Donnelly v. St. John's Mercy Medical Center
| Decision Date | 19 June 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:08-CV-347 CAS.,4:08-CV-347 CAS. |
| Citation | 635 F.Supp.2d 970 |
| Parties | Lacquinita DONNELLY, Plaintiff, v. ST. JOHN'S MERCY MEDICAL CENTER, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
Lacquinita Donnelly, Potosi, MO, pro se.
Christopher M. Sanders, Lowenbaum Partnership, L.L.C., St. Louis, MO, for Defendants.
This is an action by a pro se plaintiff, Lacquinita Donnelly, against her employer, St. John's Mercy Medical Center ("St. John's"), under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq. ("ADA"). The complaint alleges that in December 2006 plaintiff was assigned to an area of the hospital which was under construction. Plaintiff alleges that her assignment near the construction area caused her "illness to exacerbate, leading to increase[d] absenteeism," and she requested the reasonable accommodation of an assignment away from the construction area, but the accommodation was denied until March 24, 2007.
This case is before the Court on defendant St. John's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff opposes the motion and it is fully briefed. For the following reasons, the Court will grant the motion for summary judgment. Also pending is plaintiff's Memorandum for Clerk, which the Court will construe as a motion to compel and that will be denied.
The standards applicable to summary judgment motions are well settled. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), a court may grant a motion for summary judgment if all of the information before the court shows "there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
The initial burden is placed on the moving party. City of Mt. Pleasant, Iowa v. Associated Elec. Co-op., Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 273 (8th Cir.1988) (). Once this burden is discharged, if the record shows that no genuine dispute exists, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party who must set forth affirmative evidence and specific facts showing there is a genuine dispute on a material factual issue. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
Once the burden shifts, the non-moving party may not rest on the allegations in his pleadings, but by affidavit and other evidence must set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Herring v. Canada Life Assur. Co., 207 F.3d 1026, 1029 (8th Cir.2000); Allen v. Entergy Corp., 181 F.3d 902, 904 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1063, 120 S.Ct. 618, 145 L.Ed.2d 512 (1999). The non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is "genuine" only "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Herring, 207 F.3d at 1029 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). A party resisting summary judgment has the burden to designate the specific facts that create a triable question of fact. See Crossley v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 355 F.3d 1112, 1114 (8th Cir.2004). Self-serving, conclusory statements without support are not sufficient to defeat summary judgment. See Conolly v. Clark, 457 F.3d 872, 876 (8th Cir.2006).
1. Plaintiff instituted this action by filing
a pro se Employment Discrimination Complaint alleging St. John's discriminated, harassed and retaliated against her in violation of the ADA. (See Complaint; PD 8).2
2. Plaintiff's asserted disability in this matter is asthma. (PD 79).
3. When asked at deposition about the nature of her claims in this lawsuit, plaintiff testified as follows:
Q. Okay. So in this lawsuit, tell me what the nature of your claims are.
A. That St. John's failed to go by the Americans with Disabilities Act and because of my asthma, they have harassed and retaliated against me.
Q. So when they—When you say they didn't comply with the ADA, what do you mean by that? Is that the—
A. They haven't—did not provide me with a safe environment that would keep me from having my asthma exacerbated. (PD 91-2).
4. As a remedy for the alleged wrongdoing, plaintiff is seeking the following monetary damages:
i. Compensation for increased medical costs due to her asthma;
ii. Back pay for days she missed as a result of her asthma getting worse from working at St. John's; and iii. Compensation for her emotional distress caused by St. John's. (See Complaint, PD 272-76).
5. With respect to her claim of discrimination, plaintiff claims St. John's failed to accommodate her request to be assigned to an area of the Intensive Care Unit ("ICU") that was not under or near construction. (Complaint, ¶ 12; PD 92).
6. Plaintiff claims the assignment to areas of the ICU under or near construction exacerbated her asthma symptoms. (PD 80).
7. Plaintiff also claims St. John's discriminated against her by issuing her discipline on December 16, 2007 for violating St. John's Absenteeism and Tardiness Policy. (PD 106-07).
8. Plaintiff further claims St. John's discriminated against her by making comments about her honesty and failure to help co-workers in her 2006 Annual Appraisal. (PD 263).
9. Plaintiff also claims St. John's discriminated against her by issuing her discipline in October 2007 for inappropriate behavior. (PD 97).
10. With regard to her harassment claim, plaintiff claims the October 2007 discipline for inappropriate behavior also constituted harassment. (PD 116).
11. Plaintiff also claims she was harassed when she did not receive a direct deposit and paycheck stub for the pay period ending September 28, 2007. (PD 111, 121).
12. Plaintiff further alleges she was subjected to the following derogatory comments made by co-workers related to her asthma:
i. On January 29, 2007, Chris Carnahan, a RN, asked plaintiff if she was faking another respiratory distress when plaintiff was having problems breathing. Another employee, Eric Allen, checked plaintiff's lungs and said she sounded tight. (PD 115-16, 282).
ii. On February 4, 2007, Shelly Donnelley asked Katie Kraus whether she ever felt discriminated against. Ms. Donnelley was looking at an employee bulletin board with pictures and talking to Ms. Kraus. Plaintiff felt like the comment was directed at her. (PD 113-14, 283).
iii. Plaintiff did not inform management about these comments. (PD 116).
iv. St. John's had no knowledge of the comments made by Kraus or Donnelley. (Dodson Aff., ¶ 10).
13. With respect to her retaliation claim, plaintiff asserts that the same things that she asserts were harassment (see above) were also retaliatory. (PD 123).
14. Plaintiff states the conduct she engaged in for which St. John's purportedly retaliated against her was because (1) she was sick and (2) they did not know quite what to do with her. (PD 123). Plaintiff was asked several times during her deposition what conduct she engaged in that she felt was the reason for the retaliation and her answer was consistently that (1) she was sick, and (2) St. John's did not know how to handle it. (PD 123-24, 290).
15. On December 3, 2007, plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") alleging disability discrimination and retaliation. (Def.'s Ex. LL; PD 234). The Charge of Discrimination was drafted by the EEOC investigator. (PD 234).
16. Plaintiff's Charge of Discrimination did not contain any allegation of harassment. (Def.'s Ex. LL). Plaintiff never amended her Charge of Discrimination to include a claim of harassment.
17. On December 18, 2007, the EEOC issued a Dismissal and Notice of Rights to plaintiff indicating the EEOC was closing its file on the Charge of Discrimination for the following reason: "The EEOC issues the following determination: Based upon its investigation, the EEOC is unable to conclude that the information obtained establishes violations of the statutes." (Def.'s Ex. MM).
18. Plaintiff admits she did not experience any retaliation from St. John's as a result of filing a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC. (PD 159-60).
19. Plaintiff has filed three Workers' Compensation claims covering the same injuries alleged in this lawsuit. (PD 170, 232).
20. On December 20, 2006, plaintiff filed a Workers' Compensation claim alleging she suffered "extreme emotion[al] distress brought about by the harassment about my disability (asthma) in BJ Hipsky['s] office." (PD 248; Def.'s Ex. RR).
21. Plaintiff intends the Workers' Compensation claim to cover the incident in Betty Jean Hipsky's office (explained in detail below) and being assigned to construction areas that had outside air being pumped in (explained in detail below). (PD 248).
22. On January 31, 2007, plaintiff filed another Workers' Compensation claim alleging she suffered the following injury: "Unit 476 under construction, triggering and asthma attack. . . ." (PD 252; Def.'s Ex. TT).
23. Plaintiff intends the second Workers' Compensation claim to cover asthma-related injuries she suffered between December 20, 2006 and January 31, 2007. (PD 252-53).
24. Both the December 20, 2006 and January 31, 2007 Workers' Compensation claims are still pending and were recently consolidated by the Workers' Compensation Judge. (PD 249, 253).
25. On December 17, 2008, p...
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