Donnelly Garment Co. v. Keitel

• Decision Date: 11 March 1946
• Docket Number: 39549
• Citation: 193 S.W.2d 577,354 Mo. 1138
• Parties: Donnelly Garment Company, Appellant, v. Elmer John Keitel et al., as Members of the Unemployment Compensation Commission, and Gloria A. Bosler
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

193 S.W.2d 577

354 Mo. 1138

Donnelly Garment Company, Appellant, v. Elmer John Keitel et al., as Members of the Unemployment Compensation Commission, and Gloria A. Bosler

No. 39549

Supreme Court of Missouri

March 11, 1946

Rehearing Denied April 8, 1946.

Appeal from Cole Circuit Court; Hon. Edward T. Eversole Judge.

Reversed and remanded (with directions).

Robt. J. Ingraham, Maurice M. Milligan, Burr S. Stottle and Reed, Ingraham & Milligan for appellant.

(1) The court erred in affirming the decision of the Unemployment Compensation Commission awarding benefits to claimant because such award is contrary to the letter and spirit of the Unemployment Compensation Act in that the Act does not contemplate the payment of unemployment benefits to persons who have suitable employment available to them but refuse without good cause to accept it, as claimant did here. Secs 9422, 9430(a), 9430(b), 9431(d), R.S. 1939; Laws 1941, p. 566; Haynes v. Unemployment Comp. Comm., 353 Mo. 540, 183 S.W.2d 77; Commonwealth v. Liveright, 161 A. 697. (2) Claimant Bosler having voluntarily quit her employment with appellant and having refused (without good cause) to accept suitable work offered her by appellant and having told appellant she did not desire to work for appellant she thereby waived the reoffer each week thereafter of reemployment by appellant and was disqualified to receive benefits not only for the week in which such re-employment was actually offered to and refused by her but for each succeeding week, under the provisions of Section 9431I(d). Sec. 9431I(d), Laws 1941, pp. 610-611; McDaniels v. Cutburth, 270 S.W. 353; Smith v. Means, 170 Mo.App. 158, 155 S.W. 454; Deichmann v. Deichmann, 49 Mo. 107; Kinsella v. Kinsella, 60 S.W.2d 747; Eberle v. Koplar, 85 S.W.2d 919; Finley v. Wells, 14 S.W.2d 475; Leesburg State Bank & Trust Co. v. Merchants Bank, 142 S.W.2d 94. (3) Under the circumstances aforesaid, claimant was not "available for work" and hence not eligible to receive any benefits, under the provisions of Section 9430(c) of the Act. Sec. 9430(c), Laws 1941, p. 608; Haynes v. Unemployment Comp. Comm., 353 Mo. 540, 183 S.W.2d 77; Wolpers v. Unemployment Comp. Comm., 353 Mo. 1067, 186 S.W.2d 440; W.T. Grant Co. v. Board of Review of Unemployment Comp. Comm., 29 A.2d 858; Board of Review v. Midcontinent Petroleum Corp., 141 P.2d 69; Miles v. South Carolina Unemployment Comp. Comm., 28 S.E.2d 535; Dept. of Labor, etc., v. Unemployment Comp. Board, 35 A.2d 739. (4) The burden of proof was upon claimant to establish her right to benefits and she has failed to sustain that burden. The decision of the Commission and the judgment of the court are not supported by the findings of the Commission or by substantial evidence but are contrary to the evidence and the findings, and the court erred in affirming the decision of the Commission. Haynes v. Unemployment Comp. Comm., 353 Mo. 540, 183 S.W.2d 77; Wolpers v. Unemployment Comp. Comm., 353 Mo. 1067, 186 S.W.2d 440; S. S. Kresge v. Unemployment Comp. Comm., 349 Mo. 590, 162 S.W.2d 838.

Michael J. Carroll, Chief Counsel, and John F. Sloan, Assistant Counsel, for respondents.

(1) The decision of the Commission was in accord with the letter, spirit and the express provisions of the Unemployment Compensation Act of Missouri. Haynes v. Unemployment Comp. Comm., 183 S.W.2d 77, 353 Mo. 540; In re Costello's Estate, 92 S.W.2d 723, 338 Mo. 673; Klein v. Hughes, 173 S.W.2d 877, 351 Mo. 651; Whitcomb Hotel Co., Inc., v. California Employment Comm., 151 P.2d 233, 24 Cal.2d 753. (2) In an appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Compensation Commission the findings of fact made by the Commission are conclusive upon the court if there is substantial evidence to support them, and in determining the sufficiency of such evidence it must be considered in the light most favorable to the findings of the Commission. Sec. 9432B, R.S. 1939, as amended 1941; Atkisson v. Murphy, 179 S.W.2d 27, 352 Mo. 644; Trianon Hotel Co. v. Keitel, 169 S.W.2d 891, 350 Mo. 1041; Haynes v. Unemployment Comp. Comm., 183 S.W.2d 77, 353 Mo. 540; Boynton Cab Co. v. Henry Giese, 296 N.W. 630, 237 Wis. 237; Clapper v. Larkin, 123 S.W.2d 27, 343 Mo. 710; Krisman v. Murphy, 171 S.W.2d 575, 351 Mo. 18. (3) An unemployed individual who meets the eligibility requirements set out in the Unemployment Compensation Law can only be denied benefits to the extent authorized under the disqualification provisions prescribed by Section 9431 of the Unemployment Compensation Law and the burden of proof to show conditions of disqualification in a proceeding of this kind under the Unemployment Compensation Law is upon the employer as it is he who asserts the affirmative of that issue. Secs. 9430, 9431, R.S. 1939, as amended 1941; Cape Girardeau Sand Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm., 184 S.W.2d 605, 353 Mo. 828; S.S. Kresge Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm., 162 S.W.2d 838, 349 Mo. 590. (4) The Unemployment Compensation Law is remedial legislation and is required to be liberally construed in favor of the payment of benefits to unemployed individuals who are eligible therefor so as to provide security against unemployment. Sec. 9422, R.S. 1939, as amended 1941; Haynes v. Unemployment Comp. Comm., 183 S.W.2d 77, 353 Mo. 540; Zehender & Factor, Inc., v. Murphy, 53 N.E.2d 944, 386 Ill. 258; Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 81 L.Ed. 1245, 57 S.Ct. 868, 109 A.L.R. 1327; Godsol v. Michigan Unemployment Comp. Comm., 5 N.W.2d 519, 302 Mich. 652; Waterbury Savings Bank v. Danaher, 20 A.2d 455, 128 Conn. 78.

Bradley, C. Dalton and Van Osdol, CC., concur.

OPINION

BRADLEY

Gloria A. Bosler, claimant, was awarded unemployment benefits by the unemployment compensation commission. This award was affirmed by the circuit court, and the employer appealed.

The commission found the facts as follows Claimant, for several years prior to August, 1940, was employed by appellant as a presser. In August, 1940, she became separated from her employment because of illness. October 21, 1940, she returned to the employer's premises and indicated that she might not be able to continue her employment, requested and was granted a leave of absence from November 1, 1940, to March 3, 1941. Late in November, 1940, she returned to work, but after a few days was again separated from her work because of illness. Upon expiration of the leave of absence, March 3, 1941, claimant did not return to work and appellant then placed her on the extra list until May 1, 1941, "when, claimant having indicated her intention not to return to work, even though her physical condition would permit reemployment, was removed from the extra list." During the period of claimant's employment at appellant's plant, she was a member of the union at that plant.

June 18, 1941, claimant secured work with Markay, Inc., a Kansas City employer, and worked there under a permit issued by another union. Her employment continued at Markay's until July 3, 1941, when she was laid off for lack of work. She filed for benefits July 9, 1941. August 13, 1941, appellant offered her work of the same type and at the same pay she received in her former employment with appellant. She refused to accept this offer of work, "stating that since she would be required to join the union at the employer's establishment as a condition of employment, her acceptance would result in her loss of standing as a member or permit holder under the jurisdiction of the" union at Markay's.

Specifically, the commission found: (1) That claimant left her work March 3, 1941, without good cause; (2) that her failure to return to work at the expiration of the leave of absence was a voluntary leaving; (3) that she was not required to resign from a bona fide labor organization as a condition of accepting the offer of work tendered by appellant; and (4) that claimant, on August 13, 1941, "refused without good cause to accept suitable work when offered her by the employer (appellant) by whom she was formerly employed."

Ella M. Hyde, appellant's employment manager, interrogated by Mr. Hoegen, an appeals referee, testified: "Gloria (claimant) became ill last spring (1941) with malaria and was off about eight weeks. During that time she drew benefit insurance and came in and told our nurses that she did not intend to return to work and therefore did not care to draw further benefits. A little later, in the fall, about the latter part of November (1940), we became busy and I called Gloria to come back and help us during the busy season. She came over three days and reported she did not feel well enough to work, at which time she left. I had never tried to contact her after that until I heard through this office (August 12, 1941) that she was looking for employment, and per Mrs. Fuller's suggestion, I called the girl and I could have used her very, very nicely. We were quite busy in that department. . . . Q. And it was after that (claimant's employment at Markay's) an offer was made to her about August 13th (1941) to return to work? A. Yes, sir. Q. At that time there was work available at the Donnelly Garment Company for her? A. Yes, sir. . . . Q. Did you ever refuse her employment? A. No. Q. If you had had knowledge that she wanted employment at the time, before she filed a claim with this commission, would you have been willing to have given her this same work? A. Yes, I would have -- would have been glad to have. Q. And you are now willing to give her that work? A. Yes, sir." Claimant did not testify.

Under the facts found, the decision of the commission was "Claimant is disqualified for the week of March 3, 1941, for having left her work voluntarily and without good cause. Claimant is further disqualified for the week beginning August 13, 1941,...