Donoghue v. Smith

• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: BANKS, J.
• Citation: Donoghue v. Smith, 114 Conn. 64, 157 A. 415 (Conn. 1931)
• Decision Date: 15 December 1931
• Parties: DONOGHUE v. SMITH et al.

157 A. 415

114 Conn. 64

DONOGHUE v. SMITH et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

December 15, 1931

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas. New Haven County; Miles F McNiff, Deputy Judge.

Action by Ethel A. Donoghue against J. Francis Smith and another to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of defendants. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal.

No error.

Michael V. Blansfield, of Waterbury, for appellants.

William K. Lawlor, of Waterbury, for appellee.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HAINES, HINMAN, BANKS, and AVERY JJ.

BANKS J.

The plaintiff suffered injuries resulting from a collision between an automobile in which she was riding and one owned by the defendant Smith and operated by the defendant Farrington. The verdict of the jury awarded her damages in the sum of $9,000, and the defendants appeal from the denial of their motion to set the verdict aside as contrary to the evidence and excessive, and also assign error in the rulings on evidence and the charge of the court.

The rulings complained of were, with one exception, those which overruled the defendant's objection to testimony offered by the plaintiff. The finding, to which alone we can refer, does not contain the answers to the questions objected to, and we are therefore unable to determine whether the admission of the evidence was prejudicial to the defendants. The remaining ruling to which exception is taken sustained an objection to the testimony of a physician as to the contents of a hospital record, which was itself already in evidence, and was clearly correct.

The complaint alleged that the plaintiff had received very severe and serious injuries from which she would suffer for a long period of time to come, and the plaintiff offered evidence that she had suffered injuries of such character, and also that she had an injury to her heart which would permanently incapacitate her. The court charged the jury that, if they found in her favor they might award the plaintiff damages to compensate her for such pain and suffering and physical impairment and incapacity as it was reasonably probable that she would suffer in the future. No evidence was offered as to the plaintiff's life expectancy. The defendants claim that the court erred in permitting the jury to award the plaintiff compensation for future pain and suffering and incapacity, since, in the absence of evidence of her life expectancy, they had no measure by which they could reasonably compute the length of time of her future suffering and incapacity. As to injuries which will cause the plaintiff pain and suffering in the future, but which are not permanent, it is obvious that the plaintiff's expectancy of life is not the measure of the duration of the pain and suffering, since it is not claimed that they will continue to the end of life. As to such injuries, the medical and other testimony as to the nature of the injuries and the probable duration of the suffering therefrom furnishes the jury a sufficient basis for an award of compensation. In the case of permanent incapacity or impairment, mortality tables are commonly used to assist the jury in estimating the expectancy of life of the plaintiff and thus determining the period of the probable duration of such incapacity. Such tables only give the average of a large number of lives, and in the individual case the expectancy may be higher or lower than the average. While generally held admissible, they are not conclusive, nor are they the exclusive evidence admissible in proof of that fact, which the jury may determine from other evidence, such as the age, health, habits, and physical condition of the plaintiff. Sterling v. Union Carbide Co., 142 Mich. 284, 105 N.W. 755; Deisen v. Ry. Co., 43 Minn. 454, 45 N.W. 864; Amos v. Delaware River Ferry Co., 228 Pa. 362, 77 A. 12; 17. Corpus Juris, p. 875, § 181, p. 1036, § 331. In Jackiewicz v. United Illuminating Co., 106 Conn. 302, 138 A. 147, we held that the probable duration of the...