Donovan v. Shenandoah Baptist Church

Decision Date03 October 1983
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 78-0115.
Citation573 F. Supp. 320
PartiesRaymond J. DONOVAN, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Plaintiffs, v. SHENANDOAH BAPTIST CHURCH, a religious association, operating as Roanoke Valley Christian School, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia

Marshall H. Harris, Regional Sol., U.S. Dept. of Labor, Philadelphia, Pa., Paul R. Thomson, Jr., U.S. Atty., Roanoke, Va., Leroy D. Clark, General Counsel, William L. Robinson, Associate General Counsel, Mollie W. Neal, Reg. Atty., EEOC, Baltimore, Md., for plaintiffs.

Donald W. Huffman, Bird, Kinder & Huffman, Roanoke, Va., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

TURK, Chief Judge.

Plaintiffs, United States Secretary of Labor and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, have brought this action for injunctive relief to remedy alleged violations of the minimum wage and equal pay provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, 206(a), 206(d) (hereafter "the FLSA" or "the Act"), and for restitution of back wages allegedly wrongfully withheld in violation of those provisions.1 Defendant, Shenandoah Baptist Church, is an unincorporated religious association which operates a preschool, an elementary school and a secondary school, known collectively as the Roanoke Valley Christian School.

The Secretary of Labor, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, has moved for summary judgment in his favor asserting that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of defendant's minimum wage liability. This motion involves only the wages of certain non-professional employees of defendant's school. The EEOC, which is involved in the equal pay dispute surrounding defendant's professional employees (teachers and administrators), has not moved for summary judgment at this time on the equal pay issue.

Defendant, since the inception of this suit, has defended its payment practices on two grounds. First, it asserts that the FLSA does not apply to church-operated schools in general. Second, it argues that as applied, the FLSA violates its rights secured by the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.

As there are no genuine issues of material fact the Secretary's motion is ripe for determination at the present time. For the reasons given below the court concludes that: 1) the FLSA's minimum wage provisions apply to church-operated schools; and 2) requiring defendant to comply with these provisions in its role as an employer of non-exempt school employees would violate neither the Establishment Clause nor the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.

FACTS

The parties have stipulated the following facts: Defendant Shenandoah Baptist Church is an unincorporated religious association with an office and place of business in Roanoke, Virginia. The Church operates on its premises a preschool, elementary school, junior high school and high school that are known collectively as the Roanoke Valley Christian School. In operating the school, defendant employs persons as teachers, bus drivers, kitchen workers, and day care center workers. These employees regularly handle and work on goods and materials manufactured or produced outside the Commonwealth of Virginia.

The minimum wage prescribed by the FLSA during the calendar years in question, and the amounts defendant allegedly paid its non-exempt employees during those years is as follows:

                            MINIMUM
                  YEAR      WAGE      LOWEST RATES PAID
                  1976       $2.30           $2.20
                  1977       $2.30           $2.20
                  1978       $2.65           $2.33 to $2.65
                  1979       $2.90           $2.35 to $2.90
                  1980       $3.10           $2.35 to $3.10
                  1981       $3.35           $2.50 to $3.35
                  1982       $3.35           $2.65 to $3.35
                

APPLICABILITY OF THE FLSA'S MINIMUM WAGE PROVISIONS TO CHURCH-OPERATED SCHOOLS

In various briefs filed in this action defendant has asserted that the educational activities of the Church, specifically its operation of the Roanoke Valley Christian School, are exempt from the FLSA's minimum wage provisions. Defendant suggests that such a conclusion is compelled by a reading of N.L.R.B. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 99 S.Ct. 1313, 59 L.Ed.2d 533 (1979), wherein the Court held that schools operated by a church to teach both religious and secular subjects are not within the jurisdiction granted by the National Labor Relations Act. In Catholic Bishop the Court stated that where there is a significant risk that exercise of the NLRB's jurisdiction would infringe on the church's First Amendment rights, there must be a showing of a clear, affirmative expression of congressional intent to bring the church-operated school's teachers within the Board's jurisdiction. 440 U.S. at 504, 99 S.Ct. at 1320. Given the absence of such a clear expression of Congress' intent, the Court found it unnecessary to resolve the defendant's First Amendment claims. Id. at 507, 99 S.Ct. at 1322. Thus, applying Catholic Bishop to the case at bar defendant submits that this court can enter judgment in its favor without consideration of its First Amendment claims should it find that there is no clear, affirmative expression of congressional intent to have the FLSA's minimum wage provisions apply to church-operated schools.

Recognizing that requiring defendant to comply with the federal minimum wage laws may pose serious constitutional questions, it is incumbent on the court to first decide whether Congress clearly and affirmatively intended to include church-operated schools within the Act's coverage. After a careful reading of the Act and its legislative history the court concludes that Congress clearly intended the Act's minimum wage provisions to apply to church-operated schools.

Section 3(s)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(5), the applicable coverage section, reads in pertinent part:

(s) "Enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce" means an enterprise which has employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or employees handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods or materials that have been moved in or produced for commerce by any person and which—* * *
(5) is engaged in the operation of * * * a preschool, elementary or secondary school * * * (regardless of whether or not such * * * school is public or private or operated for profit or not for profit); * * *

29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(5) (emphasis supplied). The highlighted portion of this coverage section reveals an obvious congressional intent to require church-operated schools to pay their non-exempt employees the prescribed minimum wage. Since church-operated schools are private and generally not operated for profit they clearly fall within the literal terms of Section 3(s)(5).

Two federal district courts have also recently decided that church-operated or affiliated preschools are not exempt from the Act's minimum wage provisions. Donovan v. Central Baptist Church, 25 BNA Wage and Hour Cas. 815, 816 (S.D.Tex. 1982);2 Marshall v. First Baptist Church, 82 CCH La.Cas. ¶ 33,548, 23 BNA Wage and Hour Cas. 386 (D.S.C.1977).

In addition, there is authoritative legislative history demonstrating that Congress knowingly included church-operated educational institutions under the coverage provisions of the Act.

In 1966 Congress amended the FLSA by extending coverage to public and private schools. As originally proposed in the House, H.R. 13712, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1966), would have extended coverage to public and private institutions of higher education, whether operated for profit or not, but would have kept elementary and secondary schools outside of the Act's scope. During House floor debate on the bill Congressman Collier of Nebraska proposed an amendment to expand the definition of a covered "enterprise" to include elementary and secondary schools as well as institutions of higher education. 112 Cong.Rec. 11371 (1966). Explaining the purpose of his amendment, Representative Collier stated that these schools were to be brought within the Act's coverage as a means of achieving "equity," by ensuring universal application of the Act to all educational institutions. Id.

During this House debate the question of whether the proposed amendment would extend coverage to church-run schools was raised. Congressman Pucinski of Illinois specifically asked whether nuns working in a parochial elementary school's cafeteria would have to be paid the minimum wage. Id. Congressman Collier replied that nuns would not be covered. Id. Congressman Burton of California clarified that response by stating that the amendments would not bring members of a "religious order" under the Act's definition of an "employee," and thus "a minimum wage would not be required to be paid a nun." Id. It is therefore apparent that while nuns or other members of a "religious order" would continue outside the Act's definition of an "employee," the amendment was intended to bring church-operated schools within the Act's definition of a covered "enterprise." Congressman Collier's amendment to H.R. 13712 was proposed to, and passed by, the House the same day, May 25, 1966.

H.R. 13712 was then considered by the Senate Committee on Education and Public Welfare where it was amended, in part, by deleting public and private elementary and secondary schools from the statutory definition of "enterprise." This action was taken because of concern about the possible financial impact an increase in wages might have on local public school systems and because no committee hearings had been held on extending coverage to elementary and secondary schools. S.Rep. No. 1487, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in 1966 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 3002, 3010.

The full Senate passed the Committee's amendment on August 26, 1966. The Senate amendment and H.R. 13712 were then...

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  • EEOC v. Tree of Life Christian Schools, C-2-85-1771.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio
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    ...Baptist Church, "would `create an exception capable of swallowing up the rule,'" id. at 1397 (quoting Donovan v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 573 F.Supp. 320, 323 (W.D.Va.1983)), which would be contrary to the fact that the term "employee" in section 203(e) was given "the broadest definition ......
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    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • 23 Abril 1985
    ...Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 458-459, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1169-1170, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958). But cf. Donovan v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 573 F.Supp. 320, 325-326 (WD Va.1983). 27 Petitioners point to the following testimony by two associates deemed representative by the District Cou......
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    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia
    • 7 Febrero 1989
    ...Shenandoah to pay employees other than teachers or administrators at least the statutory minimum amount. Donovan v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 573 F.Supp. 320 (W.D.Va.1983). In so holding, the court ruled that Shenandoah could not assert the First Amendment rights of its school employees, w......
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    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • 5 Abril 1990
    ...court entered partial summary judgment in favor of the government on the minimum wage claim. 4 Donovan v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 573 F.Supp. 320 (W.D.Va.1983) (Shenandoah I ). The court concluded that Congress intended the Act to apply to church-run schools, that Shenandoah's nonprofess......
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