Donovan v. Miller

• Decision Date: 03 November 1906
• Citation: 12 Idaho 600,88 P. 82
• Parties: J. J. DONOVAN et al., Appellants, v. A. R. MILLER et al., Respondents
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

88 P. 82

12 Idaho 600

J. J. DONOVAN et al., Appellants, v. A. R. MILLER et al., Respondents

Supreme Court of Idaho

November 3, 1906

ENJOINING AND RESTRAINING ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENT-NEGLIGENCE, MISTAKE AND UNSKILLFULNESS OF ATTORNEYS-NEGLECT TO PLEAD DEFENSES-PERJURY-DISCOVERY OF-REASONABLE DILIGENCE.

1. A court of equity will not grant an injunction to restrain the enforcement of a judgment at law on the grounds of want of consideration or that the contract sued on is against public policy, where the defendant, through negligence of his attorneys, fails to set up such defenses.

2. Where a defendant fails to interpose all of his defenses in the trial court and judgment goes against him, a court of equity will not restrain enforcement of such judgment on the ground of the failure or negligence of his attorneys to interpose such defenses.

3. Courts will not relieve against a judgment in an independent suit for mere mistakes at law.

4. The erroneous advice of an attorney is not such a mistake as will entitle a party to relief from a judgment.

5. A court of equity will not restrain the enforcement of a judgment at law on the ground of perjury or fraud in obtaining it, unless such fraud is extrinsic or collateral to the question examined and determined in the action.

(Syllabus by the court.)

APPEAL from the District Court of the First Judicial District for Kootenai County. Hon. Ralph T. Morgan, Judge.

Action to restrain the enforcement of a judgment at law. Judgment on demurrer for the defendants. Affirmed.

Demurrer sustained. Costs of appeal awarded to the respondents.

Charles L. Heitman, for Appellants.

It must be conceded, under the allegations of the complaint, taken as confessed by the demurrer, that the judgment which respondent Miller obtained against appellants, the enforcement and collection of which is sought to be permanently enjoined and to be vacated and set aside, was obtained by fraud on the part of respondent Miller.

A judgment is subject to attack by original bill for fraud even after judgment in the appellate court. (Kingsbury v Buckner, 134 U.S. 650, 33 L.Ed. 1047, 10 S.Ct. 638.)

The complaint shows (1) that appellants had a cause of action and lost it; (2) that such loss occurred because they were prevented from presenting their defense, or having it properly considered, either through fraud, accident, or mistake, and other sufficient grounds justifying the interposition of equity; (3) that unless they secure relief in equity, they will be without adequate remedy. (Little Rock Co. v. Well, 61 Ark. 354, 54 Am. St. Rep. 216, and note, 33 S.W. 1057, 30 L. R. A. 560.)

In the case at bar appellants were prevented from presenting their defense by the mistake or the negligence of their attorneys. They were prevented from having their defense properly considered by the fraud and perjury on behalf of respondent Miller. (Erie R. R. Co. v. Ramsey, 45 N.Y. 637; Story's Equity Jurisprudence, secs. 875, 884.)

Courts of law are not to be used by parties in perfecting, through the forms of law, the ruin of a party who has employed a negligent or unworthy attorney. (People v. Mayor, 11 Abb. Pr. 66.)

The attempt of appellants to make their defense proved unavailing through fraud, accident and mistake, which are sufficient grounds to induce the action of a court of equity. (Burton v. Hynson, 14 Ark. 32; Parnell v Hahn, 61 Cal. 131; Preston v. Ricketts, 91 Mo. 320, 2 S.W. 793; St. Louis v. Schulenberg etc. Co., 98 Mo. 613, 12 S.W. 248; Curtis v. Cesne, 1 Ohio 432; Winpenny v. Winpenny, 92 Pa. 440; Bias v. Vickers, 27 W.Va. 456; Hendrickson v. Hinkley, 17 How. 443, 15 L.Ed. 123.)

Edwin McBee, for Respondents.

"Courts of equity will only interfere to enjoin a judgment at law rendered against a party by reason of fraud or accident, unmixed with any fault or negligence of himself or his agents." (Phelps v. Peabody, 7 Cal. 50.)

An injunction will not be sustained to stay proceedings under a judgment obtained by neglect of a party or counsel where, if the neglect were excusable, full relief might have been had on motion in the original action. (Borland v. Thornton, 12 Cal. 440.)

Where a party moves for a new trial and fails, he cannot, on the same facts, go into equity and enjoin the judgment rendered. (Collins v. Butler, 14 Cal. 223.)

A judgment cannot be attached on account of material of which a defendant might have availed himself in the original action, when there is no proof of fraud or surprise. (Weir v. Vail, 65 Cal. 466, 4 P. 422.) A judgment at law will be set aside on the ground of fraud only when the fraud was practiced in the act of obtaining the judgment, and the party against whom it was rendered and his counsel are free from negligence. (Zellerbach v. Allenberg, 67 Cal. 296. 7 P. 908; Ede v. Hazen, 61 Cal. 360.)

"Perjured testimony procured by bribery on the part of the successful party is not ground for setting aside a decree, although there is a reasonable certainty that the result of a new trial would be different." (Pico v. Cohn, 91 Cal. 129, 25 Am. St. Rep. 159, 25 P. 971, 27 P. 537, 13 L. R. A. 336.)

A judgment will not be vacated for perjury where one of the defendants in an action on a promissory note falsely testified that he signed as surety only. (McDougal v. Walling, 21 Wash. 478, 75 Am. St. Rep. 849, 58 P. 669.) A judgment will not be set aside on an original bill on the ground that it was founded upon a fraudulent intendment or perjured evidence when there were no hindrances besides the negligence of the defendants in presenting the defense in the first suit. (Brooks v. O'Haro, 8 F. 529, 2 McCrary, 644.)

"The frauds of which a bill to set aside a judgment or a decree between the same parties, rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, will be sustained, are those which are intrinsic or collateral to the matter tried, and not a fraud which was in issue in the former suit." (United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 25 L.Ed. 93.)

An injunction will not be granted against a judgment on account of misconduct of counsel, where the remedy at law by a motion to vacate the judgment would have afforded relief. (Cowley v. Northern P. R. R. Co., 46 F. 325.) Ignorance or mismanagement of the case by the attorney will not authorize relief by injunction against a judgment at law. (Winchester v. Grosvenor, 48 Ill. 517; Lowe v. Hamilton, 132 Ind. 406, 31 N.E. 1117; Mouser v. Harmon, 96 Ky. 591, 29 S.W. 448.) The mistake of an attorney in pleading will not authorize an injunction against the judgment. (Green v. Robinson, 5 How. (Miss.) 80; Hambrick v. Crawford, 55 Ga. 335; Owens v. Ranstead, 22 Ill. 161; United States Bank v. Daniel, 12 Pet. (37 U.S.) 32, 9 L.Ed. 989.) The general rule is that parties are not entitled to relief from a judgment entered against them on account of the negligence of their counsel. (Jones v. Vane, 11 Idaho 353, 83 P. 110; Haight v. Green, 19 Cal. 118; Smith v. Tunsted, 56 Cal. 175: Quinn v. Wetherbee, 41 Cal. 247; Mulholland v. Hindman, 19 Cal. 605; Ekel v. Swift, 47 Cal. 619.) It is well settled that equity will not relieve against a judgment at law on account of any ignorance, unskillfulness or mistake of the party's attorney (unless caused by the opposite party), nor for counsel's negligence or inattention. The fault in such cases is attributed to the party himself. (1 Black on Judgments, sec. 375.)

SULLIVAN, J. Stockslager, C. J., and Ailshie, J., concur.

OPINION

SULLIVAN, J.

This suit in equity was brought to restrain and enjoin the collection of a certain judgment in the case of Miller v. Donovan et al., 11 Idaho 545, 83 P. 608. Reference is here made to the facts of that case as stated in the opinion, and we shall not repeat them here. It is sufficient to say that this suit was brought to restrain and enjoin the collection of the judgment entered in that case, and is based on the following grounds alleged in the complaint, to wit: 1. That there was a total want of consideration for the contract for the purchase of the sawlogs mentioned in the complaint in the original action, for the reasons that no part of said logs were ever delivered, and that said logs were seized by agents of the United States government under the claim that they were cut in violation of the laws of Congress upon the public domain. 2. That the attorneys of the defendants in that action, who are appellants here, by their negligence and unskillfulness or by reason of their reliance upon certain decisions of courts of last resort, neglected and failed to frame the answer of the appellants to the complaint in that action in such skillful and comprehensive manner as would enable them on the trial of the case to properly present their several defenses, and that such neglect and unskillfulness was committed in opposition to the positive instructions of appellants, and that it would be contrary to good conscience and to justice to make appellants suffer by reason of such neglect and unskillfulness. It is also alleged that the evidence in that case on behalf of this respondent was false, fraudulent and perjured in certain particulars which are set out in the complaint, and the prayer was that the respondent be restrained and enjoined from collecting that judgment. A general demurrer was interposed to the complaint and sustained by the court. A general demurrer admits the facts properly pleaded. Then the question for decision is: Does the complaint state a cause of action?

Counsel for appellants bases his claim for equitable relief upon three grounds, to wit: 1. Want of consideration for the contract sued on and that it is against public policy; 2. The negligence and unskillfulness of the attorneys for appellant in the original suit; and 3. False testimony given on the...