Donnelly v. Meskill, Civ. No. 15103
| Citation | 345 F. Supp. 962 |
| Decision Date | 18 July 1972 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 15103,15109. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | Harold F. DONNELLY et al., Plaintiffs, v. Thomas J. MESKILL, Governor of the State of Connecticut, et al., Defendants, J. Brian Gaffney et al., Intervenors. Christopher G. LINDSAY et al., Plaintiffs, v. Thomas J. MESKILL, Governor of the State of Connecticut et al., Defendants, J. Brian Gaffney et al., Intervenors. |
Francis J. McCarthy, Hartford, Conn., for Harold F. Donnelly and others.
Alan Neigher, Bridgeport, Conn., for Christopher G. Lindsay and others.
Robert K. Killian, Atty. Gen., Raymond J. Cannon and Barney Lapp, Asst. Attys. Gen., of counsel), for defendants.
Richard R. Stewart, Hartford, Conn., for Intervenor J. Brian Gaffney.
James A. Wade, Hartford, Conn. and Robert Satter, Satter, Fleischmann & Sherbacow, Hartford, Conn., for Intervenor John M. Bailey.
Joseph Adinolfi, Jr., Adinolfi, O'Brien & Hays, Hartford, Conn., for Intervenor William R. Cotter.
W. Paul Flynn, Kopkind & Flynn, New Haven, Conn., for Intervenor Robert N. Giaimo.
S. William Bromson, Windsor Locks, Conn., for Intervenor Ella T. Grasso.
Francis B. Feeley, Feeley, Elliott & Nichols, Waterbury, Conn., for Intervenor John S. Monagan.
Before SMITH, Circuit Judge, BLUMENFELD and ZAMPANO, District Judges.
These two cases, attacking the constitutionality of the present Congressional district boundaries in Connecticut, arise under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, Article VI, Clause 2 of the Constitution (the Supremacy Clause) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. Jurisdiction is conferred by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(3) and 1343(4). Plaintiffs seek temporary and permanent injunctions restraining the officers of the state from holding elections in accordance with the present districting statute, Conn.Gen.Stats. § 9-9, Public Act 2 § 1 (1964), and for further delineation of the rights of the parties.
A three-judge district court was appointed on June 14, 1972 to hear and determine the cases pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284.
The cases were assigned for hearing June 19, 1972. All parties to the actions as brought were represented and additional parties consisting of the present Connecticut members of the U.S. House of Representatives and the respective state chairmen of the Republican and Democratic parties were permitted as individuals to intervene. The court requested the filing of proposed plans of reapportionment and set the cases down for hearing on June 28, 1972. A number of plans were submitted and all parties were given an opportunity to present evidence and argue the suitability of the various plans submitted, as well as of the existing apportionment. Counsel for intervenors Bailey and Gaffney requested that no court action be taken on the plan until after Friday, July 7, 1972 to permit an attempt by the two major political parties to work out a solution of the problem without court action.
It was conceded by all parties, and the court finds, that the present apportionment fails to meet present constitutional requirements of equal representation of the citizens and voters of Connecticut.1
It has been obvious, of course, since the 1970 census results became known, that reapportionment is necessary.2 This is in the normal course a matter for the legislative process. An apportionment bill was passed by the legislature in Public Act 807, which was vetoed by the Governor, apparently because of its alleged political effects as well as the extent of its deviation from absolute numerical equality in population of the districts. Further efforts to solve the problem legislatively have so far been of no avail and finally the present actions were brought and this three-judge district court appointed, as stated above, on June 14, 1972.
With the election in November and nominations to be completed, the time for action is short. The parties to the actions and their counsel have acted with commendable expedition once the actions were filed and have cooperated in presenting to the court for action a number of possible alternatives, including temporary retention of the existing districts, adoption of the plan of Public Act 807, modification of Public Act 807 to minimize population deviations, a plan for absolute equality, cutting some town lines, a plan for near absolute equality without cutting town lines regardless of the geography or compactness of the districts and other plans largely built around existing districts.
Three of these plans come close to perfect equality.
The three plans submitted which have minimal population deviations are:
Exhibit D-1 — without cutting town lines, maximum deviation
(submitted by 106 or 0.02%. (One district runs from
counsel for Bridgeport, Stratford and Milford on Long
plaintiffs Island Sound to Salisbury in the Northwest
in the corner of the state). The districts generally
Donnelly lack compactness. The shapes of the districts
action) are irregular to the point of being bizarre
Exhibit Gaf-1 — has no deviation. It cuts Bridgeport, a major
(submitted by city, population 156,542; Watertown, population
counsel for 18,610; West Hartford, population
intervenor 68,031; Manchester, population 47,994; and
Gaffney) Cheshire, population 19,051
Exhibit B-1 — has a maximum deviation of 200 or 0.04%
(submitted by It cuts Newtown, population 16,942; Somers
counsel for population 6,893; Clinton, population 10,267
intervenor Portland, population 8,812; and Westport,
Bailey) population 27,414.
The population variations between these three plans are small, both numerically and percentagewise, ranging from 1 to 200 people maximum deviation between the largest and smallest districts and from 0% to 0.04%, quite possibly within the margins of probable error inherent in the census data. D-1 has an administrative advantage in not cutting town lines. Gaf-1 and B-1 have an advantage in compactness over D-1. B-1 has the added advantage that it is basically the plan adopted by the legislature,3 and advocated by the Lindsay plaintiffs and intervenor Cotter, adjusted, however, to the more refined census data now available to reduce the population deviation from a maximum deviation of 4383 people or .866% between the largest and smallest districts set up by Public Act 807 to a maximum deviation of 200 people or 0.04% between the largest and smallest districts of the plan submitted as Exhibit B-1.
Intervenor Giaimo submitted evidence as to coverage of communications media, a consideration, of course, arguing for compactness of districts to bring about ease and economy not only in political campaigning but also in communication of ideas between representative and constituent.
The plaintiffs in the Lindsay action, and intervenor Cotter argue that Public Act 807 is close enough to numerical equality so that the court should adopt it, in view of the difficulty of setting up new election machinery if towns are to be cut.
The numerical disparities in that plan if not modified, involving an apparent maximum total deviation from largest to smallest district of 4383, as well as in the Giaimo and Monagan plans involving an apparent maximum total deviation from largest to smallest district in the Giaimo plan of 3361 and in the Monagan plan an apparent maximum of 5513, appear too large to be justified by any consideration urged upon us.4
There is no reason obvious to us which would prevent the prompt implementation of the plan B-1 if approved, following the general outline of Public Act 807, but reducing population variation to 0.04% and calling for the division of only five relatively smaller communities.
The legislative adoption of Public Act 807 tips the scales in favor of the plan in Exhibit B-1, which provides districts essentially as outlined by the legislature, with adjustments necessary to bring about virtually complete population equality.
If time permitted extended hearings before the court or extended consideration by a court-appointed...
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Carstens v. Lamm
...has deferred to the legislature, they cite White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 93 S.Ct. 2348, 37 L.Ed.2d 335 (1973) and Donnelly v. Meskill, 345 F.Supp. 962 (D.Conn.1972). These cases fail to support Carstens' In White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 93 S.Ct. 2348, 37 L.Ed.2d 335 (1973), the Supreme Co......
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Karcher v. Daggett
...aff'd mem., 456 U.S. 966, 102 S.Ct. 2228, 72 L.Ed.2d 841 (1982); O'Sullivan v. Brier, 540 F.Supp. 1200 (D Kan.1982); Donnelly v. Meskill, 345 F.Supp. 962 (D Conn.1972); David v. Cahill, 342 F.Supp. 463 (DNJ 1972); Skolnick v. State Electoral Board of Illinois, 336 F.Supp. 839 (ND 7. See gen......
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O'SULLIVAN v. Brier, 82-1335
...having failed to enact a new redistricting plan, our powers are broad. We may adopt in whole a proposed plan, see Donnelly v. Meskill, 345 F.Supp. 962 (D.Conn.1972); Dunnell v. Austin, 344 F.Supp. 210 (E.D. Mich.1972); David v. Cahill, 342 F.Supp. 463 (D.N.J.1972); Skolnick v. State Elector......