Donohue v. Pohlman
| Decision Date | 22 January 2013 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION No. 11-1982 |
| Parties | WILLIAM DONOHUE, Plaintiff v. JAMES POHLMAN, et al., Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
Before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants, Jack Stephens (the "Sheriff"), in his official capacity as Sheriff of St. Bernard Parish, Louisiana,1 and Deputy Brad Alfonso ("Alfonso") (together, "Defendants").2 Plaintiff, William Donohue ("Plaintiff"), opposes Defendants' motion.3 Defendants raise several arguments in their motion, including the argument that they are entitled to qualified immunity. This order addresses only Defendants' contention that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Defendants' remaining arguments will be addressed by separate order. For the following reasons, the Court finds that Alfonso is entitled to qualified immunity and GRANTS the motion as to Alfonso. The Court further finds that the Sheriff is not entitled to qualifiedimmunity and DENIES the motion as to the Sheriff.
On Saturday, August 14, 2010, Plaintiff was incarcerated as a federal detainee at the St. Bernard Parish Jail (the "Jail"), a facility operated and controlled by the St. Bernard Parish Sheriff's Office.4 The Jail has two windowless isolation cells and three main wings: A Wing, B Wing and C Wing.5 A Wing and C Wing are identical. Each wing has a central control booth ("A Wing Control Booth" and "C Wing Control Booth") and four tiers - two of which are large tiers designed to house 32 inmates and two of which are small tiers designed to house 14 inmates. One deputy staffs the A Wing Control Booth and one deputy staffs the C Wing Control Booth. The C Wing Control Booth is elevated several feet and has windows on all sides. The C Wing Control Booth deputy is responsible for monitoring the activities of the inmates in the four surrounding tiers.6 In order to view all of the tiers, a deputy must "spin around."7 Closed-circuit surveillance cameras record the ongoing activities in the A Wing and C Wing tiers, but television monitors displaying video feeds from these cameras are not located in the A Wing Control Booth or C Wing Control Booth.8 Rather, these monitors are located in B Wing's control booth, which is designated as themain control booth ("Main Control").9 Each tier in A Wing and C Wing has a buzzer system (the "Simplex system") which allows inmates to communicate with the deputy stationed in A Wing Control Booth or C Wing Control Booth, respectively. The Simplex system also allows the control booth deputy to speak back to the inmates.10
B Wing comprises a 16-person disciplinary tier, which houses inmates in cells, and four dormitory-style tiers.11 One deputy in Main Control monitors the inmates in B Wing.12 The Main Control deputy also must monitor the screens displaying the surveillance feeds from A Wing and C Wing, and operate the doors throughout the Jail.13
On Saturday, August 14, 2010, Plaintiff was housed in tier C-4 - one of the small tiers devoted to federal detainees - located in the C Wing.14 C-4 consists of seven 2-man cells which open onto a common area containing two picnic-style tables.15 From 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m, inmates are locked in their cells.16 Outside of those hours, inmates in C-4 may use the common area.17 Alfonso, who at all times was acting under color of state law andwithin the course and scope of his employment, was on duty in the C Wing Control Booth on the afternoon of August 14.18 Jail policy required Alfonso to conduct thorough visual security checks every fifteen minutes.19 To conduct a visual security check, Alfonso "would actually take a walk around the booth, look through the glass into each tier and inspect any aspect of the inmates['] . . . living abilities [sic] to make sure everything is the way it is supposed to be."20 Alfonso conducted security checks at 4:46 p.m., 5:00 p.m., 5:14 p.m., and 5:29 p.m on August 14.21 During that period, another deputy was in tier C-3 cutting inmates' hair.22 At approximately 5:19 p.m., between Alfonso's 5:14 p.m. and 5:29 p.m. security checks, another inmate, Kendall Wilson, approached Plaintiff in the C-4 common area and demanded Plaintiff's opinion regarding the controversial proposal to build a mosque in New York City, New York, near the site of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack.23 Plaintiff stated he believed the mosque was a bad idea.24 In response, Kendall Wilson spat on him.25 Plaintiff, upset at being spat upon, approached Kendall Wilson, whothen "sucker punched" Plaintiff.26 Thereafter, Ricky Wilson, a relative of Kendall Wilson, joined in the altercation.27 The Wilsons beat Plaintiff for approximately twenty seconds.28 At some point Plaintiff lost consciousness.29 Plaintiff suffered facial trauma, facial lacerations (right eyebrow and lip), a nasal fracture, two broken teeth, and a left distal fibular fracture.30
Plaintiff regained consciousness at 5:22 p.m.31 He attempted to contact Alfonso in the C Wing Control Booth by banging on the tier's glass windows and using the Simplex system.32 However, the Simplex system was not functioning properly.33 Alfonso testified at his deposition that he did not hear or see Plaintiff attempting to contact him.34 Alfonso also testified that, as part of his official duties, he was not responsible for verifying that the Simplex system was operating properly before he started his shift and, as a result, he was not aware that it was malfunctioning on the date Plaintiff was attacked.35 Plaintiff retreatedfrom the C-4 common room to his cell at 5:23 p.m.36 Consequently, when Alfonso conducted his 5:29 p.m. security check, Donohue was no longer in the C-4 common room where Alfonso could easily see him.37 No evidence in the record indicates whether the deputy in Main Control saw the fight on the video monitors.
Corporal Brandon Lewis ("Lewis") entered Plaintiff's tier to conduct a "feed up" (i.e., to feed the inmates) at 5:57 p.m.38 Lewis observed Plaintiff's injuries and immediately contacted Alfonso to notify him of Plaintiff's condition.39 Alfonso then contacted the booking desk and his sergeant to inform them that Plaintiff needed medical assistance.40 Plaintiff was removed from C Wing at 6:02 p.m. and provided first-aid.41 An Acadian EMS unit arrived at the Jail to evaluate Plaintiff, render medical treatment, and transfer Plaintiff to Interim LSU Public Hospital.42 Hospital staff and Jail staff provided medical care to Plaintiff over the next several months.43
Thereafter, Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking relief for the alleged constitutional violations that occurred during his incarceration at the Jail. First, Plaintiff alleges that the Sheriff, in his official capacity as the policymaker and final decision-maker for the Jail, operated the Jail with a policy, practice or custom of deliberately understaffing Plaintiff's tier on weekend days, thereby failing to provide adequate manpower to prevent and to respond to inmate-on-inmate violence, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiff also asserts a failure to protect claim and failure to respond claim against Alfonso in his individual capacity. Second, Plaintiff alleges that the Sheriff in his official capacity, pursuant to policy, practice or custom, failed to provide adequate medical attention to Plaintiff in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Third, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants' actions constitute negligence pursuant to Article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code. Fourth, Plaintiff alleges that the Sheriff is liable for Plaintiff's claims under the theory of respondeat superior of Louisiana law.
Defendants have moved for summary judgment, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the actions described in the recitation of the material facts of this case, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, do not rise to the level of constitutional torts such that he is entitled to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition, Defendants have moved for summary judgment that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Finally, because they argue that Plaintiff cannot succeed on his federal causes of action, Defendants urge the Court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims. Defendants do not address the merits of Plaintiff's state law claims.
Summary judgment is appropriate only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
If the dispositive issue is one on which the moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party "must come forward with evidence which would 'entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.' " Int'l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1263-64 (5th Cir. 1991). If the moving party fails to carry this burden, the motion must be denied. If the moving party successfully carries this burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Id. at 322-23. Once the burden has shifted, the non-moving party must direct the Court's attention to something in the pleadings or other evidence in the record that sets forth specific facts sufficient to establish that a genuine issue of material fact does indeed exist. Id. at 324. The non-moving party cannot simply rely on allegations or blanket denials of the moving party's pleadings as a means of establishing a genuine issue of material fact, but instead must identify specific...
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