Donohue v. Shedrick

• Decision Date: 02 March 1877
• Citation: 46 Md. 226
• Parties: GEORGE W. DONOHUE v. JOHN T. SHEDRICK.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

46 Md. 226

GEORGE W. DONOHUE v. JOHN T. SHEDRICK.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

March 2, 1877

APPEAL from the Court of Common Pleas.

The appeal in this case is taken by the defendant below from the rulings of the Court below, (GAREY, J.,) upon several bills of exceptions, the nature of each of which is stated in the opinion of the Court.

The jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff, and judgment was entered accordingly. The defendant appealed.

The cause was argued before BARTOL, C.J., STEWART, BRENT, GRASON MILLER and ALVEY, J.

O F. Bump, for the appellant.

E B. Bates, for the appellee.

GRASON J., delivered the opinion of the Court.

This was a suit brought by the appellee, a bricklayer, against the owner of certain buildings in Baltimore City, to recover a balance alleged to be due him for laying the bricks, and this appeal was taken for the purpose of having reviewed the rulings of the Court of Common Pleas of Baltimore City, upon points of evidence raised during the trial, and in which rulings it is alleged that there is error. The amount involved in the suit is very trifling, and the points raised in the several exceptions are very plain, and we have no difficulty in disposing of them.

First Exception.--This exception was taken to the admission of the testimony of a measurer, to prove that he had measured the buildings in question by a rule adopted by the trade in the City of Baltimore, which had been tested and found to be correct, and that by the measurement so made the buildings contained two hundred and three thousand, eight hundred and fifty-four bricks. It was contended by the appellant's counsel that, as it was shown that the bricks were of unequal size, a correct estimate of the number in the houses could not be ascertained by the rule of measurement adopted and practiced by the trade. The evidence was certainly admissible, but it was the province of the jury alone to weigh it and give such effect to it as they might think it entitled to, and there was no error in admitting it.

Second Exception.--After the evidence as set out in the first exception had been given, and after the signing and sealing of that exception the measurer was cross-examined, and then the counsel for the appellant requested the Court to incorporate in the first bill of exceptions, the evidence given by the witness upon his cross-examination, and upon the Court's refusal to incorporate it, this exception was taken to the refusal. What the witness proved upon his cross-examination, did in nowise affect the admissibility of his evidence in chief, or change the principles of law governing its admissibility. The only possible effect of the proof of the witness upon his cross-examination, was to weaken the force of his proof upon his examination-in-chief; and for this purpose the appellant had the full benefit of it before the jury. The Court below therefore, very properly refused to insert in the first bill of exceptions, the proof given after that bill of exceptions was signed and sealed.

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