between them, the employees, and the Donnelly Company, the employer, there is no controversy. Between them there is no dispute of any kind touching wages, hours of labor, working conditions in the factory, or any other subject. The employees are organized. They call their organization the Donnelly Garment Workers Union. Every employee is a member of this union. This union has asked and it has received from the company full recognition as the agency of the employees for collective bargaining.

The Donnelly Garment Workers Union has no connection with a certain unincorporated association known as the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union. That association has 250,000 members. The moving defendants are agents or members of that association. The officers of the International and also the defendants would compel the employees of the Company to affiliate with the International and would compel then recognition of the International by the Company. To accomplish these results against the will both of the Company and its employees the officers of the International and the moving defendants have declared and now are engaged in waging war against the Company. They have gathered a fund of a quarter of a million dollars to finance that war and already they have begun the struggle. Unless the white flag is run up they propose to destroy the Company's business. To that end they have circulated false reports concerning the Company, have threatened the Company's customers so as to induce them to discontinue buying the Company's products, and have threatened to organize gangs of lawless men, who will prevent by intimidation and force the operation of the Company's factory.

Such is the controversy between the Company and its employees on the one side and defendants on the other. The Company has appealed to the law of the land through this court of equity. Answering that appeal, it is asserted by defendants that, although a court of equity once had the power to protect the owner of a business in such a situation as that described, no longer does it have that power; Congress has taken that power away, for this is a "labor dispute"; in a "labor dispute" a court of equity, practically speaking, is powerless; in such a controversy Congress has done its utmost to render impotent the nation's courts.

1. Whether the controversy here is a "labor dispute" within the meaning of that phrase as used in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 et seq., title 29, U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (29 U.S.C.A. § 101 et seq.), undoubtedly is the prime question presented. When it has been shown to be a "labor dispute," defendants' contention may not have been indisputably established, but certainly it will have been far advanced.

The provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act which chiefly concern us are these:

Section 1 (title 29, U.S.C. § 101 29 U. S.C.A. § 101). "No court of the United States * * * shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, except in a strict conformity with the provisions of this chapter."

Section 4 (title 29, U.S.C. § 104 29 U.S.C.A. § 104). "No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts."

Section 7 (title 29, U.S.C. § 107 29 U. S.C.A. § 107). "No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue a temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, as herein defined, except after hearing the testimony of witnesses in open court * * * and except after findings of fact by the court, to the effect —"

Section 13 (title 29, U.S.C. § 113 29 U.S.C.A. § 113). "When used in this chapter, and for the purposes of this chapter —

"(a) A case shall be held to involve or to grow out of a labor dispute when the case involves persons who are engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation; or have direct or indirect interests therein; or who are employees of the same employer; or who are members of the same or an affiliated organization of employers or employees; whether such dispute is (1) between one or more employers or associations of employers; and one or more employees or associations of employees; (2) between one or more employers or associations of employers and one or more employers or associations of employers; or (3) between one or more employees or associations of employees and one or more employees or associations of employees; or when the case involves any conflicting or competing interests in a `labor dispute' (as hereinafter defined) of `persons participating or interested' therein (as hereinafter defined).

"(b) A person or association shall be held to be a person participating or interested in a labor dispute if relief is sought against him or it, and if he or it is engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation in which such dispute occurs, or has a direct or indirect interest therein, or is a member, officer, or agent of any association composed in whole or in part of employers or employees engaged in such industry, trade, craft, or occupation.

"(c) The term `labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee."

That what ordinarily would be understood by the phrase "labor dispute" greatly is enlarged by the statutory definition in section 13 (29 U.S.C.A. § 113) at least seems apparent. Except for that definition, no one would conceive there is a "labor dispute" when employer and employees in a given business enterprise are in perfect accord, with no disagreement between them, merely because outsiders, some of whom may be engaged in the same kind of production, conspire to destroy the given enterprise. Certainly, as generally understood, a labor dispute is a dispute between an employer and his employees about wages or hours or working conditions or who shall speak for the employees, a dispute about that which is a possible subject of dispute between employers and employed, between those who alone could be concerned directly in such a controversy. Except for the statutory definition, no one would think of a controversy between A and B, competing owners of factories, as to what wages A should pay his employees, as a "labor dispute," so that, if B hires outlaws to dynamite A's factory unless he raises wages, A cannot have an injunction from a court of equity. Except for the definition, no one would think of a dispute between A and a group of unemployed demanding that he employ them, although he does not need them, as a labor dispute, so that they could not be enjoined from trespassing on A's property. But the statutory definition does appear to enlarge the natural meaning of the phrase.

There is such a mass of confusing verbiage in section 13 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act (29 U.S.C.A. § 113), purporting to define terms, that it is only possible to hope to arrive at the meaning intended¹ if the act is broken up and separated into its several elements as we now attempt to do. We have:

"A case shall be held to involve or to grow out of a `labor dispute' — "1. When the case involves persons who are interested in the same industry, trade, craft or occupation.

"2. Or (when the case involves persons who) have direct or indirect interests therein (i. e., in the same industry, trade, craft or occupation).

"3. Or (when the case involves persons) who are employees of the same employer.

"4. Or (when the case involves persons) who are members of the same or an affiliated organization of employers or employees —

"Whether such dispute (i. e. 1, 2, 3 or 4) is

"1. Between one or more employers or associations of employers and one or more employees or associations of employees.

"2. Between one or more employers or associations of employers and one or more employers or associations of employers.

"3. Between one or more employees or associations of employees and one or more employees or associations of employees.

"4. Or when the case involves any conflicting or competing interest in a `labor dispute' (as hereinafter defined — i. e. in subdivision (c)) of `persons participating or interested' therein (as hereinafter defined)."

"A person or association shall be held to be a person participating or interested in a labor dispute—

"1. if relief is...